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ABSTRACT
NATURE, FREEDOM, AND ASSERTION
: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONSOF ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM
SEPTEMBER 1990
LOUIS E
.
HOWE, B.A., THE EVERGREEN STATE COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by Professor Nicholas Xenos
The dissertation explores a postulate common to both Max Weber and
Hans Blumenberg that modern organizations gain their intense
motivational power from the anxieties created in the modern era by the
disenchantment of nature and the death of God. The doctrine of
omnipotence gave rise to a modern theodicy problem, experienced as an
anxiety that the conditions of goodness must henseforth be self-
consciously created by the self-assertion of large associations of
interdependent people. This self-conscious forsaking of omnipotence
carries with it a high price. In the work of Immanuel Kant natural law
ethics and economics are no longer available and our associations tend
to be bureaucratic.
The dissertation follows the thought of both practical reformers
and philosophers in developing this characterization of modern
organization. What emerges, alongside their positive accounts of the
relation between freedom and organization, is a darker picture of
profound anxiety and melanoholy. Particularly instructive is Kant's
interpretive text on Cain and Able in which modern people are identified
with the brother who murders. Kant's insights are followed by those of
Soren Kierkegaard, Rene Girard, Elton Mayo, Martin Heidegger, Michel
Foucault, and others to explicate the structure of mimetic desire as it
operates in modern large-scale organizations. These intense mimetic
structures do not mean that freedom in large organizations is a myth,
but it does mean that the self-conscious assertion of freedom involves a
profound spiritual struggle which can result as easily in demonia as in
release. Thus the final chapter employs a Weberean typology to show how
freedom in its various organizational guises has so far remained elusive
while the champions of freedom have tried to embody it in ever more
inclusive organizational structures.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores a postulate common both to Max Weber
and to Hans Blumenberg that modern organizational life is a response to
and accommodation with the disenchantment of nature, or, in another
vocabulary, the death of God. I will not so much test this postulate as
discuss what it actually means; I will explore it, deepen it, and
specify it more closely.
What Weber, emphasizing its negative aspect, calls disenchantment,
Hans Blumenberg, striking a positive note, calls self-assertion. This
will become clear in Chapter IV. Blumenberg was referring to
Heidegger's infamous Rectoral Address, and wished to counter some of the
more destructive directions which the doctrine of self-assertion had
recently taken, but without for all that giving up on it. Blumenberg
especially rejected the notion that modernity needed, through self-
assertion, to be ruthlessly destroyed. He argues, first of all, that
nothing could be more modern than self-assertion, so that it is a poor
tool for defeating modernity. But he argues further that self-assertion
is not an optional stance in the world, but follows directly from
western civilization's long meditation over the problem of theodicy; how
is it that bad things happen to good people, and inversely, how is it
that good things happen to bad people? From Blumenberg and Weber we can
learn that the modern quest for freedom is deeply rooted in this
1
2question of theodicy. What I wish to understand is how freedom and
theodicy have become implicated in the modern large-scale organization
and how that entanglement has worked to frustrate our aspirations for
both justice and freedom.
This raises clusters of themes which I will explore below. I have
anchored these themes in two poles: in the phenomenon of organization
and in the later works of Immanuel Kant. These two work in the
dissertation as recurring foci, orienting the other themes. But they
also take on different persona depending upon the context within which
they come up. m the context of civil service reform they seem
straight-forward and benign, in a context of organizational pathology
they appear sinister, and in a context of philosophical rigor they seem
profound. I believe that organization is the way disenchantment or the
death of God is actually experienced, and that our experience is
ambiguous on this score. I found that this theme comes up and is made
especially clear in the works of Immanuel Kant.
Through the focus on organization it became difficult to discuss
any one theme without discussing the rest. Kant reinforces the concern
with both assertion and with organization, but then further introduces
the themes of freedom and anxiety, and through them, returns again to
the problem of theodicy. Kant also introduces, through his focus on
Cain and Able, the concern with mimetic desire and collective murder and
he shows how these things are connected to self-assertion, freedom, and
progress. with these the.es on the table, the work of Soren
Kierkegaard, Rene Girard, and Elton Mayo all become themes, and they in
turn call forth the work of Blumenberg, Heidegger, and Michel Foucault
.
Each of these thinkers, in turn, implicate Immanuel Kant and especially
his relation to objects. The experience of organization is first of all
an experience about the modern relation to objects, but also the
experience of organizing people in such a way that they can experience
this relation properly. what I am trying to understand is why the quest
for freedom can so often come down to this search for the truth of
objects and of ourselves.
In the first chapter I study a number of American organizational
reformers and strategies and their links to the Protestant religious
problematic, especially the problems surrounding the question of
theodicy. This chapter, while remaining at a fairly pragmatic level,
introduces a number of Kantian themes which call for a more rigorous
formulation. Thus in the second chapter I study the works of Immanuel
Kant, especially Kant's Critique of Tel enl ocrica 1 Jnrtgmpni- and his very
revealing interpretive text on Cain and Able. Kant understood as well
as anyone that nature had become disenchanted, and how and in what sense
this situation called for something like modern self-assertion. It is
my contention that Kant's doctrine of freedom makes no sense without the
profound ambiguity he uncovered in the Genesis story and the melancholy
he experienced over the French Revolution.
4Having articulated Kant's pure theory of a free self-assertion and
its relation to organization, in the third chapter I look to Soren
Kierkegaard and the humanistic management movement for insights into the
pathological potentialities of modern organizations. I briefly compare
the religious interpretive mode which I prefer with a secular
Aristotelian mode to show why I find mine superior.
The forth chapter overtly addresses the discussions of Hans
Blumenberg in order to put pressure on the critical presuppositions of
the previous three chapters. In Blumenberg the disenchantment of nature
is specified more closely as the history of the doctrine of omnipotence.
Once this history is spelled out, argues Blumenberg, one will see that
self-assertion in the modern age is a legitimate attempt to assert human
goodness against the empty echo of omnipotence. While the point is well
taken and appreciated, the discussion of pathological organization makes
it impossible to simply endorse the modern era, even when one speaks of
potential rather than imperative progress. I therefore engage
Blumenberg with two other texts, one by Martin Heidegger and one by
Michel Foucault, in order to put pressure on his optimism.
The last chapter pays tribute to a recently retired political
theorist, Donald Mcintosh. Using Mcintosh's discussions of Max Weber, I
review in ideal typical terms the organizational strategies put forward
in the first and third chapters. Each organizational move, I believe,
was an attempt to locate freedom and goodness together and to give them
5simultaneous organizational expression. Eac h successive attempt to do
this articulated the point of moral freedom in a more inclusive
collective entity; the church, the individual, the college, the
profession, the corporation, and the state. Mcintosh's work helps us
understand, much as Hegel's truth comes finally to that which it always
already was, how modern organization always depended on the charisma of
weaponry, and finally on nuclear weaponry.
Finally, an earlier reader of the third and fifth chapters has
complained that there is nothing here except textual exegesis and little
contribution of my own. My method of interpretation is defensive as
opposed to offensive. That is, in many sports one defends against the
opposing offense by being assigned a "man." One stays with one's man,
locked in. It raises the intensity; one loses oneself in the play.
Here I try to stay with a thinker, to follow a thought, and to lose
myself within it. Thus I seldom lay out a thinker's position and then
reply. The purpose was to ask questions whose answers I really would
like to know. I would have to admit that I got something less than
answers from this study and from my own interpretive techniques. But I
have gained a deeper insight into my own questions.
CHAPTER I
NATURE
,
FREEDOM, AND ORGANIZATION IN 19th CENTURY AMERICA
—Introdiir.t i on
In this chapter I will explore the problem of nature, freedom, and
organization in a preliminary way by offering an interpretation of three
texts: Perry Miller's Nature's Nation, the speeches and letters of the
Land Grant College advocate, Jonathan Baldwin Turner, and the speeches
and letters of the Civil Service reformer, George William Curtis. The
first section will trace what Max Weber called the disenchantment of
nature as it occurred in Miller's version of American Puritanism, the
second and third sections will discuss two possible responses to
disenchantment and their organizational implications. By focusing on
Protestant religious disputes I hope to avoid two pitfalls; first, the
naive view that science, technology, and organization were simply better
ideas whose time had come, or, second, that these things were simply
elitist impositions upon exploited people.
7Faith and Enl ightenmpnf i n Am^ri™
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Americans went
through their own version of Hegel's Faith-Enlightenment dialectic. The
purpose of mentioning it here is not so much to establish the relevance
of continental European thought for American political theory as to
better appreciate how we came to have the organizations that we do.
Hegel's dialectic is quite fair when it deals with faith. Yet somehow
when one reads it, it is hard to escape the impression that faith is a
moment in the history of Enlightenment. Even though the consciousness
which faith possesses is given an internal and completely
phenomenological reading, the story is told from the point of view of
someone who already knows that faith cannot possibly win. This actually
closes off our taking faith seriously. When we look back at the past or
try to construct geneologies of present day organizations, we tend to
look for the rise of Enlightenment structures, and even when we
criticize or deconstruct these structures, it is Enlightenment that we
privilege. Whenever we do this, we judge the history of organizations
more in terms of their future than their past.
But in their own day Enlightenment figures were actually far
outnumbered by people who tried to move according to the dictates of
faith. In fact the premise, so familiar to us, that faith's fate was
already sealed was simply not available to the participants. That is,
faith was not, for its adherents, a historical moment which could not
8sustain itself. Faith rather confronted the participants with a range
of problems, options, and ways of being; out of which they had to create
entire lives. One might, then, ask the questions of Hegel's dialectic
at a more local level and with an eye toward discovering exemplary
figures who experienced the conflicts of faith and enlightenment but are
interesting precisely because they did what world history cannot do,
they lived their lives in a state of unsustainable tensions. We judge
such people much as we do characters in a drama. We ask whether or not
they remained true to their dramatic situation. The obvious point here
is just that people do not live their lives at the level of world
history, the level of the problem of sustaining an entire epoch, but at
the level of sustaining their own best insights, ambitions, plans, and
loves. I will now turn to the problem of freedom and hope.
If in philosophy our modernity begins when representations no
longer mirror their objects, 1 in spiritual things it begins when
estrangement from paradise is no longer a sign of our disability, but
becomes the basis for our systematic activity. It becomes a blessing.
2
Earlier Dante had faced this estrangement but comprehended it as a
temporary blindness; what we see is not fundamentally different from
what we cannot see. Hope--and Christianity must offer hope--resided in
1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
,
Norman Kemp Smith, trans.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A-34/B-50; A-92/B-125--A-95/B-129;
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things
,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973) .
2. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
,
Talcott
Parsons, trans., (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 88. Larry
Peterman, "Machiavelli 1 s Dante and Sources of Machiavellianism" Polity
,
20 (Winter 1988) 254.
9the faith that ultimately our vision would be made complete. Of course,
this means Dante had to be close enough to the Beatific vision to feel
its absense; the threat of its being withheld was a compelling
experience. It was not totally and simply other. But by the time of
the New England Puritans, God had indeed become too radically Other to
support Dante's sort of hope. Human and divine vision were in principle
incommensurable, and the Puritans did not look in this direction for
hope
.
In contrast, the loss of paradise in Milton's Paradise T.osf sets a
different sort of task. The fall from grace opens up opportunities, and
it is these which now constitute hope. There are exertions one might
make, or rather, that one must make if one does not want to abandon
hope. We are placed, Puritans believe, in a wasteland which requires
cultivation and improvement, 3 and this is the conception of nature
through which one best approaches the twin notions of hope and freedom
in religious thought. For the wasteland to be a dynamic and compelling
image for Puritans, it must be, at least in principle, possible for
America to become a paradise. If paradise were not possible then
cultivation and improvement would be a merely futile gesture. But the
inverse is equally true. The possibility of paradise would move no one
unless it were bolstered by our being situated in a wasteland. For the
3. Peter N. Carroll, Puritanism and the Wilderness: The Intellectual
Significance of the New England Frontier 1629-1700 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969), 14.
10
formula to work, success must be rather difficult, yet demonstrably
attainable
.
Two sets of problems need to be mentioned here. The first set
involves spirituality, the second freedom. The formula of cultivation
and improvement sets a specific context for how these things might be
experienced in modernity, while they severely modify our belief in the
formula
.
First, the formula of cultivation and improvement answers a
spiritual insight, yet puts that insight to work in the everyday world
of work. The everyday world is held together by a constellation of
habits and manners, the highest expression of which—habits informed by
spirit—is ethics. But spirituality enters the work-a-day world only at
a great cost to itself. It is always the uncanny guest, an outsider.
It can not really explain itself in ethical or legal terms. 4 It cannot
be contained in ethical categories. It sometimes even becomes a sort of
scandal5 to the world of habits and manners, and it is certainly
possible for habits and manners, including churchgoing, to maintain
4. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling
,
Howard Hong and Edna Hong,
trans
., (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1983). For instance
see p. 115, "Abraham cannot speak, because he cannot say that which
would explain everything (that is, so it is understandable) : that it is
an ordeal such that, please note, the ethical is the temptation."
5. I have borrowed the term scandal from Rene Girard, The Scapegoat
,
Yvonne Freccero, trans. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986)
.
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themselves at the expense of the spirituality which animates them.
6
Thus habits and manners might maintain themselves for some time without,
for all that, constituting a living ethos. m this situation we would
expect manners to resent being reminded of spiritual things; this may be
the case in the late 20th Century United States. But earlier the
problem was less vicious. One suspects that in the early eighteen
hundreds, say, it was more a question of contradictory pressures.
I will mention three instances of such pressure, all of which
could probably plague any religion, but which seem to especially plague
Calvinism and later forms of American Protestantism. First, things done
from spiritual motives can, especially when a religious person
personally benefits, always be interpreted as self-serving. Since the
spiritual defies rational or ethical language, the believer might feel
slandered, but would still be unable to offer a compelling defense. For
the same reason, the world which American Puritans created by
cultivating and improving the wilderness could never be adequate to the
spiritual vision which called it forth. The Christian insight, once
gained, inspired people with an intense and simple vigor, yet, its
success continually unnerved it. The vision seems to be always turning
stale; turning into an array of acquisitive manners through which
spirituality could only penetrate in the form of a recitation of
formulas. American Protestants recognized this problem early on and
6. George W.S. Trow makes this point in a very different context in his
"Annuls of Discourse: The Harvard Black Rock Forest," New Yorker , June
11, 1984, 44.
12
much of the history of American Protestantism involves a series of
strategies designed to meet it.
A third pressure, arising, again, from the same source, is that
the spiritual project of cultivating and improving the American
wilderness actually ruins the wilderness and renders the spiritual
project increasingly difficult. This involves social decadence. In,
say, their clothing people tend to dress for the work at hand. How
everyone dresses to confront a wilderness is usually courser and less
pretentious than the way they dress to confront a commercial world or an
intellectual circle. As colonial life became more sophisticated
hundreds of small nuances in etiquette would reinforce intricate
patterns of social divisions and specialized pleasures. All this would
make the simple and vigorous piety of the early days much more remote.
Already by 1700 the second generation of New England Puritans were
bedeviled by decadent temptations. By 1837 Nathanial Hawthorne's
allegorical "Celestial Railroad" evoked the specter of a streamlined and
easy religiosity through which true pilgrims, like those Bunyan
describes in Pilgrim's Progress
,
might pass only by a heroic, and, the
reader suspects, myopic act of will. But along with decadence, many
Americans were beginning to sense, in the eighteen hundreds especially,
that the lands and forests and rivers were themselves being irrevocably
mauled. This line of thought was troubling; it arises from a spiritual
insight, but throws into question the most cogent available expression
of that same spiritual insight. It thus always manages to sound
13
righteous and even didactically pr0phetic when it is uttered, especially
by abolitionists, but always remains an other voice, usually
romanticism. I will discuss this more below. But this thought was
deeply troubling for another reason. The notion of freedom had become
implicated in a search for happiness within the bounty of the
continent's natural resources. This search was motivated by, and
justified itself as, a spiritual insight. Americans could believe
themselves to be free, I am saying, only so long as their quest for
happiness through cultivation and improvement could be plausibly called
spiritual. They could not maintain their self
-conception as free beings
if they were merely being swept along; the slaves of greed wantonly
destroying the continent.
The second set of problems revolve around the issue of freedom.
For religious thinkers the problem of freedom often presents itself in
one of two forms; the question of the nature of God and the question of
the nature of man. If today we have trouble understanding how
Calvinists could believe in predestination and still consider themselves
free, it is because we think of freedom in terms of the second set of
questions. Before the Great Awakening of 1740, and for most people a
long time after that, virtually all white Americans posed the question
in terms of the first set, what is the nature of God?
If God is all-powerful and all-wise and all-good, then he isn't
the sort of God who would create us unfree, or make nature vastly
14
different from our aspirations and moralities. God's omnipotence is the
guarantee of human freedom. The question of whether people are free or
not is answered by simply saying that they are certainly free enough and
that to have faith is to already believe this. But even though faith
and revelation are the courts of ultimate appeal here for Puritans,
there needed to be some reference to nature. Nature is where one looks
to discover "God in the act of willing, "7 and the early Puritans took
this quite literally. They were supported in this by the older science
of the Renaissance which involved the notion of a chain of being, and
even a sort of prose of the world. There was a space between the dumb
animals and the angels where there ought to exist a free creature like
man, possessed both of reason and will. since everything in the great
chain supports everything else and nothing is superfluous, if God
reated the space for freedom, he must be supposed to have created the
ture of freedom as well. This doesn't mean God is constrained by
is creation, of course. It only means that he is good; as William Ames
put it, "not for want of power, but through abundance of his goodnesse:
that namely he might communicate a certain dignity of working to his
creatures also, and in them make his efficiency more perceivable . "8
Theologically, then, the Puritans turned to nature to be reassured of
God's wisdom and goodness.
9
c
crea
h
7. Perry Miller, The New England Mind, the 17th Century
,
(Npw York:
MacMillan Co., 1939), 224.
8. Ibid., 235.
9. Mark Taylor, "Itenerarium Mentis in Deum: Hegel's Proofs of God's
Existence," in Mark Taylor, Deconstructing Theology
,
(New York:
Crossroad Publishing, 1982)
.
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With the introduction of Bacon's science the formula doesn't
really change, but it does become more vulnerable. Puritans had never
liked miracles and their earlier writings all stressed the regular and
orderly course of nature, encouraging believers to perceive God in the
everyday. After 1685, however, they became more interested in the
unusual. it became more important to demonstrate that nature, as a vast
causal system, was not simply indifferent to human concerns. For
instance, Increase Mather needed to develop a notion of secondary
causes, causes in which God insinuates himself into the natural causal
chain so as to change its direction through completely natural means. 10
Suddenly an earthquake or illness might show up and change the course of
events. Secondary causes are at work when a child of ungodly parents
falls into a well and drowns. God nowhere has to suspend physical laws
to work His will in these events, and we might read off these events,
even in Bacon's or Newton's world, to get a result similar to the
earlier one. "The greatest probability of Success," writes Urion Oaks,
"is ordinarily on the side of Causes that are most sufficient in their
kind of Efficiency. "11 But in this formulation we notice two things.
First the Puritans are very aware that a causal order, as opposed to a
great chain of being, is one laced with radical contingency. There is
no necessary connection between, say, heat and flame anymore. Second,
this formulation puts heavy pressure on the premise that God is all-good
10. Miller (1939), 228-29.
11. Ibid., 235.
16
and all-wise, since the fact that he rules the world in one way rather
than another is itself a completely contingent state of affairs. In
work-a-day practice, of course, the Puritans had displaced the problem
of freedom into diligent activity and industriousness, and faith in
God's goodness into the formula "The Diligent Hand makes Rich, but
Sloth, and Poverty, and Rags and Shame must be expected to go
together. "12 There is a work-a-day equation of success with election.
This means that the equation of piety with freedom is most sustainable
when God's positive lessons outnumber his negative ones, and so long as
obviously greedy people are not routinely rewarded with success. As the
conditions of piety became more difficult, paradoxically through
success, the work-a-day conception of freedom detached itself from its
theological foundations. Of course, work itself remained Americans most
pious activity.
In 1740 and again in 1800, evangelical revivals spread across
America. Immediately a dispute arose over the nature of evangelical
conversions. Was it God's hand, or was it rather the rhetoric and
charisma of the evangelists which moved people to such fits and
convulsions of religious frenzy? The dispute wound up relocating
forever the issue of freedom; away from the question of the nature of
God to the question of the nature of man.
12. Ibid., 232.
17
The older conception could support, as we have seen, a doctrine of
predestination. it also supported a covenant theology, the political
expression of which was theocracy. The duties of the clergy included
reading the natural signs of God's wrath against the commonwealth in
such things as hurricanes, droughts, and diseases, but included also
establishing the legal code by which the commonwealth might best fulfill
the terms of its covenant. This sort of theocratic commonwealth seemed
to work best in the small tightly knit colonies of New England where
religion was actually a way of life shared in common by most people.
Success, while not impossible, was difficult. To have the clergy making
civil law in accordance with religious precepts made a certain amount of
sense in such circumstances. But few Christians in 1800 believed this
arrangement could survive a far reaching and prosperous westward
expansion. 13 In the West religious factions multiplied at an alarming
rate, different geographic sections became bitterly opposed to one
another, and commercial expansion created an economically diverse and
non-equal population. No one Christian denomination could claim to
speak for the conscience of all Christians anymore. 14 No one could
speak with enough authority to constitute a theocracy. Things actually
came to such a pass that when the clergy of one section tried to declare
a day of national atonement and prayer, something which had been fairly
routine for two hundred years, because the Lord had visited a
devastating cholera epidemic on his people, politicians and other
13. Perry Miller, Nature's Nation
,
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1974),
109-10; 116-17.
14. Ibid., 110.
18
clerics actually disputed „hether Qr ^ ^ ^^ ^
were
lame
as had been claimed. 15 Once such interpretations of God's wrath
open to empirical dispute, theocracy had become impossible.
Furthermore, the American Revolution had been fought in the n«
of religious liberty and it is instructive to note that evangelists used
religious liberty to justify themselves against the more orthodox
clergy. Perry Miller relates the following:
...Peter Cartwright once found himself forbidden by a Presbyterian
minister to form a Methodist society within the area of his
church, and to him Cartwright answered, "The people were a freepeople, and lived in a free country, and must and ought to be
allowed to do as they pleased." when the Presbyterian cleric
still endeavored to suppress the Methodists, Cartwright relates
that members of his own congregation objected on the grounds thathe was un-American. "I told them," Cartwright continues, "that myfather had fought in the Revolution to gain our freedom and
liberty of conscience; that I felt that my Presbyterian brotherhad no bill of sale for the people. "16
Much is being said in Cartwright' s reply. Hegel, in his
Faith/Enlightenment dialectic, rests much of his argument upon the
premise that faith had already accepted all of enlightenment's standards
of rationality
. 17 The empirical dispute about the cholera epidemic and
Cartwright ' s almost utilitarian reply to the Presbyterian minister give
us a more local glimpse into how this worked in America. What is being
15. Ibid., 114.
16. Ibid., 87.
17. Jane Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
,
Nature and the
State in a Post-Hegelian Era
,
(New York: New York University Press,
1987), 28. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit
,
A.V. Miller,
trans., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph 564.
19
asserted here, says Perry Miller, is the assumption that "men who had
fought for liberty in the Revolution were the sort of people upon whom
one could evangelize." That is to say, first
, that predestination „„
no longer an operative dootrine. Man's nature was such that he oould be
reached by evangelism and thereby spurred to action in his own behalf.
Further, since authority has collapsed, that no one has any right either
to forbid someone to preach, or to tell Christians not to listen. it
also means that in times of grave spiritual crisis, Christians don't
kneel to pray, nor write fine tracts on theology, they get out and do
something. But especially it means people must be such that they can do
something about their own salvation, and that no one can deny them all
available help in doing so. The new faith, then, upon which both
religion and nationhood rested was this: God gave us this broad and rich
continent in which we were meant to be free and happy. A free people
searching for religious truth and happiness in an extended continent are
bound to splinter into endless bickering factions, but it is exactly
this fragmentation which, says Miller, constituted national unity. 18
Americans could sincerely boast to Europeans that finally there existed
a Christian nation. The trick was that man-centered religion looked not
to the past, to floods, diseases, or hurricanes for inspiration, but
instead to the future; to the promise of future happiness or to the
series of crisis which threatened it. "This people," writes Miller,
"lived not in fear.
. .before a covenanted Jehova, but as a race who go
18. Miller (1974), 117.
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through sorrow, distress, resources in an eostatic assuranoe o£
' happiness 1 "19
But to suggest how much of the Enlightenment has been accepted
here we need only note that evangelism- s self-defense is practically
identical to modern advertising's. Already we see that in a continent
available as resources for spiritual and material happiness, available
for productive work; already people too become available and on call as
means; available to evangelism, available for salvation, and available
for happiness. In the same way modern advertising finds them on-call
and abvailable, and justifies itself with the notion that people need t
hear its messages and no one has the right to tell people not to listen.
Utilitarian logic had won the day.
Americans for a long time were touchy about being criticized as
utilitarians. To their credit most Christian Americans worked to make
sure their works and lives were not merely utilitarian, but inspired
also by spiritual concerns. We might even suppose the nation became
great precisely because so many people kept this issue so straight for
o
s o many years. In the next section I will turn to the thought of one
such American, Jonathan B. Turner,
19. Ibid., 116.
21
On December 31, 1866, Jonathan Baldwin Turner, in a letter to the
editor meant to accompany the text of his speech from the day before,
which the paper was reprinting, wrote that in light of the recent
history of negro emancipation, «I think we may safely conclude that the
Lord has determined that this shall be a Christian continent. At any
rate we are no more competent to take care of Christianity than we are
the solar system or the laws of nature. "20 The last sentence needs
clarification. The dispute here is over who should be in charge of
college education funds in Illinois. There were at the time many small
religious colleges in the U.S., each representing the doctrine of some
one or another religious sect. 21 Congress had recently passed the Land-
Grant College, or Morrill, Act and the discussion was over whether to
divide the proceeds from the act among existing colleges or to found a
wholly new State agricultural and industrial university
. 22 Turner, of
course, had been campaigning for such a university since 1851. The
argument he answers here comes from religious college presidents who
claim that in large secular universities, Christianity will die out.
His counter claim is that free people thinking freely do not need
classically educated scholars to manage the education of their children
20. Mary Turner Carriel, The Life of Jonathan Baldwin Turner
,
(Urbana,
IL: University of minis Press, 1961), 182.
21. Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, The Development of Academic
Freedom in the United States
,
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1955) see Chaters 3 and 6.
22. The 37th Congress, The Congressional Globe
,
32, Part 2, (Feb-Mar
1862), see House Bill 138.
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nor do they require denominational colleges to wet nurse their
Christianity. His argument, to a modern reader, is missing a premise,
which one can infer by thinking about the previous sentence, "the Lord
has determined that this shall be a Christian continent." We know this
because everywhere we look we see that despite our best attempts and
efforts to thwart it, God's divine purpose and design can be seen
realizing itself in our national life. This must not be seen as a
purely utilitarian position. Freedom and Christianity and national life
can almost be synonyms for one another. in fact we learn that
emancipating negroes means that they can finally receive the benefits of
Christianity, which nature would have imparted to them anyway, and
Turner uses the word 'Christianity' here in exactly the grammatical
position where we would probably use the word 'freedom.'
We shut [four millions of colored slaves] out from all light of
the Bible, and from all our schools and literature; we hemmed them
in with fugitive-slave laws, and employed the whole force of our
courts, our army and navy to crush out all the Christianity that
was in them.
.
.
, we leveled against them the entire force of our
arms, our votes, our schools, our literature, our pulpits, and our
prayers; we called on our doctors of divinity...; we even, at
last, forced our brave boys in blue to stand guard over "this kind
of property" and keep Christianity from them at the point of the
bayonet .23
In the main body of the speech he is more explicit
Mr. President, I am sick and tired and disgusted with
hearing about a Christianity that can only be kept in the world in
a bandbox or in the care of a dry-nurse. And I wish here to
affirm that wherever freedom is, there Christianity must be; and
23. Carriel, 181-82.
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wherever Christ is, there freedom^ and ahali be . For
fad ^dLlx^r 1 Y°U t0 d° " S ° — " « ^es
Turner's argument is more interesting than it at first appears to
be. To deny that freedom and Christianity are mutually supportive and
tightly linked, is to deny God's omnipotence. To deny that we are
realizing freedom is to deny that God is wise. The teleological proof
for God's existence is being used against the cosmological proof. 24 In
fact the argument only works if we presume the opponents accepted, and
the college presidents probably all did accept, the cosmological
argument. The cosmological argument states that because everything we
observe is the subject of natural causality, there must be some one
thing which is the cause of all the other causes, the cause of nature
itself which is not itself subject to natural causality. But such a
cause could only be an omnipotent God.
This argument was never considered an adequate substitute for
Biblical revelation, but it was believed to be forceful when confined to
merely secular studies, like physics. Kant had already pointed out that
the argument as it stands does not aid piety since an omnipotent God
might still be an idiot or a despot. While he doesn't mention that
argument here, elsewhere the despotic argument clearly bothered
24. Mark Taylor (1982).
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Turner, 25 and he probably had it in mind
. He doe3 say^ „hen he
IOCS at the natural world he sees not merely a grid of mechanical
oausality, as in Newton's physios, or Xncrease Mather's seoondary
oauses, but evidenoe of a grand and beautiful design, the testation of
Christian freedom. This freedom has been ooming into being despite the
best efforts of religious seots and regional prejudices. One either has
to believe this, or give up believing that one oan infer anything at all
about God from natural events. This wouldn't bother the seotarians
theologioally. They could still oontinue teaohing thoir own individual
accounts of revelation in their own sectarian colleges. But it would
mean giving up on the further idea that here on the North American
continent somehow we had at last founded a Christian nation. It would
mean admitting defeat in the very cause the sectarians were championing;
saving the country from a plunge into barbarous prosperity and secular
utilitarianism.
Turner's turn to teleological inspiration goes back to at least
1833. During a horrifying cholera epidemic at Illinois College, Turner,
a first year professor fresh from Yale, worked heroically ministering to
the sick and burying the dead. A hundred people in the town died; the
young man saw ghastly sights and heard grizzly stories. Overworked and
exhausted, he kept on healing, but he also found time to write letters
to his fiance in Connecticut. Several times he notices in these letters
that cholera makes no distinctions as to piety or vigor, two signs, in
25. Carriel, 56-57.
25
early New England, of election. On July 15 ir^ hovti u x id, lBjj, e writes of the
impending epidemic:
wel^as the
n
;G
^°St 'T^' the^ r°buSt and temperate asll a feeble. Of course there can be no secuH^, ml !meet and trust God forever rt j, nn ! curity, only tov->w^ j_ui.«ve . i is o longer confined to the
nunZd^r ^ SWeSPS ^"^-ely to the t^by^he
By August 28 he had lived through the epidemic, but after describing
some of the horror and exhaustion he had experienced, he brings up the
same theme again:
...the most temperate as well as the drunken and worthless are
stricken Doubtless more than one tenth of the presentpopulation have died since I came here; that is, more than ahundred persons. But this does not prove the place unhealthful-
not at all; for what place or people are healthy or safe, when God
sees fit to scourge them with cholera? But my trust is in
Him... alone, not regarding the disease so much as to change or
restrict my diet in the least. 27
Then follow a remarkable few sentences, considering that this is
the close of a long letter detailing the horrors of a cholera epidemic
and written by a professor of classical rhetoric. He ends the letter by
talking about the abundance of fresh fruit. "The woods have been full of
blackberries which the people were forbidden by ordinance to eat."
Turner ate his fill, despite the law. "I am sure they helped me; and
now the woods are full of plums of all kinds..." Twelve persons
gathered twelve bushels in about three hours. The fields are full of
26. Ibid., 18.
27. Ibid., 22.
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wonderful melons "as large as pu^in*," which no one dares ^^
himself and a friend; "hence, we live well."
And if we live well, God cannot be unjust. Though clearly Turner
finds the indiscriminate cholera epidemic to be a challenge to his
faith, he refuses to entertain the thought that perhaps God is unjust.
He takes the heat off God by dividing him practically in two; the
omnipotent, inscrutable, and even vengeful deity who authored natural
necessity; and the wise God whose divine laws of nature shine with
intelligent life.
All his life Turner opposed what he called omnipotence. If the
omnipotent God himself cannot be thought unjust, certainly priests,
dogmatists, and sectarians who make omnipotence the center of their
theologies can be called unjust. In fact Turner seems to believe that
these theologies are selfish and mean spirited. "[T]hese teachers make
God and nature tell us ... monstrous and utterly unbelievable lies. "28
And the lie seems to be that we are too depraved to make the world any
thing more than a valley of tears, and that things can only be better in
the after-life, and that such depraved beings as people don't really
deserve any better. Turner claims that this view creates hell on earth;
it sanctions great evils, like slavery, and because it is selfish it is
divisive and leads to distrust. The vision Turner offers instead is to
create something more like the conditions necessary to create heaven on
28. Ibid., 236-37
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earth. The Bible, he insists, "is the sole logical cause and basis of
freedom," but for more than fifteen centuries now "Christ- s gospel was
officially interpreted only in the interest of some s3motiaait e ither
church, state, or sect." Slavery and the doctrine of predestination are
only two examples of this sort of despotism. The following is a
recollection of Turner written many years later in 1906 by one of his
students. The discussions described are said to have occurred in 1850.
It was through him in a prayer-meeting talk that I first heard ofthe Fugitive-Slave law... "We are told this institution of which
we are all to become defenders is authorized by the Bible Wellif this is the Bible, I say, take away the Bible. We do not wantit... But, thank God, this infamy is not from the Bible 'Whom theSon maketh free is free indeed.'" Once in a class he had occasion
to denounce fore-ordination, which he characterized as
omnipotence, "chaining men down by decree, and then damning themfor not being free." "I tell you," he said, "nothing could equal
my utter detestation of such a God as that; but thank Heaven, such
is not the God of the Bible! "29
With this we begin to understand at least the psychology of the
man who, as much as anyone, bequeathed us the modern American University
system. His almost breathless energy is involved with a creative
anxiety. The vigorous pursuit of justice in America is finally the
justification of God. The overcoming of factional sectarianism, the
creation of national colleges, and his enthusiastic embrace of science
are all finally the overthrow of hell on earth and the creation of a new
world with new beings within whom it is possible for heaven to dwell.
29. Ibid., 56-57.
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There is one more place in Turner's biography where the word
omnipotence comes up in relation to drudgery and ignorance. Again the
quote comes from the 1866 debate over how to best disperse land-grant
funds, and Turner is arguing against simply adding an agriculture
department to existing colleges, where one might perhaps take courses in
agriculture much the way students today take physical education or
English composition. Turner here is both replying to a very popular
criticism of government help to agriculture in general, while at the
same time taking over the argument. 30
When Almighty God created heavens and earth, and ordered man to
eat his bread by the sweat of the brow, He created, and mostlikely endowed, the best possible university for learning
all... mere manual arts; and if we expect to supersede Omnipotenceby grants of land, for endowments, it will prove worse than the
Bull Run defeat; for no institution for teaching arts and thehabits of bare manipulation and industrial skill can ever be
endowed at all comparable with those which the great Father of all
has most munificently spread abroad The principles of
science, therefore, and not the bare manipulations of art, should
form the sole end of industrial universities
. 31
Earlier in the address Turner had equated learning to plow with
becoming a two legged work animal. Nature, conceived as God's
omnipotence, yields only an animalistic existence. The implications are
that nature teaches hard work, but hard work does not of itself offer an
exalted life or even an intelligent being. Drudgery, Turner seems to
believe, is not the mother of either freedom or of thought. An American
30. See the debates over the creation of a Department of Agriculture,
Congressional Globe, 32, part 2, p 856, and the comments of Mr. Hale on
May 8, 1862, p. 2014 and also those of Mr. Fessenden, p. 2016.
31. Carriel, 202.
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farmer content to mimic the „ays of his father is a slave, or at least
leas than free. The argent is radically anti-traditionalist, hot what
is more revealing is that tradition is understood by Turner as
omnipotence, and omnipotence as a realm of drudgery and necessity.
Omnipotence cannot be the basis of American freedom because it justifies
despotism and unf reedom-hell-on earth, with this in mind, it is
interesting tc look at Turner's attack on the classical moral
curriculum.
The forth Illinois Industrial Convention, meeting in January,
1853, presented a memorial to the state legislature which the
legislature in turn sent to the U.S. Congress. The memorial opens with
a confession.
We would respectfully represent: That we are members of theindustrial classes of this state, actively and personally engagedin agricultural and mechanical pursuits. We are daily made to
feel our own practical ignorance, and the misapplication of toil
and labor, and the enormous waste of products, means, materials,
and resources that result from it. We are aware that all this
evil to ourselves and our country, results from a want of
knowledge of those principles and laws of nature that underlie our
various professions and of the proper means of a practical
application of existing knowledge of those pursuits. 32
What might enable such a confession?
32. Edmund J. James, The Origin of the Land Grant Act of 1862 and Some
Account of its Author Jonathan B . Turner
,
(Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1910), 90.
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It is interesting to notice that J.B. Turner tended to argue
against classical education in America in terms very similar to those
that some classical theorists today use to argue against scientific
education. Turner, and he wasn't alone in this, calls classical
education a t^hnoA^y, and to it opposes thinking, that is, science.
To make this more plausible to political theorists, and to anticipate a
bit, G.W. Curtis, in a discussion of Milton, makes almost the same
point. "Technical scholarship begins in a dictionary and ends in a
grammar. The sublime scholarship of John Milton began in literature and
ended in life." Richard Hofstadter has cataloged the dreary monotonous
form of classical education in pre-Civil War America. The method was
memorization, pure and simple. A professor typically spent his time
insuring that students got every word correct. Turner, a teacher of
rhetoric, was no exception. In one letter he mentions that he starts
hearing recitations at five in the morning. This method of teaching
must have, as Hofstadter claims, done much to deaden the study of the
classics. But if we stop at that, then we refuse to ask any serious
questions about the curriculum itself, and assume that, taught properly,
it could do the work of creating practical reasoners in a democratic
regime
.
But, of course, we are imagining the curriculum as it is today,
something outside the status quo of American education, a form of loyal
opposition. In Turner's day, it was, as it were, a minister with
portfolio. I suspect that the curriculum's roots in the natural law
31
tradition will always make lt# ^^ _ ^
specific circumstances employ it. In the modern world, that will always
Place it in the position of an apologist for regimes which cannot
themselves be convincingly rooted in natural law.
Turner might be correct to call the classical curriculum technical
since, in the older sense of the term, the curriculum thinks of itself
as technical. t^,, says Martin Heidegger, "is a process of
reflection in service to doing and making. "33 One no longer approaches
the classics thoughtfully, as the matter given for thinking, but one
rather occupies him or her self with the classics. And this education
purports to produce better citizens and practical reasoners. Throughout
the debates between Turner and the college presidents, the presidents
always seek to show that Turner's sort of education ought to be
disqualified; whether because it will be agnostic or will produce people
who are unfamiliar with classical questions, or both, or because it will
produce a barbarous unreflective nation. They think in terms of valid
and invalid. Again Heidegger puts the point best, "When thinking comes
to an end by slipping out of its element it replaces this loss by
procuring a validity for itself as techne, as an instrument of education
and therefore classroom matter and later cultural concern. "34 Turner
believed himself to be in a strong age which could think for itself.
The curriculum is technical, then, in the sense that it forces and molds
33. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings David F. Krell, editor, (New
York:Harper & Row, 1977), in the "Letter on Humanism," 194.
34. Ibid., 197.
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material in particular wavs and n„y , that these ways close off other ways in
which the material might be . The other „ays here^ ^ ^
poetically as life, religiously as spirit, or philosophically as
thinxing, but when one uses the term technical as a accusation, clearly
it is in the name of something else; an experience of absence, an
experience of unwarranted restriction. Thinking, it is declared, has
ceased. 35
It is notable that Turner opposed the classical curriculum in
the same terms he used when he opposed a merely vocational curriculum
and dogmatic sectarian religion. in religion he argued against the
notion that Jesus was sent to atone for anything in us, arguing instead
that Jesus was sent to assure us of God's goodness. He opposes the
merely vocational curriculum because of its connection with Omnipotence,
necessity, and unfreedom since Adam's fall. He opposes the classical
curriculum because it is simply a discipline, unconnected with a living
ethos, and because it conceives itself as a dry-nurse, the need for
which Americans have outgrown.
The underlying premise, the chief disagreement between Turner and
everybody else, is that he doesn't believe in the finally depraved
nature of human beings. He seems completely uninterested in the
classical problem of how one introduces moderation into human affairs.
35. Martin Heidegger, Being and Timp f John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson, trans., (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 43.
33
He seems rather to worrv ahr,m- i-v,~y bout the opposite problem, how to awaken vigor
and life among free people.
The technical, then, must be understood as a sort of aggressive
resignation; a literal cultivation of innocence and ignorance. . [Ilt is
inconceivable that God would allow for creating a military science of
filing but not an agricultural science of feeding, clothing, and
housing, and in which^ people cannot develop their highest faculties
^e to their sphere of duty> „ 36 The classical curriculu^ q£
course, helps keep a kind of hierarchy in place, since it has little
useful value for farmers, and therefore relegates most Americans to
ignorance. 37 Turner consistently denies that such a hierarchy can be
justified, either in scripture or in nature. Nature may allocate
diverse duties, but it needn't consign one to ignorance, subservience,
or unhappiness. Without a basis in natural law, it is difficult to see
how the classical curriculum could ever maintain a hegemonic place in
American education. Without a natural law cosmology, the classical
curriculum degenerates into one constructivist alternative among many;
that is, it becomes modern. it can only commend itself as a technique
for training virtuous citizens. But without its pretensions, it no
longer can reply to those who find it boring or irrelevant, except
dogmatically. But a dogma can not separate itself from what it
eludes. The curriculum offers the experience of absence.ex
36. Edmund James, 57.
37. Ibid., 79.
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Turner., basic insight is this: We ought to be abie to develop a
course of liberal education which would do for farmers what the
classical curriculum does for lawyers, clerics, and doctors; or what
west Point does for military men. This insight rests upon another. The
classical curriculum does indeed work, though only for selected people.
SO the question becomes why does it work when it works, and why can't it
work for everyone? To reply to the second question first; there is no
longer any one best way to live.
It is true that the laws of god are everywhere, and to allpersons and classes, the same; and that all science is based uponthese unxform laws; but it is equally true that their applicationto the pursuits of life, and the consequent natural discipline anddevelopment of mind, is infinitely various. 38
If we all agreed on what was the best way of life, we might also
agree that the classical curriculum was the best education for everyone.
The idea that the classical curriculum somehow transcends particular
ways of life, that it speaks to everyone, is an idea so obviously false,
that Turner never even gives it serious consideration. He also takes it
for granted that the classical curriculum is only one among several ways
of educating free responsible people. The classical curriculum does not
elucidate Being itself, but only one particular way to be. For Turner,
the laws of God do elucidate Being itself, but their applications are
too varied to be captured in any one curriculum.
38. Ibid., 55.
35
The other question-how i s it that the classical ^
for the professional classes-is answered as follows:
greatest of Ttls**™ ^^ " COnCerned ' H ^ow that the
heir 3e^1Chooi-= if -themselves, but by continued habits of reading t and
IN AFTER.°lIFE^
CTE5TI0N THEIR SEVERAL -0FESS?^L pURSUI T S
allied It Ai
and
^ S ° aCqUirSd
' ^ 13— in f-t,
The young candidate from these schools is generally
h!™to ITZ' T; risciplined and sophoraorica1 ' -d sho-
for hi. n? ?
3 Universit
^
or school has done one thingm of immense value and importance, and only one; it hasneither duly informed nor disciplined his mind, as it is sometimespretended; but IT HAS SHOWN HIM HOW THAT MIND CAN BE DISCIPLINEDIN CONNECTION WITH THE PROFESSIONAL PURSUITS OF HIS AFTER LIFE 39
The classical background of professional men fits into a general
collegiality of their professions. The sun, the light of life, Being,
is discoverable in all different ways of life and work, but only from
out of those ways. The sublime is disclosed through the mundane, one's
daily sphere of action and duty, or it is not disclosed at all. It
takes reflection, and every sphere requires a literature, libraries,
scientific experiments, and other tools of reflection; but each sphere
will require tools specific to its own life activity.
Is it said that farmers and mechanics do not and will not
read?
Give them a literature and an education then suited to their
actual wants, and see if it does not reform and improve them in
this respect, as it has alone their brethren in the professional
classes
.
39. Ibid., 59.
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Note once again the tension between wisdom and grace on the or
hand and providence and compelled labor on the other. Here divine
wisdom yields the possibility of transcending ignorance. Farmers are
not forever stuck in dosa. Humans are essentially laboring beings-
lawyers and clergymen no less than farmers-but no Christian can believe
that God would so create the world as to condemn "the vast majority of
mankind to live in circumstances in which the best and highest
development of their noblest faculties is a sheer impossibility, unless
they turn aside from those spheres of duty to which Providence has
evidently consigned them."
To assume a natural hierarchy in America is to be blasphemous. In
place of hierarchy and omnipotence, Turner next puts forward a Christian
American and earthly teleology.
For what but for this very end of intellectual discipline
and development, has God bound the daily labors of all these sons
of toil in the shop and on the farm, in close and incessant
contact with all the mighty mysteries of his creative wisdom, as
40. Ibid., 57-58.
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In passages like these it is as though Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar
had become an organizational theorist. I have quoted at such length to
show how much anxiety lies behind such a radical institutional proposal
as the Land Grant College system, and also to show how misleading it is
to ascribe the collapse of the classical curriculum in America to greed,
utilitarianism, or capitalism, on the one hand; or to a loss of
seriousness or vision, or even the admittedly ridiculous memorization
method, on the other. American Protestantism had sought freedom in an
41. Ibid., 59.
42. Ibid., 60.
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active relationship to nature, seen as God's Providence. In this
P^ct it had found friendly aUiea both in Etonian physics and in
the classicai libera i curriculum. But the view of nature as God's
Providence had, by 1850, produced some serious tensions.
For instance, everyone busily ignored the fact that Newton's
ecological proo f for God's existence had been rendered unconvincing by
Kant. 43 There was also the tension created by things li ke the depletion
of soils, destruction of timber lands, and general despoiling of the
continent. Everywhere we find agriculturalists apologizing for their
past record, even in Congress, and clambering for help in learning to do
better. it is as though in the 1630 's, Protestants battled against
nature only in order to rescue and recognize themselves, but by 1850
they had recognized that in light of what they had wrought, they no
longer could believe in their own righteousness.
I have also noted that the covenant theology had crumbled, and
that with it had gone many of the settled definitions of the good life,
authority, piety, and human nature, and that evangelism had articulated
a conception of an active individual capable of hearing the itinerant
message of evangelism, and that this individual was thought to be the
basis of the first Christian nation, a nation to which God had granted a
continent upon whose resources it could flourish and be happy. But if
farmers are apologizing and losing confidence in how they exploit
43. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Saafifln , A592/B627
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nature, then the uneasy alliance between Protestantism and
utilitarianism, as articulated by evangelism, was in trouble as well.
The happy continent of resources needed better spiritual and
Philosophical underpinnings. The nature of human activity upon the land
is not such that we can, without deeper reflection, establish a
righteous, happy, and free nation upon it.
From all these directions the classical curriculum was a problem.
For instance, it was completely unequipped to speak to the problem I
just laid out, and certainly not to the problems which were most
alarming to agriculturalists. In practice, this placed it, as Turner
argues, on the side of believing in natural hierarchies of elevated and
non-elevated culture. In Christian religion this stance meshes best
with the cosmological argument and meditations upon God's almighty
powers. But by 1850 this stance implied that people who worked the land
are unfree, that they are at the mercy of their own acquisitiveness,
that their daily toil has no clear moral or pious meaning except the
endless reproduction of the daily round of toil. If zealousness is any
measure of one's attraction towards justice, then clearly the twenty
year campaign for agricultural universities, championed by so many for
so long, is ample testimony that the situation was not only thought to
be unworkable, but unjust.
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Turner fought slavery, fouaht f n *Y, t g to found new specifically American
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spirit Of zeal and always to correct injustices wrought by the partisans
of natural ine^xities. A1 „ays he argues that people ought fcQ be given
opportunities to improve themselves because it is only thr0ugh such
projects that one ca„ discover the one true Sod. Again sieves ere not
being denied liberal £reedom, but christian They ^^
held in an unreflective reletion to nature. As we saw in Turner's
discussion of the plague, all of these positions are a response to the
theodicy problem. But we also saw that Turner's reply to theodicy is
grounded in a practical and spiritual teleology. This is very important
and Immanuel Kant will have more to say about it in chapter II, but
first I must explore why the modern response to theodicy must not only
be teleological, but organizational as well. I win exploEe this
through the writings and speeches of the civil service reformer George
William Curtis.
D. George William Curtis and the Duty of Eduraf PH M^n
1. LOVff and the Possible Motivations for Rpfnrp,
In my discussion of the Civil Service reformer George William
Curtis I will, as with J. B. Turner in the last section, not be casting
Praise or blame on him for the creatlon o£ today , 3
This contrasts with two other approaches. Leonard White in his
_„tai study o* American administratis termed the reformers public
spirited men, selfless"1 v sppHn^ iS Y eekmg the elevation of American public life.
Almost at once writers like Ari Hoogenboom replied by characterizing the
reformers as elitists who, finding themselves shut out of politics in
the post-Andrew Jackson days, tried to dampen things down, not
necessarily to insure themselves jobs, but more to create a world which
people such as themselves could recognize. 44 Another version of this
second thesis, that of Curtis- 1955 biographer, is Gordon Milne's. 45
Milne argues that the genteel tradition, though seeming quaint to us
today, did once inform certain public spirited men, and help them
improve aspects of our national institutions. Elitism, in other words,
has its value. I disagree with none of these interpretations, there is
textual evidence for them all, but all three seem smaller than the man
they interpret. Curtis admits his ambitions freely, but no one could
call him self-serving. He turned down too many ambassadorships,
nominations, and job offers. But nor was he motivated by ethics, as
Leonard White would have it. A purely ethical man would have needed
either a more public life, say, in Congress, or a more private one, say,
in business. Curtis seems, rather, to always leave and enter the public
44. Leonard White, The Republican Era. 1869-1901
,
(New York: Macmillan,
1958)
.
44. Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1961)
.
45. Gordon Milne Georcre William Curtis and the Genteel TracHrion
r
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1956)
.
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arena with ease. „is faraiiy was never asked to^ ,^
and his pubiicness aiways seems spontaneous and in response to specific
events, issues, or situations.
For instance, at the 1856 Republican national convention, his
sudden and eloquent demand to reconsider a platform amendment, one which
had just been heavily voted down, to include in the platform the words
"that all men are created equal," was based simply on Curtis' total
dismay as he watched the amendment s sponsor, Joshua R. Giddings,
leaving the hall in defeat.
It seemed to me that the spirits of all martyrs to freedom weremarching out of the convention behind the venerable force of thatindignant and outraged old man. 46
Curtis demanded the floor and after he spoke, and he only spoke after
much heckling and noise had died down, the convention enthusiastically
passed the Giddings amendment. This sort of spontaneousness, this
freshness, even in the service of the public good, does not articulate
the shared understandings of ethics so much as it creates new ones.
What before was beyond credibility became thinkable,
ft
But perhaps Curtis was a moralist. Curtis himself seems to think
this is true, he talked about little else but morality in all his
speeches. All his adult life he made arguments which resemble those of
46. Milne, 109. See also Edward Cary, George William Curtis (Boston,
MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894)
.
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Emerson, whose books he reart ,ad at age thirteen and whose friendship he
*ept ail his life. But here , thin, „e need to ask what moraiity it is
*±*h oo^ands him to speak m0 rai ly
. For uhat does morality ^
outlet, Here
,
think Curtis, own answer, written to his wife on his
seen
,
thirty sixth birthday, provides as nnnH »„H u good an answer as I have
one, as we use the word in fart t =, greate r
trulv 3<! t Hf-v ! i ' suPPose no man who loves asy as I do you and who knows himself loved as I feel I am ?!
;~ sss
Curtis was apparently an erotic man. Prior to his marriage he
fell in love often. His IzIzj^U^^^ was considered
too candid in its portrayal of Egyptian dancing girls, and I find his
treatment of the love between an old bookkeeper and his wife in Prue anH
1 to be so sensitive that it is difficult to believe a young unmarried
man could have written it. The bookkeeper is able to see his wife Prue
in everything, and he continually rekindles his love for her in
everything he does or thinks. In this he uses the method of
indirection, so that he, as it were, comes upon her again and again
unexpectedly; the beauty and purity he worshiped in her during their
courtship, when they were new and beginning—her youth he nearly says,
her purity he mentions often.
47. Milne, p. 107.
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Curtis takes up this theme again in all my l 11 his commencement
addresses. it U a i„,
rrch with a lush promise of fecundity; l ike the a hil graduates he addresses.
Curtis is a consummate lover of vonth ky u , beauty and purity. The message
is oft- overtly poUtical
, £or instance to iMight students ^^
slavey but the vehlcle
,
„hat makes spaech ^^^^ ia ^
insights the graduates t0 Uve ln such a theic aotions ^ ^
a credit to the promise ana passions o£ June
, of yQuth
, and Qf ^
One advantage to understanding Cuttis as an erotic man who uses
the the language of morality in order to give himself a sphere of aoti
is that in this field we know we oannot entirely understand or
completely capture Curtis' reforms in our diagnostic schemas and
categories. The unruliness and open-endedness of this emotion, love,
mean he will often surprise us and escape our conceptual fr
second advantage lies, to the contrary, in our familiarity with
eroticism. He are familiar enough that we can make at least s
plausible claims about the author
-s intentions and purposes. We can
say, for instance, that he loves purity and that he seeks to insight
others to disclose their own buried capacity for purity.
on
rames. A
some
Men <>Tn%rltlltT ^Jj' ^ f°E 6Xample ' " The LeadershiP of EducatedS
'
in Options and Addresses of Qeorgp W i lliam rnrH.,^^. Elliot
Norton, edrtor, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1894), Vol.
I, 3 1 6 — 36.
45
Duty *nH KSJ laiflQ
Before going any further I must ^ a discussion ^
relation during Curtis , eacly ^ ^ ^ ^
changing dramatically.,, Early on divines h^ ^
Aristotelian and scholastic oonceptions of nature with those o £ Isaac
»ewton, keeping natural theology i„ place by relying heavUy ^
Newton's cosmological proof for God's existence. From nature, says
natural theology
,
one can infer the existence of a supreme being or
principle that is good and all powerful. Hence, everyone, even a pagan,
is accountable for his sins. Miller nakes the point that this view
always came in tandem with another, namely, that one can be most
directly best informed of the truth through reading scripture. The
cosmological proof actually asserts that nature also, though less
completely than scripture, can yield a secure foundation for faith. The
dilemma here is that neither nature nor scripture can bear this sort of
weight. Who, after all, can say, asked Frederick Henry Hedge in 1851,
whether the hope a religious man feels in the face of human frailty and
death co.es from natural or supernatural sources? And Miller adds, who
can say whether Hedge's melancholy flows from his loss of faith in the
efficacy of natural theology or the efficacy of revealed religion?
49. Miller (1974), 121-33.
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Since Immanuel Kant had written M • „nntt his claSslc refutation of the
C05Ml09iCal
°»— - — « naturally suited t0
human purposes had appeared. Qne couM borrou reiigious^
*ro* scientific systems anymore, since science ls fiMUy( ^
warned long ago, at best a temporary systematization made by £inite
minas in the face o£ staggering lnfinities; NotMng
There was also a set of more standard problem conneoted with naturai
thCOl°W
'
likS
'
h
°" iS ^ P°" ibl
- « -turai theology is oPeratin3 in
the world, that there renins in human societies, even in elevated ones
like Greece or Rome, so much depravity? The degeneration o £ trust in
naturai theology tended to aiso put pressure on one's trust in revealed
religion, since, as already mentioned, the direot grounding of faith had
itself come under suspicion, and because the discovery that nature was
not intrinsically amenable to our categories cf thought left one facing
an inhuman nature. That meant one no longer
.new whether one's insights
were products of nature or just human projections upon a radically
unknowable material. Hedge no longer could tell hew to distinguish a
natural from a supernatural grounds for hope because, since he no longer
could know the natural, he oculd not contrast with it the supernatural,
and that contrast was central to making the distinction between natural
and revealed religion. Newtonian science had confirmed that the cosmos
really was the way revelation said it was. But when the cosmos turned
out to be inhuman, then it no longer confirmed revelation, and in fact,
50. Ibid., 128; Kant, Critique of Pure i»y „ni A605/B633.
51. Miller (1974), 130.
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nation at all
. Ihe God o£ „atural ^ ^
increasingly beoome less and less^^^ ^
injunctions. Ood, to survive, had to baoome minimalist.
ona response to thia dU*« was tha creation of the aew „„rc
subject-centered religion of Ralph Waldo Emerson ana Theodore Patke,
Tha believers in natural religion had always tended to opposa
revivalism. The key to their faith was, first, that nature illustrated
an "Elegance
« Baauty in all natural things»52 which wara not only
avidencas of tha author of nature, but also the basis for moral
precepta.53 The other side of this belief was, and again against
revivalism, that human beings, through natural reason, could discern
something of this author and this moral code. Thus these believers were
uncomfortable with evangelism because it seemed to tamper in a rather
utilitarian way with natural reason, and again and again preachers like
William Ellery channing, a major figure, along with Emerson, in the
religious life at Brook Farm and, like Emerson, a major influence upon
George Curtis, 54 accused revivalists of abusing human nature. 55 of
course the revivalists countered by accusing men like Channing of
stoicism and deism, since he elevated human nature to a privileged
52. Miller (1974), 126.
53 Jane Bennett, "On Being Native: Thoreau's Hermeneutics of Self
EflJ 3 ty r in press. '
54. Milne, 15. Curtis during this period also sometimes attended
Theodore Parker's church. Parker is discussed below
55. Miller (1974), 55.
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status and there seemed little loft *n r>Ut l e for God to do in bringing about
human salvation.
To us today the believers in moral nature see, romantic and
sentimental.
„
hen the romances of Walter Soott and James Fennemore
Cooper are wonderfully lampooned in Z^tesz^ „e usuaUy ^
with Mar* Twain. But their important politioal insight was that there
must be some limits upon the evangelical manipulation of people's
Physiology and psychology. There is a basic insight that the unlimited
and noisy over-stimulation of men and women is unhealthy, and that a
society which needs so many stimulants is probably sic. This almost
defensive reaction to American busyness seems to me to be at the heart
of the attempts to anchor morality in the dignity of an autonomous
rational subject, one which must never be treated merely as a means, as
in revivalism, but as an end as well.
Perry Miller makes much of Melville's reversal of the American
romantic style; Moby-p ick is a romance that dissents from romance. 56
"Call me Ishmael,
"
begins the book, and the implication is that finally
the true outcast has appeared. The romantic view of nature, the move to
create a breathing space for a free individual, is declared just another
noisy orthodoxy. Similarly and only a year after the publication of
MQbY "P lr k Theodore Parker, the nonconformist preacher, announced in the
Boston Music Hall:
56. Ibid., 136.
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sooiet^church ZTlLlT Tea" Tt SSteem 1 mUSt be *This is the neoessitv ; be oth«»"« than hated.c t y of my posrtion-that I must be hated. 57
This sort of seif soape9oati„g is, of course, mawtish and
embarrassing, out
, thin, what „e see both in Meivilie and in Pirker ls
a sort of wrenching a„ay of a iaudabie set of ideais from a discursive
home which oan no ionget support them, ear.er was in fact treated
shabbi ly by the Boston Uberal unitarian nieW( ^ o^ ^
the fight would not have been so Mtter participants ^ shared
-ny of the same visions and insists. Par.er.s change, it seems, is to
move a„ay once and for ail from any version, no matter how enlightened,
of utilitarianism.
Poor dear father, poor dear mother! You little knew howmany a man would curse the son you painfully brought to life andpainfully and religiously brought up. WelJ I bl SS you--truefather and most holy mother vou wer? to m«. ^ , .
taught me was dnty^duty to SS^y^o^^^fif^ Tpleasure, not a pain, but a duiy.58
Duty is nearly synonymous with conscience, and it serves God and
man. At this point it is completely negative, and James Russell
Lowell-
s
poem, "A Fable for Critics," captures both Melville and Parker.
I think I may call
Their belief a believing in nothing at all
Or something of that sort; I know they all went
For a general union of total dissent:
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 138.
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He fraLl
? With°Ut co^h or hem
IV I " a!OWed ^ believ^ not in them;
Fro^ ?h ^
C °Uld be
^
umb1^ or preventedm t err orthodox dissent, he diaaentS
-y as conscience and the individual as digni ty Were tormulations meant
to spea k to failures in liberal theol ogy
, but without _ing ^ ^
revivalism or Calvinism. They are above all any o attempt to rescue the
insights o£ natural theology £rom vrec^ Lifce a^
_nts, as soon ss one tried to embody liberal dlssent in positive
institutions, whether in romances or in Boston clones, dissent became
an apoi0gy for a new status quo
. Nor did Par,ez or Bmerson or Canning
or Meiviiie succeed in this regard any more than had the liberal Boston
clergy
,
and for a iong ti» the advocates of dign i fied self autonomy
were very leery about institutionalizing their insights.
All this granted, and as drearv as his oonoeption may seem today ,
Parker.
3 oonoeption of duty must have struck «„, young American
intelleotuals as an astonishing innovation; a sort of leap into new
possibilities of being. It gave one a basis for moral aotion, albeit
negative dissent, while avoiding the pitfalls of utilitarianism and
sectarian religious dogma. But mostly it gave one a language and
standpoint for criticizing the worst tendencies of the commercial ethos.
59. Ibid., 135.
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That George William Curtis shares hd these convictions is very clear
from his lectures and letters m. a letter written to Edward Gary in
I860, Curtis summed up his religious belief.:s as follows
and that S Inly essentia? tutSlV ™"
which I u„de r!,tand his absolute f ,^ " t0 be b>-dm, e„iightened
.
i i^iiid:^^ t s <*»»should believe this or i-w -k S an3tlous that men
Government, but tnat thev h ?hT ^ G°dhead ' °r the »»ine
lovingly. 60
7
°
Uld Uve P"61*' ^stly and
in all of Curtis, orations, this religious notion lies behind muoh
of the argument. He generaily invo.es the authority of oonsoienoe and
duty as a reply to the American ethos of political moderation and
commercial compromise. We can call Parker's conception cf duty an
astonishing innovation because with it Curtis inspired his listeners to
oppose slavery, favor civil service reform, and champion women's
suffrage. And Curtis was one cf the most popular speakers in America.
This religious doctrine was obviously called into being partly by
fifty years cf the noisy sectarian feuds. In the face of so many sects
all claiming to have the true reading of scripture, what thinking person
could with confidence claim to know which, if any, was correct? But
when one answers this challenge with a doctrine of individual
conscience, it becomes internally necessary to the doctrine that God
60. Cary, 7; 334.
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rSraaln fSirly rem°te
- 61 T
° ~* - MM5 that each pe„ on
-t ,a the best judge 0£ uhat i3 and Untt eniightene^
necessarily implies that- ~kat churches are not the medium through which one
learns Ws purposes and cedents
. Churches are themselves
institutions within the world „hich o££ec authoritative interpcetacions
of scripture and natural event* ,h»s. They are based on the claim that some
perhaps the regenerate, the blessed, or the clergy, can ma*e sense of
the world and the scriptures, such that the members can ,now how they
ought to live in the world. Thus churches need tc ma.e seme claim that
'God is a least- close enough that we can *„o„ his commandments in seme
detail and that these
_ds, because God designed the world with us
in mind, can be readily carried out in the world He created. For
churches to prevail there needs to be some very close affinities between
God, nature, the church, and human beings. And it is the role of
preachers to help believers appreciate these affinities and to act upon
them.
But once believers turn to the more transcendental duty of
conscience, they are under pressure to reject institutionalized ways of
belief as unreflective and dogmatic. To listen to an official church
doctrine is to abandon one's own thought processes. Thus these
believers will need to also insist that God's detailed will for humans
on earth is unavailable to us, and possibly irrelevant.
61. William E. Connolly, Political Theory an rf M^o rni - y (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988), 142.
53
the classical ttadition in educationi teiigion inMt0tal CaUSaUty
~—
-
*— t.« experience
. No„
* -3 possible to those theoiogies uhich ciai^ ^ ^ ^to explicate God's will in detail „.. as unwarranted impositions. Emerson
details about Him, and He isn't- i-„„r t too anxrous about just what we might
actually do to worship Him. Eurthermore, the older liberal theology
seemed unable to offer any compelling
_ ^^^^
it acknowledged that slaver, was an evil. Hha t was needed was a
religion capable of reaching the world.
It is into this void that Parker hurled the word duty. And when
Curtis took it up, he was able to inspire young audiences at Union
College, at Brown, at Cornell, and at Dartmouth with a sense cf
excitement. The excitement extended even to such, for us, dry subjects
as civil service reform. Edward Cary mentions several times that the
men and women who worked on the* r-iwii c~K a e Civil Service Commission, though poorly
paid and overworked, were still deeply enthusiastic.
But it was a happy quality of the reform to excite the mostgenerous devotion in all honest persons who had to do with it and
steadTlvT
elVntTd UP°n * of practical success ttlt haseadily gained with every passing year. 62
62. Cary, 278.
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Leonard White renori-^ =,jports a similar attitude among the briahty mfcj o xgn young people
-— tne Department o£ Agriculture
_
- «» experience transcendental duty ^ ^ a^
deration 0f young
_ioaM £ound ^ ^ a spirituai
-ndpoint trom „hich they might om possibiuties ^ theit
era
.
X Ihs Data of the Hn^ riran sahalai
in 1856 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow left the country to live £o
ti- in Europe. George Willie* Curtis had aotuaUy tried ^ ^
r a
him:
....Couldn't you postpone until after Christmas-
Curtis had been trying to arouse all the great American men of
learning to join him in actively supporting the Fremont campaign for the
presidency, this being the most practical way of openly and actively
opposing slavery. Curtis believed men of conscience ought to support
the new Republican party. But it must have seemed to him that all the
best minds had given up on American public life. Many people in his
63. Milne, 91.
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circle of esteemed friends, and for fht ree years he himself, had gone to
-rope in search of beauty
, culture
, and a cosmopolitan
-~ Fuller, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Charles Elliot Norton
, _
brother Burrill, for instance.
This clearly bothered him. m Prue anrt t k *rm n i
, he had given half a
chapter over to «-eiin9 „hat . writer oould bring £urope
and his a„sMI „as; only the del^^ ^^ ^ ^^
cce to passengers on a ship passing by . tropioal^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Perhaps through a haze of opium s.o.e. In one is le£t
thinking that this is enough, hut in that boo* Curtis is interested in
how someone like an old boo^eeper might .aintain, even in ^erioa, a
high quality of private life m io« wP . In 1856 he was thinking of public life,
and travel to Europe is judged much more harshly.
By 1856 Curtis is making heavier demands upon authors. No more
could an author be like a large clipper ship from which one might get
inspiring whiffs of far away places; of nutmegs, molasses, or fruits. 64
indirection was no longer enough, and no more was it permissible for
intellectuals to set sail just because the hubbub of America smelled so
nauseatingly rotten. At this point, 1856, Curtis' biographers usually
say that politics came to take up more of his time than literature.
64. Cary, 66.
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I suggest it is helpful tQ see ^^ ^ ^^ ^^
if not the philosophy, at least the strategy of Curtis-
.enters,
EmerS°n
'
Channing
'
Longfellow
»
and Hawthorne. To see how complete the
break
^ ^ C °mPare CUrti3 '—nts to his friend Isaac Hecker
in 1843 with what he was saying in 1856. m 1843, praising
individuality in Emersonian terms, he wrote:
Thro- me does not a higher judge give judgment-.
an/loo^/ 11"1 ^ m° re POSSible to *° -tside yourselfnd lo k at your own individuality?
.... Every man, tool like
the^s^f ** *" ~ ™ * ^
The trap to be avoided in 1843 is dependence. Even friendship
interferes with true nobility. And the duty of the individual, if duty
is the correct word in this period, is to facilitate, by indirection and
exemplification, the showing to each individual of the jewel which
resides unseen within him or her. "Trust thyself," Emerson wrote in
•Self-Reliance,' "and every heart vibrates to that iron string."
Emerson himself did tend to be active in public life, especially on the
public lecture circuit, and all the issues I am raising here were
probably known to him, but never satisfactorily settled. 66 Still, the
inference the young Curtis drew from all this was disengagement.
65. Milne, 15. For the impossibility of this two way journey away and
towards oneself, see Mark Taylor "Corporality, " on Merleau-Ponty in
Alterity
,
(Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 61-82.
66. Miller (1974), 206-207.
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Reform becomes at last- =, ^
loses soul... ^ the wLa maTr H
at
K
eiSm S° £" « -9ani 2ed
The harvest is said to come in the ^ q£ ^ ^ ^ ^
house of the sphere of our duty » »v^o , •. Vig rous Irving" is the medium Qf
Reform is organized distrust it sav^ hoGod's hand
-You are a miserable bu iness lo"farrer! and so disputes some Fourier or Robert O J "
Y°U
bungling. 69 wen to improve the
way to oppose slavery is to grow inwardly and intellectually. Whs„ the
good .an changes on the inside, the effect cannot fail to show in his
surroundings. Of course Emerson would say that institutions are but the
shadows oast by actual people, and improving the character cf people
will ultimately affect the character of institutions. And the mature
Curtis probably understood this relationship as well as anyone ever has.
My point is that in this early period, he has a very naive, cr perhaps
mystical, understanding cf this issue. He was more concerned about how
a private person lived a good and vigorous life than about how a public
cculd do the same thing. Later, events in Kansas had made him worried
about the latter.
67. Milne, 16.
68. Ibid., 19.
69. Cary, 125.
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Curtis in 1856 is perched at the br^V k ,C n eak between two modes of
individualism th^t- ^that U, two ways of realizing subjectivity in the
world. 70 The first mode Curtis learned at Brook Farm „c , where he lived
for eighteen months It i . . _,PUrS
"*3«otivity. that is, it knows
itself immediately, it seeks to see itself without referenoe to
community norms, standards, or traditions, and, in fact, spends a great
deal of time purging itself of all such old dead weight and noise
especially of religious sectarianism and dogmatism. Unitarianism and
transcendentalism are its creeds r-,,„i.
-
Curtis never became an atheist, but
to preserve his faith he, much like a.
.. Turner
, had to shun^ Qf
organized religion. And in muoh the same „ay and ^^^ ^
same reason, he also avoided politics.
Curtis religion was based completely upon individual conscience
and honesty. But for Curtis this stance hit several snags. First, the
one already alluded to, that a purely literary approach, informed by
even the best European traditions, was difficult to communicate to
American audiences. It was unclear whether the insights gained in
Europe were transferable to America, and it was unclear whether they
even could address the American experience. Curtis put this in terms of
noble sentiment, apparently after a study of Plato. Commenting here on
democracy in America he says:
The theory of democracy is noble. It asserts the majesty ofhuman nature. It is the wise man governing himself. it implies
70. Connolly (1988), 100-02
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the popular creed, then tL llZAtTlT ^ V Mml P^the canonization or the martvrd™ I ft Whether U order*
not find in the American people that v , ^ T1— Now 1 *>democracy either politic or St rt al0ne Can render
are not a people actually capable "of self"
' ^ WS
may be our theory. 71 <?overnment, however fair
Curtis was not a mean-spirited man and he could not for long
personally sustain such a low estimate of his fellow Am.Ub r xi ericans. He was
-otic ana he needed
. sphere of actien. But this pompous paragraph is
interesting fer its mixing of Emerson . s imagery^ ^
tensions between the two see, to be resolved by interpreting Plato's
wise .an as though he were Emerson's. The wise man here, governing
himself, who the majority might, as in olassical political theory,
either make a demagogue or a scapegoat, is not a classical hero, but a
transcendentalism But the classical statement of the political probl
doesn't really cover the American case. Noble American intellectuals
were in danger, not of being made into demagogues or scapegoats, but of
simply being ignored. And most often they preferred it that way; they
purposely remained detached.
em
But this strategy, which had worked in the lives of Longfellow,
Hawthorne, and others of that generation, did not work for Curtis.
Where the older men had sought individuality as a space beyond the
busyness of American life or the boredom of the Customs House, Curtis
sought out the community and the political as arenas in which his
71. Milne, 26.
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individuality could find expression » .r . His formulas and references to
individuality never change; in 18B? h'. a 82 hrs vrsron of the educated man's
mission still rings with notes first rung by Emerson:
and^™ ofSt^r"^6 ."0^ ° £
s^rr-s—- -grij~:irr s
It is not that he ahandoned the visions of Broo* Parm, hut that he
changes most dramatically in Curtis is his attitude towards the fitness
of Americans to rule themselves. Prom !856 on, if Americans are too
venal for democracy, it is not the fault of the c„»n man, hut the
cowardice and aloofness of intellectuals. in the "Duty of an Ericas
Scholars address, he maKes this the starting point of his whole puhlic
life. He opens by quoting Milton's,
-I cannot praise a fugitive and
cloistered virtue..."
The Longfellows had been in Europe only a few weeks when these
words were spoken, and they must have been on his mind as he worked on
the speech, systematically revising his earlier thoughts on reform,
action, organization, and duty. The speech was a resounding success, it
was reprinted in the New York papers the next day. The American
scholar's duty is to be the conscience of the nation. The end of all
72. Curtis, Orations and AHdressps
,
Vol. I, 332
73. Ibid., 9-35.
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scholarly attainment is the samP » -e, to l lve nobly." But the harvest is
different now. Even i f »the man be .^ ^^ ^ & ^
the world,- It follows
, Curtis say5f „ the fundamentai ^
ess
life is liberty" and that a thought which will help the world usel
if one can not tell it to the world. Scholars must introduce:
wa S notouricZVr t
s
r;:tis
f
fy
u
n:
ice into human affairs
-
«•
but to serve Cod and man!^^^Z^^expedient and watch with alarm the flickering of the funds he isto pursue the truth and the eternal law of justice 74
in a republic especially, educated people must participate or else
the politics of expediency and flickering funds will eventually eclipse
the very principle of liberty. He means this quite literally. In other
speeches Curtis worked out more clearly how the commercial spirit could
lead the nation, in the name of union and prosperity, to compromise far
too much with slavery.
Our commercial success tends to make us all cowards Are
we satisfied that America should have no other excuse forindependent national existence than a superior facility at money
making? Shall it have no national justification to the heart andintellect? Does the production of twelve hundred million pounds
of cotton fulfill the destiny of this continent in the order of
providence?75
74. Ibid., 13-14.
75. Ibid., 58.
Slavery annlhilates sel£ ^^ ^ ^361£ r6SPeCt
" ~ -— -e ; M the laborer
cannot have moral respect unless he be free."
:rue
Slavery and commerce are thP r>no *.e one-two punch which threaten t
individuality in America. Slavery, because it- m ,_y i u td I ust ^vn^nH k~"iuou expa d, because it
«u« subvert through fugitive slave U« the very principle of Uberty
and dignity for all
, and because lfc ^^ ^ ^ ^
the support of the state, would literally demorali ze the country. And
coerce tends to raa.e us slaves to prosperity, replying
industriousness with busyness, the endless pursuit of nere life.
"Co^eroisl prosperity is only a ourse if it be not subservient to^
and intellectual progress, and our prosperity will oonquer us i£ „e dQ
not conquer our DrosDprit-v "ia cip perity. 76 Slavery and commerce in league with each
other are a threat to America itself.
It may be important to note that Curtis is not advocating an
Aristotelean ethical order. The images he uses are never any
naturalistic right-ordering of the polity. He explicitly unhooks
America from any understanding of natural law, 77 and he certainly didn't
believe in natural hierarchies. The role educated men are supposed to
perform is never justified as in any way naturally superior, but merely
different and extremely important. Furthermore, American morality needs
76. Ibid., 57.
77. Ibid., 41.
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to be created on purpose tv,o , .P The model 1, not Ari3totle
, but Thermopylaei
and of Leonidas holdin, the pass against ^
The Roistered virtue or Curtis. youth could not ^
under the hustle of ^eriean oo^ereiar Ufe. nor in the taoe of
SlaV"y
'
THiS
^ «>« Curti. It reads him to
reve.se his earner stand on orations. He reinterprets the PUgri„
father as though they were pra^atic transcendentalists
. ^om tne
love of liberty, and from what is rarP r #•>,„ k-te the ability to organize liberty
in institutions, sprang the America of «hi,„v w rch we are so fondly proud. "78
But the point is not to discover in in,tit„f^s itutions our common
understandings and then have individual*s take part in a common ethical
life. Rather the individual has been discovered to require
organizations and the sphere of activity they provide in order to
realize himself, or give himself a content. There is never any question
of which takes precedence; the individual always has primacy over the
organization, and is in fact the only court of appeal beyond the
organization.
One forms organizations like the Republican party because that is
the only way, in a republic, to do great things. Taking a practical and
active interest necessarily leads to party affiliation. "Great public
results... are due to that organization of effort and concentration of
78. Ibid., 51.
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aim which arouse, instruct «„,i •, and rnsprre the popular heart and will "79
Pharisees performed al l the terms, "vet lac.ed the „ery heart or
religion,. And Jullus Caesar beoame ^
^
government. Therefore i-v^ ^ a.n , the duty of American scholars isn't merely to
hold office or to vote.
althou^ rt
b
may TnlLIXT T""^ ""^ d^
practical participation in ti, I Ch" con=tant active
upon the Plr^TZZA\TJZ:i lllllTl^^^Public affairs falls under the cent ol o sir ish LHon" °fcrafty and venal men t mQ= 4-u ^ exr and ignorant, or
it must be incessant' is oft"
P<SrS °nal *"ention~„hich, as
the details of Politics ^ZZlTlr^t"^^0
=tSiTis^rg^^ -s^Sv-r
Intellectuals are tempted to disdain politics, but only
intellectuals can insure that political banality does not rule our
institutions. First against slavery, and later against party spirit and
the spoils system, Curtis always held up the enlightened moral
individual. The educated man must fight the withering spell and "assert
the independence and dignity of the individual citizen, and to prove
that party was made for the voter, not the voter for party. 81 But to
79. Ibid., 272.
80. Ibid., 266-67
81. Ibid., 279.
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'as a moral
make this difference t-« •«ence, to insure that the United States «
^= first and a oo^eroiai rePubl io second
, to be an ^Uberty more than ln husiness, inteileetuais had to patticipate
Otherwise their freedon „as empty at host and endan9eted at ,otst Put
into .ore PhilosoPhie terms, subjectivity couid not he reaii 2ed
ne9atiueiy as an earned esoaPe fro, husyness and noise; it couid not
define itself oven against the co™onality without ma ,i„g the
commonality part of its self „.!*.definxtion. Brook Farm is simply Wall
Street inverted. Before 1 856 one could evaluafce
Positively or negatively, grub in the markefc or^ ^ ^
air of subjectivity-and Curtis actually did try both options-but one
could not be both a subj ect and a participant in American daily affairs.
One's subjectivity could not make any difference. The young Curtis,
whether at Brook Farm or on Wall street, must have felt half deadened,
even given his native enthusiasm and good humor.
After 1856, Curtis turned his eroticism on American public
opinion. He sought always to bring out its best and he always had a
lover's insecurities about its potential for the worst. But if the
people, through public opinion, can be active in the strong sense of
agency, then there is strong pressure in his position to regard
institutions as finally neutral. The Supreme Court, for instance, will
always be glancing towards public opinion when it interprets laws, and
the long debates over slavery had convinced Curtis that the Constitution
could be plausibly interpreted to defend even slavery if the people were
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everyone's mind he said:
Constituent ll^Tl^LZ^lt ""^ S~« ° f
means in a crisis what the'oeoo".' I " always
United States will alw„„. -
P
f
P
°
0Se
'
The PeoPle °* the
themselves, because that isT^' ^ °MStlttti°» *>«
because they have learned h2"^™ °* anddo partisan service 1 , 9 sometim« appointed to
the measure of our morally 82 °"
C°nStituti°" always be
Again these themes recur throughout Curtis' life. In 1882
,
claiming that it is no stig™ when limited men label one a visionary, he
says that:
A visionary is one who holds morality to be stronaer than fh„
-«'0«±ty.... Cobden felt that the heart of England was agentleman, and not a bully. So thinks the educated ^erican ofhrs own country.
„e has faith enough in the people To anneal to
cir
p
:
p
t
ul
:h^r~ror:.8r ability of the pe°pie - - -
And in 1877, on the same subject he said:
It is especially necessary for us to perceive the vitalrelatron of individual courage and character to the common
welfare, because ours is a government of public opinion, andpublxc opinion is but the aggregate of individual thought Wehave the awful responsibility as a community of doing what we
choose, and it is of the last importance that we choose to do whatis wise and right. 84
82. Ibid., 92. Note, by the way, the two constitutions here; the
and the unwritten, denoted by the upper case and lower case 'c •
83. Ibid., 331-32.
84. Ibid., 280.
written
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"Technical scholarshio " fwn . k ^n p, Curtis had announced in 1856, "begins in
a dictionary and ends in a gramar
. The^ ^ ^
Hilton be9an in literature and ended ^ ^ „ ^^ ; ^^
to show, the duty of the educated Mn to his county changed. One must
participate in public Ufe, and the older aloofness could only appear
selfish. Without the participation of the educated and intelligent
members of the nation the dream of liberty would never be reaped. flnd
with this insight Curtis opened his long erotic affair with public
opinion. His orations all read 1U. an uneasy mixture of Emerson's
"Self-Relianoe" and Plate's
"Symposium," both of which he read and
adored when he was young. At the level of systems, a Kantian
individualism such as Curtis' can be called too abstract and too
universalistic. But when we descend to the level of a man trying to
live out a coherent standpoint, we find that at least for one man at one
time, it also could accommodate and put into practice a sensuousness not
usually associated with such a philosophy. And of course all this
should be a warning not to interpret Curtis or other reformers of this
period through preconceived notions of what we believe about the later
Progressive period.
4, The DppUne of Manners a nd th e Bias o£ Organizations
Everywhere Curtis looked he saw a general tackiness taking over
the United States; it seemed to prevail in manners, in morals, and in
68
™ce ,es sia.ery „as tolerated because ^ oppose ^ a
-ion impossible, and politics ^ o£ _ ^
and, lat6r
, Roscoe conkling
, Much 0£ this he lays at the^
- «- oom„ercial ethos, „hich is fcoth a blessing a_ ^^
ol6K in t„ speeches, ..He„ york and it press „ „The spirit anfl
Influence of „igher EdacaUon ,. ^ ^
-toleM„ce, slowness to extremism, a csrtain liberality , .. a„d ^^
important, a system of education
. ^ ,f^^ ^ ^
-sufficient conditions cf freedom, which without them destroys itself,
but which also always tuns the risk of being forgotten in their
presence
.
The problem with commerce, then, stem from its ability to limit
certain excesses of democratic politics while encouraging others.
Business men "pursue what is expedient and watch with alarm the
flickering of the funds " -t tn , but easxly lose sight of justice and freedom.
"[Our]... wise shrewdness and great aspect of action harmonize with an
absence and postponement of art. "86 There is, then, a general
forget fulness of freedom and justice, taste and eminence.
85. Milne, 13.
86. Cary, 43.
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Probably no one anymore should try to nr *xa g ound manners and taste in
objective criteria ri m.87 Along „lth religion
_ ^
education, manners could not- ot survive the ontologlcal shifts of the early
nineteen hundreds. If nature can no longer be ^ _ ^
created with humans in mind, then there can he no inherently oorreot
behavior for npnni
^
r people, anymore than there can ho ,6
° be a universally recognized
expounder of the Constitution. Purthermore, utilitarianism^ ^
view the earth and the people upon it as infinitely available for
o-elopment and change. In the absence of universally recognized
3tandards of behavior, any manipulation of people which oan plausihly be
said to contribute to their „ell-being is justifiable. Evan9elism and
political parties would be cases in noint-p nt. if genteel behavior could no
ion9er speak with authority to the needs of Americans, and if there were
no .rounds for limiting the demands a party might make upon its „illing
Participants, then, since party was by definition good, the party could
ask anything of its members, including tithes for office hclding . The
iinchpin of the argument for leaving the party alone in this ultimately
rests on the old relation to nature which I discussed under the concepts
of natural theology. To say that there is nothing in nature which
prohibits these behaviors is tc first of all recognize the old standard
as the only viable one, but then to deny in every specific case that the
,LfanSI 9 Gadamer ' ItUth and Method , (New xork.- Crossroad Press,1982). see especially Part I. Jean Bethke Elshtain has reminded me
of taste LT™ Alan . B1 °°m does a"e«*Pt just such a natural groundingand manners in his Closing of the Smarisaa Mi "^ I take upthis problem more rigorously in Chapter II through Kant's discussion ofSpinoza's natural teleology.
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old standard can actually SDea k «y sp to us. This seems particularly
e
"
m"ality c™" — i.- helps ln any speoi£ic
ca.es, while ,ti» holding on tQ morality ^ ^ ^
operative. And I t-hint *-whi k thla accounts for so,e of the viciousness with
which reformers were attach- p„ •tacked, for instance Roscoe Conkling-a savage two
hour denunciation of Curtis »nH ^ t, a d Curtis was present, at the 1877 New
*ork state Republican Convention rv™i,i •. Conklmg referred to Curtis as the
••man-milliner" and as the ,.carpet .knlght q£
Curtis. morali 2ation of America circumvented this sort of moral
wisdom of the natural causal order. „e enti rely relocated the ground of
virtue and purity outside of scientific nature altogether, placing it
instead in the subjective conditions of rationality. He thereby, at
least in principle, saved manners from a crass materialistic fate. But
at the same time he sought to save Emerson's vision of Nature as the
light through which God shines in everyone, viewed practically, in
Curtis' hands the sources of morality, virility, purity, manners, and
action were all more immediately available to individuals than they had
ever been before. Nature also is more directly available. These things
are not mediated any more through preachers or party bosses. We have
already seen how the concept of duty and the subject it implies, in the
hands of Parker and Emerson, acted as a means to save natural theology
after Kant and Hume and American commerce had discredited its basis in
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science. But- r„ rn„Curt.s reverse, their e,rli,r strategy
. Rather than
trying defensively to pre ,PrvB ese e some relation to nature against the
hubbub and noise, Curtis tried to take the off •ensive. He attacked the
— and noise „ith the insigh;a he had gained f ^ ^
Uaraing
. S ubjectivity „as empty u it oQuid nM ^ ^ ^
transrormi„g the hubbub lnto at least a higher ^^^^^ b^ ^
already noted
, this required ^ ^^
rhetorical because Africans nad ai„ays sougnt, as , have trled tg
show throughout this chapter> to ground the±r £reedQm ^^ ^
Curtis offere. a new aiteit pated down version of , natural^ ^
"°te S °1Ved S°me
°
f
°ld« P»««- »ith morallty
, but lt also had
rtent institutional implications. It is to these that I win
some impo
now turn
Curtis was a reformer. He was not an organizations theorist. So
near as I can tell he never thought critically about the institutional
legacy he was leaving. still I don't think it is unfair at this point
to note some of the drawbacks of his moral formulations.
First, nature had to become a sort of Real World, that against
which we measure human institutions and find them wanting. As such it
can never be an actual nature. This means that reform, for instance,
can have no end, and no amount of political victory is enough to declare
oneself the winner. Liberty, like art, is always postponed. And
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SUbjeCtS
" " "~ *» * I -Me bind 0£ believingReives the u„d6rd09s
, no matter Khat^ ^^^^ oonMpt
* an indivldual „ho ia no„
^ om
decisions implies both a period o£ tutelage and ,^ ^
individual, for n„,f ; „ nCurt,s
,
clearly begins life at college commencement, or
upon leaving Brook Fa rm. one returns to one, alma mater in order to
xn sue, a way that you will not be embarrassed by either your youthful
ldealism or your later experience. Truth is forever young. 88 So some
institutions are good tutors and see are not. Colleges are certainly
legitime, out parties are not. But such claims, while seeming self-
evident to intellectuals and college trained people, will always be
perceived as arbitrary by some members of the population.
Third, the approach is always, in a sense, dethroning the
arbitrary power of kings. 8 9 Curtis sometimes defends civil service
reform on the grounds that political parties have become a modern
version of an executive with too much arbitrary power. This seems to
strain things a bit. In fact, the executive branch has never been
weaker than it was during the post-Civil War period, and the Republican
party, though very powerful, was never so monolithic as a king. Yet
only this model of power will fit with Curtis- understanding of freedom,
88
:
Curtis
'
Qratat ion s and Ad rPssPs, Vol. I, 316. This is also a majorpoint in Prue anH t JO
89. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Pow.r/Knnwl^ Colin Gordon,
trans., (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979).
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"hiCh
"
al"ays de£i
-s
- -— — -itraty authority
, the
-in, o1 Edition and pouer ^ inst_ ^ ^ ^ ^
parties, what he thinly h
o
ks xs wrong i3 that there ig an arbitrary
aggrandizement of the party boss a „n -v,-, nd thxs results in demeaning those
who hold political patronage positions. Curtis feels he ,u r i only needs to
-d of£ . li3t o£ the gross ine£flciencies and subservient behaviQrs ^
office holders to that them o£ spoiis ia too rotten ^
tolerate
-
since the^^ ^ - «~ - natural justification
,
and since
, therefore
, others are obeying arMtrary^^
workers are denied access to their own conscience and morality, viewed
fro» the point of vie* of the good
, nothing ln the spoils system
can allow for the voice of the whole to speak Th»l K. e unexamined
from the boss's arbitrary personal bondage, individuals would be able to
hear the voice of a universal conscience within themselves. Curtis
can't imagine that much of the party's power might be arbitrary, yet
impersonal. Thus one is compelled to interpret all threats to morality
and freedom in terms of arbitra ry authority, end this blinds reformers
to the power structures that don't fit this model, for instance, those
they set up themselves, like tightening the discipline in the New York
State University system, or the aspects of self-surveillance that must
accompany a heavy emphasis on individual conscience. But primarily it
blinded them to seeing how the reform did not so much abolish
authorities as replace them with others.
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Rein
"
SCh"mann h
" «- t-» ape.UU. custodial
agencies,- meaning mostly Rant , s transcendentai ^^ These^
agencies act as fiduciaries ~*. . of reason, once reason has deconstruoted
aUth0ritiSS
~ —e, Curtis, conscience
and the sau it requires are certainiy ^ ^
but Curtis, in order to make the self extroverted, had to oreate
agencies of government which have a verv simile ,y milar function. what the
metaphor of the king did to Curtis was to l„ u-eave him unable to comprehend
that these agencies of self and government might also be barriers to
freedom, might still act, to keep the metaphor of tutelage, to keep us
immature
.
p. Conclusion
in this chapter I have tried tc view the rise of modern
meritorious organizations from the point of view of an American
Protestant problematic, in the first section I discussed what might be
called God's withdrawing His hand from nature, such that His will could
no longer be authoritatively read in detail from natural events. I also
noted some early religious responses to this, like evangelism and
natural theology. m the second and third sections I discussed two
other responses; the Land Grant College system and the articulation of
public duty by a civil service reformer. These responses are somewhat
90. Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger op Being and ArHna- txaa p^n„ i r1 -.Anarchy
,
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 8-9.
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Afferent, yet both seemed to contain an xnternal organizational
imperative. Jonathan B. Turner ]„n -locates a source of virtue in the
natural laws by whirh r^w •Cod w.sely governs nature
. To be enUghtened
about these laws is be opened to a liberalitv «, ,noeral y equal to that which
classical education used to imoart- f„ „part to the professional classes. But the
only way to ma.e such a relation to natural laws possible is to form
lar9e state university system. George William Curtis sought in a
-her different way to add a spiritual tension to American public
Uf., online Turner, he celebrated the value of classical learning
but insisted, U*e Turner, that it not be used in the service of mere
scholarship or by clerical functionaries as a way of keeping people
subordinated to unquestioned d0gmaa. But Curtis locates the source of
-rality in a conscience which, when properly enlivened, can guarantee
the highest principles against the hubbub of American democracy. The
difference between the two responses resembles in .any respects the
difference between Rousseau's Savoyard vicar and Kant's cosmopolitan
By mentioning the names of Rousseau and Kant I have tried to call
attention to two versions of the doctrine of self-legislating freedom as
it applied in America. Thoughtful Americans had come to believe, once
the prose-of-the-world standpoint was abandoned, that freedom hinged on
subjugation only to laws one gave oneself.
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Turner's might be thought of a, a k9 s physrcal solution, based upon
sample concepts generally understood by all m. ka embers of the community
and articulated in
* *** * — -o, a9rlculture
. H_
-ike in Ro_. s £2£ia^m
_ neoessary ^^^^ ^
<
largely undiscovered and extreeiy^ ^ jb^^
then, the university system functions as . second ethos
_ adjunct ^
The second ethos is necessary largely because
agricultural knowledges could, by his dav .„...y n y , sustain neither themselves
nor American agriculture T r»HiM. aditional agricultural knowledge is, in
-rner. s view, iterance and ruin. Turner sought to maintain the
element „f ,implicity and ^ ^^^ ^ ^
rdaal college as an interdisoiplinary hands-on and, though highly
structured, at least lcosely scheduled institution. L1 ke Kousseau,
Turner had nc gualms about disciplining those whose behavior disrupted
self-legislated freedom. Only hard working highly motivated people who
shared the general visicn were truly welcome. The second ethos, of
course, never did do what Turner intehded. Its scientific discoveries
were too minute a„d too complicated aha took too much extended
concentration for uhdergraduates to easil y uhcover them in the course of
a year or two, and its discourse quickly became too technical and
cumbersome to form anything like a community of shared concepts.
From the perspective of this study, by turning to science at all
Turner has already become more Kantian than Rousseauean. As so,
admits that the natural scope of man's powers are insufficient to hi,
>on as one
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highest moral and ohv^i^ip ysrcal needs and th.t kno„led9e and reason need to
r
cuitivated
-
that
-
he
-
-
- - - - Powers „ot merely
- natural lMtinot but rather ^ £r_m ^ ^ ^3COP... one has forsaken Kousseau and entered a Kantian world
. 91 Thus
^«uuy, ..e. Turner lo3es M3 exi3tentiai intsrest ^^
sinoe he U Unable to either Mlnt4ia hls 3tandpoint ^^
its tensions.
The analogy between G. W CurH« »r>* tw. rtis and Immanuel Kant is meant to
*+Um the doctrine of ..K-^.^ freedom in u . intelligible
« opposed to phy,ic.1( £orm . The advantage of this version ia ^
needn.t give itself a specie pl ace, any specific set of distances,
not provide any specific ethos. „ . highly lntegcated
co^ercial repuhlic, this version neednH hecce very specific ahout how
one ought to iive and can even appeal to people with very diverse ways
of life. In an intelligible version of self-leaisl -f«H * *a ir gislated freedom much of
J. B. Turner's discipline can be relaxed.
The doctrine of intelligible freedom insists that people are
endowed with and enjoy "active and spontaneous faculties which are not
reducible to the the dictates of sensuousness
. We have interests and
needs as understanding and reasoning beings which often directly
Cambr
e
H
rge
„
ArmStr°ng
,nd Hinmry., (Cambridge:idge University Press, 1969), 95.
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contradict our interests a «s sensuous animaiistio beings
. 92 AU Qther
versions of freedom-Rousseauean trariit- •
'
a^tionalist
f utilitarian and
—
-
tend to subordinate these faculties and interests ^ ^^
o, the „hoie
, but ln dolng so „ind up de£eating prsciseiy ^^ ^
freedom they claim to celebrate. This is h»„because true freedom cannot be
the resuit of naturai causai necessity.
„„ether that be family,
tradition, onanism, or sensuous desire. To be subject to naturai
-salitv is to be thi„gli ke
. Evety natural action ^ ^ ^ ^
prior action. Thus nothing in nature can be said to be truly
spontaneous. A free being cannot be one subject to such things. Thus
literally no tMng can be prior to a free action *. •
-
r as its cause. Thus,
the intelligible formulation of self-legislating freedom claims that it
is only to the extent that w. clearly mar, ourselves off from things
that we can be free. Respect people; that is, don't use them as
elements in a causal chain anx n . All other versions of freedom wind up
violating this precept.
This implies that people must become the sort of beings who can
hear for themselves the voices of reason and understanding. Only such
people could ever hope to choose to bring themselves, one at a time,
together to form the community of intelligible freedom, the community in
which everyone obeys the laws they have made for themselves. This being
is properly called a subject, and certainly Curtis can be seen
92. Gilles Deleuze, Kant,
' 3 Crit i ca l Ph ilosophy
,
Hugh Tomlinson andBarbara Habberjam, trans. (Minneapolis, MN : University of MinnesotaPress, 1984), 30-31.
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constantly exhorting people „, h,j „P , as had Emerson before him, to aohieve a
mere and more refined subjeotivity
.
14
"
SaSy t0
*" h°" SUCh * stance might iead one to
a form of disengaged politios, that of the spectator. Curtis strove to
overcome this problem through eduoating public opinion and thcough
creating organizations. Ths civil Service Commission, however, seems t
be an essentially negative institution, charged with clearing away
social structures like party patronage which bloc, subjectivity. In
weber.s terms, Curtis opposes patriarchal institutions but accepts,
with little reflection, bureaucratic institutions, seeing clearly the
problems of personal domination, but seeing not at all those of
impersonal domination.
o
If the new institutions, the Civil Service Commission or the
Department of Agriculture, say, are understood as attempts to establish
self-legislated freedom, then the ground of that freedom will need to
reside in the institutions' ability to organize an arena of intelligible
freedom, a site where an intelligible community could, if it did ever in
fact come to exist, flourish. In practical terms this means that the
institution must not be self-defeating, a test which the spoils system
could never have passed. Nor would it build personal empires or
establish natural hierarchies, since these violate the community's
requirement for equality and the personal voice of reason present in
each member, that is, the requirement that no member be treated merely
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as means. Thi ^ wmii^
thS~ could subordinate him orherself to the organization and remain free, provided he or she believedin the organization
=! <™ a i =.goals and procedures, and that they seif_defeating, and that it allocates work on fh» K •t e basis of rationally tested
and universally aooeptable standards of merit This • ,. x is clearly a tall
order and 1 win have t„ retutn fc> ^ ^ ^
sness and
are
Both Turner and Curtis, despite their personal unique,
creativity, suoceeded in oreati„g organizational solutions which
unlikely to produce men such as themselves. « therefore u largely
irreievant whether they were personaily elitist, or ethical, or self-
interested, we can also say that modern organizations are in large part
attests to fill a vacancy left in our spiritual lives by the withdrawal
of God's providence from our Mediate lives. They insure behavior, an
arena of action, and a link with goodness which wouid be unavailable
otherwise. That organizations cannot fulfil! the terms of this promise
will be the subject of much of the rest of this dissertation. But for
now we ought to say that modern organizations grow out of our most
worthy aspirations and sentiments; freedom, dignity, love, and
spirituality.
Any great object we undertake today will have to be done as Curtis
says, "in combination," and also without final reference to any
recognized authority. I have tried to show that his consequence foil
from a history of religious concern over the disenchantment of nature.
ows
This history involved the niav ^ ^Pl y of the problem of theodicy with the
problem of frepHom v~ed . For the ^^ ^^ ^ ^
tlee Un"3S
~ ^— — - aSpiMtlons.,0 be both £ree
and^ in tandum and in tension< through a ^ ^
-atS3ies, but finally^ ys ^ ^
^ ^
laudable aspirations, and these aspirations ^ ^ ^ ^
Parties, interest groups, universities. and other complex modern
organizations. The nrnhiom t-vp oble , then, beoomes how to maintain freedom
"ithin a complex and interdependent life.
Both Turner and Curtis failed to appreciate that it isn't only
Private and personally based motives which present this problem; it
isn't Just a problem with utilitarianism. It la also a problem in even
the most meritcrious government agencies end even the most open modern
universities. Thus we can learn a great deal from Turner's critique of
classic.! education and his critiques of the older American relation to
the land. These critiques should alert us to the fact that some options
of the past, say an Aristotelean ethical relation to the world, are
probably closed to us. And we can learn much from Curtis' condemnations
Of party spirit, and be alerted to why it is that such recurring
attempts to revitalize American spirituality as evangelism,
commercialism, and discipline will never satisfy the best aspirations of
Americans for freedom. But we do not have to conclude that the problems
they uncovered are solved in their own solutions.
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CHAPTER II
IMMANUEL KANT: FREEDOM AND THE TELEOLOGY OF SELF-ASSERTION
The purpose of this chapter is to try to make some headway for a
critique of organizational freedom. I will explore, through the works
of immanuel Kant, some of the salient features of such a freedom: why we
need it, what it expects of those who enjoy it, and, finally, its limits
and failings.
There is a difficulty about the relation between a philosopher's
works and daily life. Clearly I wish to claim that Kant's philosophy i
not irrelevant to modern organizational life, yet I do not believe that
his philosophy is the cause of those organizations within which the
philosophy is practiced. We should not blame Kant for actual
institutions or governments. In fact I will assume the opposite; Kant
found himself in a world where freedom as material independence was
impossible, and articulated instead a philosophy of freedom for
extremely dependent people. I will refer to this condition as radical
interdependence
.
s
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Kant himself had achieved Ms pQsition ^^
Pnnc30Phy through perseverance
work
_ ^^ flot
SP- His U£e „orking as . professionai ^
^^
university
, he often ,t. lunch „Uh officers served ^ ^
lar9S3t
~" — - corresponded
„ith^ " h
—«-V crgani 2ed ohurches, and they au under
^ """""" '~-—
— - - Prussian state. And Kant
never doubted that he was a relat ively free ma n.
Kanf
3
.oral and political phi losophi e3 presuppose a radioal
interdependence, not merely among me^ers of the same ^
also among regiona, peoplea, and nations. The nature! world i. also
charactered by mlnute interdependencies, an governed by the neturel
laws of mutual attraction and repulaion, and yet scehow ingeniou3ly
ergani zsd 30 that Ea.i.oa might actually burn firewood which had been
carried by the Gulf stream all the „ay fro. the interior jmgie3 of the
Amazon
.
Communities of people had beoome commercial unions where "each
merger... has constant relations with all the others." Kant refers to
this as a community of reciprocal actionl, which works more like the
natural realm of attraction and repulsion than like any traditional
kJTT* 1 *^' ^^^^^ f No. 62, in Hans Reiss, editor,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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system of natural law. The di .eference between these two would be in the
continuous, even, and global nature of the reciprocity in t he first
, and
«- -re oisoontinuous and looal oharaoter of the oblivions and
P-viie.es in the latter. Kant wrote, then, against a backgrou„d of
scientific and social interdependence. In a worl d where no one is self-
sufficient-no one; no individual, no family, no citv no „.110 Cl yf nation
—there
is a problem about freedom.
Friedrich „ayek has put the problem this „ay .2 In John Locte . s
world, producers are no longer self-sufficient since they are largely
governed by markets, yet they are still in principle free because no one
tells them what to produce. One chooses how to spend one . s own days
Society comes along only after the fact to judge whether the product is
sociall, useful or not. Thus he or she is rewarded or ignored, but
never told beforehand what to do, and sociall, useful people are still
in principle free. But this model presupposes independent producers.
What happens if one is working as sav a f<i fl^"g , y, ile room manager in a large
cookie-making corporation?
It is impossible, first of all, to objectively ascertain whethe,
and how much any one person in the corporation has contributed to the
cookie. This means that there is no direct confrontation between our
manager and the market, and the decision about whether the manager's
editor
6^ "E{*Uality' Value ' ^d Merit" in Michael J. Sandel6 l 0
'
^beral Tsm *™i i ts PrjHos, (New York: New York UniversityPress, 1984), 80-99.
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work is useful or not is decided dgers. These managers may
not be using social criteria x
C°~« or even departmental
and personal goals and agendas to decide what will oe don „n b e, how valuable
xt is, and how it will be rewarded. Therefore if f „n t , reedom is thought to
require independence, socially useful people in l.P arge organizations are
in principle unfree.
For Hays, this U really nQ problem ^^ ^
orga„i Zations are significantly di£ferent ^^
£tee
"
Chan9S j °bS
— —« -haps to be, like Hayek, a
happy conservative Kantian today one would need to convince oneself that
not all microchip companies are the samP an,cn e, d perhaps they arn't. But
it seems to me that Manuel Kant takes a more courageous loo, at the
Problem. Kant does not a assume that society is massively mobile, so,
even though it is true that the Job-search has become a crucial
institution and the site of much political debate, Kant allows us to
focus more on the srpnsr^ «-pcenario of someone stuck in a tolerable but less than
compelling position.
To be free in modern life, Kant believes, takes a great deal of
cultivation. Cultivation must be aimed at creating a subject, and
freedom becomes the subjective act of choosing, one chooses to endorse
the ends and goals of other subjects, thus people freely unite in
endeavors. This is the principle of love, the principle of social
attraction. It sets up a world of freely chosen interdependences;
common
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those who one loves „k„
'
Pr°]eCtS °™ h« accepts,, are
obligated to show gratitude that reSPeCt
-
RSSPeCt
" the Principlestance. » is the f_ ^ q£ , ^f Llon
-
1 limit my own
— by respacting ths autonomy and freedom ^ Mother
"=» the other to be an entity tor lt3el£
. _
-ividuates.3 Lovs ls . f_y ^^ ^
a
-eely chosen chec. upon megalomania
. what^ ^ ^
simply the endorsement of one', ,-h=-s chains is that one chooses in light of
an overarching moral principle. This pri„ciple turM ^ ^ be
and believes one's voluntary involvements in organisations, one's
efforts at self-development, and one's commitment to a vocation all
enhance and further progress towards this end. Further in o dt iLii , r er to
better comprehend this end, one requires a certain4 amount of leisure,
freedom of thouaht- a^n = • •Lnougnt, and a minimum of affluence Th„ uiii , Throughout Kant's
«orks, actions can be at times legitimately coerced, but minds and
intentions must be left completely free. This is so that the system of
interdependencies can incorporate a mechanism for self-criticism, to
Prevent its becoming a simply dead routine. One way to sum all this up
would be to say that our organisations would have to be voluntary, as
opposed to instrumental^ rational, or, in Kant's famous phrasing,
3. Immanuel Kant, Met
Part 2, Nos
. taphor of Mor i11 l> Part Ir# Elements of Ethi
Zvirtu,
in
^
a
H
eS Ellington
'
trans
-' a^ei^ph^ic^i
^^^^-^Xt^ (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964),
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people would never be treats ^ n* ated merely as means, but as ends in
themselves
.
™is is a rather long llst and _ mlght be , usti£iabiy skeptioai
of our being able evpr t-o*a ^x e o achieve it Y^i- a ii „ fet ll of ltS elements appear in
the self-understandings of people „s ^ _ ^ ^ ^ ^^
as, whether theSe conditions are ever ^ x uill^ ^
list as a text to be interpreted. Most ordinary men a„d women today
"Ml
" «—io. governmental, corporate, or
collectivism Whether they cling to items in the list because these
ward off anxiety or becanse they really d0 choose their sitnations,
either way, people today rightfully guard their freedom, and it is my
purpose here to further their aspirations. This critigue of
organizational freedom is meant, then, to light up, as it were, from the
inside, this formula for freedom, to see what else it commits us to.
Some of these unseen commitments, I believe, are self-defeating for the
aspiration of freedom, and yet they are implied by it too. The purpose
for exposing these other commitments is to ask whether and to what
extent they might be revised, loosened up, or even, perhaps,
acknowledged as necessary, though unwelcome and transient, evils.
1. The Ot-hpr K^nti^n w^yg
I find over and over how features of the modern age seem pre-set
in advance by Immanuel Kant. In Nietzsche, for instance, it seems to me
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-t the doctline 0£ the £ternai Recurrence of ^ ^ ^
— works. In the c^i,,,,^^
^ ^
The value of life fn
(by the natural end of th^sum of^IrT bY Bhat "e «njoyhappiness), is easy to decide L ? inclinations, that is by
would enter li fe afresh under ' the same 00^™^ ^ "h°
Or again, „hen Michel Foucault ^ ^ ^ _
construotion oreated out of a multiplicity of drives, ur3es, positions
and thought, he is perhaps taking a path which Kant, in the CiUo^
Often noted, hut refused to oonsider.5 in faot all that
stands between Poucaulfs multiplicity and Kant . s transcendental unity
Of apperception is universal reason. Neither a unified self nor a
unified field of ejects are ever said by Kant to be direotly known.
The unity of experience itself is, alcng with the self and its obj ects,
an imposition upon material which may or may not resale our knowledge,
our concepts, or our aspirations as free beings. Kant, of course,
claims we act as Reason's agents when we dc this, but were we to become
unconvinced of this claim while keeping the rest of his philosophy, the
result would look very much like Foucaulfs multiplicity. Kant himself
often points this out, and usually dismisses , t- uHt-h i-v,y i wit the argument that
we can not coherently think of ourselves other than as coherent
Meredith^
Kant
' Part II, no. 22, James Creedredith, trans., (Oxford: Oxford University Press
, 1986) 97
*'
'TT Kant ' ^^-^ ^ P"rP P^son, Norman Kemp Smith, trans ,(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), B131-B136.
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belng othet than . systematlc unity avaiiabie ^
themselves could be completely otherwise.
This list could go on MarH n o. ti Heidegger discovers that Kant,
despite himself perhaps, owes his best insiaht, *«51 g s to an essentially
phenomenological, rather than hi* =n ls avowed epistemological, mode of
enquiry.
6 Certainly few phenomenologists have penetrated deeper into
our experiences than did Kant in the first critique
.
I have selected these three examples, first of all, because I
intend to follow them somewhat. Patrick Riley has recently written that
in the face of Kant's later political writings no rigid distinction
between deontology and teleology ought to be attributed to Kant
. 7 I
have already taken this one step further by assuming that deontology is
a necessary fiction for people living in a situation of radical
interdependence. A second reason to note these three examples is that
they allow us to see the curious way in which modern thinkers have so
often come back to Kant. They come back by the other road, the other
Kantian way, the one he indicated but did not pursue. In so honest a
6. Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, Barton and Deutsch, trans(Latham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1985)
7. Patrick Riley, "Autonomy and Teleology in Kant" review essay, The.Review of Pol j ti ps
, 50, (Summer 1988): 490-95.
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thkkei ' S b°0kS
-
*~
'
— * «- - eluded thoughts, the
other conceptiona and the proscribed a^ ^
The D^at
_h of Ah^]
x »iu be3in by exploring one of Kant , s utei ocMsionai^
"The Speculative Beginning of Human History, - read here as . soct of
9ene0l09J
°
f m°d"n^ ** oration, As in all his Uf
"Orxs. Kanfs piece on history gives , fleshed Mt discussion ^^
important part3 and premlses ln the eariler critiquea
_ ^ ^
critical philosophy these uter dlscussions ^ Wstory
_
^ ^
Enlightenment, or progress are mentioned as presuppositions. Like„ise,
everything in these easaya Presupposes the concluaions of the earlier
critiques
.
Reaaon ia a great j0xer. It gives u3 science, but ieads us astray
aiac into metaphysical presumption. It ia thus the precondition for
both sclentism a„d pseudo-mysticism. It makes us £ree
, but in doing so
ma.es us anxious and, together with imagination, renders us sieves to
acquisitiveness and greed. It destroys the innocence of natural man,
but only to render him guilty. It destroys paradise, but mates us free
by making ua work. It is the fall of man and the hope of salvation. As
in Rousseau it intensifies sexual desire, and thus renders love and
marriage possible, but at the same time, introduces infidelity into
human relations. Reason allows one to plan for the future and render
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life more predictable, yet if om *V xt nly does 30 by making one homeless andinsecure, splendidly nH seraKi Qmi ble. Reason displaces instinct and convertsits natural iongings into voiuptueusness thenp o , creates the realm of
refusing the voluptuous impulses it has created.
sensuaftfii^stic attract"^ T^ £"» "»
eventually to love 8
ttraCtl °ns
-
£rom "ere animal desires
Since instinct is largely silenced, it might he worth mentioning
that instinct is "that ^ic^ that all animals obey," which
Permitted natural man, Mam perhaps,
-to use several things for
nourishment, hut forbade others,. Thus when
..reason soon began to stir
and sought by means of comparing foods..,. to eventually
..coo, up
an urge to avoid,.
.9 we not only became voluptuous, we lost the only
direct voice with which God spea.s on earth. Rational beings cannot be
once they have surveyed the "glistening misery which our reason builds
around us, tc return to some state of natural equilibrium are simply
being nihilistic
. 1
0
HumXev
e\ Kant SPeCulative Beginnings of Human History," in '
u!!^!Y:...
anS
:'
^Petual P^p ^Qth^^^, (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 52
9. Ibid., 50-51.
10. Ibid., 59.
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This remaking of ourselves „as . boW foreboding ^ aeif_
MSerti0n
"
"hlCh
~— «~hy of Ms rigbtful place in
the creation as the designated ruler of the earth but ,un , also rendered
himself perpetuaiiy discontented, and thus incapable of living „ in
bovine contentment and slavish servitude... Thus unworthy and
discontented, man knows himself a, „»i (l.r s neither master nor servant. Men know
they are too corrupt to command. In Kant this always means they knew
they should bring about a state of affairs in which the cultural world,
which men build in place of their instinctual one, would reflect and
make natural our highest moral aspirations. But because we are
unworthy, we cannot trust one another enough to create such a world.
The unworthiness of individuals is our riai'l™ «^ x da ly experience, and the
unworthiness of states is the experience of every war.
Yet if in the name of natural existence we abandoned the
aspiration to rule our world, if we tried to recreate the bliss of Haiti
or Romanticism or the polls now, that would be, in Nietzsche- s phrase,
to try to be stones in a great edifice. Kant says we could not be happy
natives in Haiti, nor really even happy subjects in a modern state.
Thus Reason has placed us in an existential bind. In terms of
Aristotle's well known phrase, modern people can neither rule nor be
ruled. We cannot rule because we are limited by the difference between
our moral aspirations and our moral capacities. We are unable to be
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ruled because we are unable to confirm „ne our aspirations, desires, andimaginings within i-^ -i >l the limits which civic virtue wonlHv j.i_i.ue u d require.
X would also add, ln llght 0£ Rant , s imperative ^
People aa means, 3ince such an lmperative makes sense ^ ^ ^^ ^
which treating people as me incr(,rtiK . tedibly tempting, that anyone today
Practicing civic virtue, say an ^erican steelwork wbo accepts a pay
from S16 to 59 an hear because ha understands the ccantry needs to
be mere competitive in internationai markets and because he believes
union demands since 1945 have hurt the U q *o.S. economy as a whole; such a
person will simply be used peuY . F w of us today could accept such a pay cut
without feeling degraded. In a realist world one must either
artificially keep oneself in
-bovine contentment," or defensively refuse
to practice civic virtue p*t-K^. Either way, we prove ourselves unworthy of
our best aspirations, whether of ruling or being ruled.
in Kant's myth of human beginnings, when reason began to dispiace
instinct, the first human development was the nomad. The nomad led a
simple life; he required only mobile families to sustain himself. He
was not permanent, required nc absolute property rights, and therefore
no systematic exclusions cr enclosures. He was rough, but relatively
self-sufficient. However he was already a reasoning being who wanted
more than mere survival. Some nomads, perhaps seme of the women or
younger brothers, began to practice agriculture.
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Agriculture requires more elaborate cultural anrt •d social systems.
Farmers must enclose i anr* ^land, demand water r-irrht-* ^ jigh s, and develop economies of
eXcha„ge
. They requlre more security ^ ^^
VUla9eS « -— a problera
. The _d
and the tatmer di3agreed completeiy , ustice ^ ^the fa^er formed village3 in order to him3elf „ ^ ^
Posaible from Cho3e „ho followed the herding <Gen 4;i6)n They ^d
thia "in ordor t0 protect their property against ^ ^^
0, wanderin, herdsmen,.n It is the a9riculturalists
, says^ ^
deveioped cuiture, art, indnstriouanesa, civil constitutions and
administrated justice.
2rSiSLL£3£"S; S huT arts ' of "hich- - r^iun ry are the most worthwhile ronin
^tsrs^s rac? couid muitipiy ^' fcro°™
sent everywhere LLualL^
6
;
^ educated colonists could be
evils but Till' f
ln£aUiil
t
ty am°ng men-that source of so many
^Lre^s^Ltlr^^""9 9°°d-alS °^ ^. period
But to backtrack a little, we need to remember that Kant s task
here is an interpretation of Genesis. The farmer and the herdsman are
none other than Cain and Abel. Kant says:
...[T] he herdsman... hates property ownership because it limits his
envied^ ZVT* ^ ' The **** seem tonvied the herdsman as being more blessed by heaven (Gen 4-4)
while in fact the herdsman annoyed the farmer enormously as longas he remained in the neighborhood, for grazing cattle do notspare the farmer's crops
.... (Because these incidents could not be
11. Ibid., 56.
12. Ibid., 56-57.
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farmer who first used
hat the herdsman did not
Finally the farmer se>n* r- a *-~<,par tes, removes himself, from those who
follow the herding life Aft-^r- . i. ter a long tome, the herdsman sucoumbs to
the sensuous allurements o-f the village and the nomads are finally
completely assimilated.
But the Bifcla uses stronger imagery. Cain murdered Abel, and
Kant, While Seeking to rationalize the passage
, aotually
S" °£ US drSad£Ul ^"-tions, since we are the heirs, net e £ Abel,
bet of Cain, the agriculturalist who slew his brother the herein.
Kant's myth of our beginnings only barely conceals a collective
.order,
and one based in resentment. Abel's offering had seemed more acceptable
to God. Again Kant offers a clue. The nomads "acknowledged God alone
as their ruler" while the farmers and villagers recognized "a man
(government) as their ruler (Gen 6:4," m the footnote Kant explains
that since nomads have no fixed property to protect, families are free
to leave whenever they feel dissatisfied. It is impossible to impose a
strong ruler over such people. We can imagine nomads, then, as less
diffident, less circumspect, and more self-confident than the
villagersl4 who had to care more for their neighbor's good opinion of
13. Ibid., 55-56.
PartT^^ ^is . a"itude of savage superiority rather often. Inart I of the Metaphysio of Moral', at No. 53, he puts it this way:
...Citizens will not intermix with any neighbouring people who live ina state of nature, but will consider them ignoble, even though such
savages for their own part may regard themselves as superior on account
96
themselves and who haH 4-« ^d to drscrpline themselves to good manners
being punished for something. m fact bn , h K ,t , ot Kant and the refer to
agricultural work as punishment, and the nomaH'., d a n d s manner probably
constantly reminded the farmer that he lived a life of adversity The
nomads would certainly have scoffed at such a heavy life. But the
farmers knew that they were more complex, more sophistioated, more
cultured, more mannerly, more developed, and less barbaric than the
nomads. How could these savages lead such charmed lives. How could
they presume so much. How could they en joy the favor of God ?
Clearly Kant identifies with Cain more than with Abel. To
understand this we must remember that Abel is a younger brother, and
thus Cain is not overthrowing traditional or patriarchal authority as
in, say, Freud, though herding is in some sense older and prior to
agriculture. On a developmental scale, herding is more childish and
agriculture more adult. Thus, there is a teleology at work, and in
terms of teleology Cain must supersede Abel, the older must replace the
ycunger. Thus, even though the parents may have been happy herdsmen, by
the time the children approach adulthood, the situation may have
changed. If the first agriculturalists were simply herdsmen who allowed
their reason to expand their desires, and if herdsmen are not simply
°H^Li a"';f freedC"" they h3Ve chosen." In Reiss, Kanf., Pnl i
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'ho now
instinctual beings, then th* h.e apPy lnnocence Qf the herdsme^ ^know about and probably trade with the vill™rllagers, might be mQre fei
and studied than it was for-r the parents. Thus the herdsme„ might not be
"
SeP"ate
~
SUPeri
" "
- «- P-hlem about
herds eating the farmer's crops hegins to resemble the mo.ern
independence, herding could plausibly maintain itself as a form of happy
innocence taking its direction oniy fro, the Mediate voice of Cod in
nature. In the interdependent world of the children h„nnaren, owever, the claim
indistinguishable from a license to plunder, viewed from the nomad,
side, innocence might have become unhaPPy innocence due to the anxiety
created by the agriculturalist's prohihitions; pronations which the
ncmad indeed could not recognize as le9itimate or even understand. But
because he xnew he did net understand something, the thought would
fester and make him anxious. !5 Cain's hard and patient »„rk must
somehow come to he respected because the sii^Uan has changed.
Kanfs myth Probab ly tells us more about eighteenth Century Europe
than about our earliest ancestors, hut the point is that Kant's
prehistory begins self-ccnscicusly with murder, force, exclusion, and
15 Soren Keirkegaard, The Concept of f^-joty, Reldar Thomte andAnderson, trans., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1980, tl .
Unlve I
CTe°tl0n P°int6d °Ut t0 me * P«er F »ve he
™ L«. T USSttS C°mp"ati- "terature Department. Por aslightly different account see Charles Taylor, "Rationality,"EbUo Bnph,r n i P , Po r - M z , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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assimilation of the nomads And fh.3- t e nomads were closer and more
Ufe in „hich lt might plausibly ^ heacd b^ thia
a by „hioh everyone kne„ ha murdered ws^ ^^
^is mar, i. open to many di££erent interpretationSj ^ certainiy
indicates that Ahpi '« ^.fi, .oe s death is some sort of smpH.ir candal. it constitutes an
indigestibl e event in Cai„. 3 constitution,
. part o£ Ms identity^
he can neither rePudiate nor accept. *et it is als0 „hat protects Cain
He is now, because or his deed
, aiienateo from the scil, and is thus a
wanderer „hom ethers might He thus ^ ^ ^ ^
neither n« not a9 riguituraiist any longer
, ^ . ^ ^
wanderer
.
in Kant's version the mar, is absent, but in its place we find
government. Government acts as a voice of Abel reminding people that we
are unworthy and corrupt. It does this by reminding us that we are the
sort of people who require government to secure our property and
voluptuousness. We require an impartial system of justice, and our
world, the one we prefer to live in, is not a very nice place. In this
way Kant enlists Abel's voice, the Other's scoffing voice, in the very
project by which Abel was excluded. The victim becomes the accomplice
in his own victimization, but in such a way that he will need to be
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continually remurdered s j n „0 K
'
Sl ce he continually incites iny us that whichneeds controlling.
Agriculturalists founded vill,™
they f
lageS erSCted "ments becauseeared the nomads. One finds t-his event mentioned in almost
marginal remark in virtually all of Kant • s books xD . i am suggesting we
no longer read past these ro fQ
ctherwise brilliant philosophical exposition The DP^gress which Kantinvisions in human affairs is" C °ntin9ent upon this original act of
withdrawal, exclusion, murder, and assimil.t- imilation. Nor is there any easy
return to a happier innocence. For better or fos r worse we have created
ourselves as unworthy and discontented. if there is nocn way to limit
desires anymore, and therefore no easv w„„ *y ay to promote happiness, then
Perhaps there is hope in the other direction fh - ,a , t at of unleashing desire
and self-assertion. Unhappiness might be a sour t-ny il o p o progress, and
progress might be the route t-n *o a new more intelligible and self-
conscious form of innocence.
3. laiaalagy
To call the defeat of Abel by Cain progress is not something
justified by our merely observing the facts in the case. It comes
rather from the imposition of a teleology. To understand this teleology
better I „1U be discussing the CrlUaauaf Teleomo^, llllSassmi 16
16. Immanuel Kant, Critin„ 0 of .n,^„m„ t Part
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What teleology asserts here is that- »,at what is contrary to nature;
,
murder and tillage of the soil
' ^ StUl be redeemable since thesethings allow us to gl impse in their
,
.
SSUlt an order beyond the merelv
«. -— to a bUnd mechanism of_ n? ^
^ that natu
- >—
—— oultlvatlon
. The
agriculturalist asserts against a ,„rW that iso ia possibly i n vain that .
An organized being possesses inherent f„
moreover, as it oan impart to materL,^^ P°""' and 5uch 'which it organizes. This thereto " ° f lt"™t.ri.lformative power, which cannot be Slaved ""-P^-tin,movement alone, that is to say, b^SS^.Jf ° £
lying
Teleology is a
..secret reeling of the existence o £ something
*eyond ,.l 9 People require once theu ^^^^^^ ^ ^
off from nature, first «« ao
'
Say
'
33 Savages Adorning themselves foolishly
with feathers and earthen Dainf k„+.p t, but more importantly as farmers
providing for themselves rationally bV ridina hnY Dy 9 orses or plowing with
Pi*s, asses, and oxen.20 Kant brings up these examples to shew that
teleology does net arise with Just any whole. Natural man lives in a
whole but coesn.t xnow it could be otherwise. The xind of whole that
be'come^ck^i.e^ai;,^ 8^
31111510
"
t0 natur« ,s "aging Abel t0
18. Ibid., 22.
19. Ibid., 11.
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calls for teleology i s fln 0gy 13 a ar^i^ whole, that 1.
though it functions
p 1 .
11 C °Uld
^ — been otherwisePeople in societies bring
itself ,„
-elat.ons ln ways that nature bvwould never bring about and I, xn ways answering merely to theirown cultivated desires annSl d a spi rations. one can *nHU
'
a d perhaps must,
"
thlS f°™ °f h
-—
- -
-ogy
, t0 th8 entirety ofthe world c ° £
anrmals, and even, on however 1™ a oJ?^ 6Xist as" st al
= ° not be absent. But in th.? ' "
rati°™l animals,
that are indispensable for c '
Ca =S
'
thoss things
as ends of nature. 21 existence must equally be regarded
allianoe U*. that between Laplanders and their reindeer, or
the use of Brazilian firewood by Eskimos t-M „o t , his does not mean that
Lapland or the Arcfir ^an k~otro c be assumed to be the natural and proper homes
have displaced people to such inhospitable regions. 22 Thus, their
living there is a result of the human rebellion against the natural
state, and their ability to survive there is a result of the human
this—nature especially provides us with the abilih, -Ln o i ty to open-endedly
21. Ibid.
22. inmanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in Reiss, 110.
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have ends, without specifying them in detailm aH, as wlt h sheep-it is notnatural teleology in the way
t . .
' Arist °tle. s is. Ratherf
eleology of self-assertion.
The schema for this teleology runs as fftl .57 3 33 °llows
-23 First come the
s^ective ends of individual3
, pursuu o£ ^^^^^ ^
~U, push people tQ ^^^^ a sooiai^ ^ ^«*• the next group o£ ends the ^ ^^ ^
—re, discipline, l a„, and administration. Next ms* " "S «. end of creation lt5elf
™- is represented already in the second^ ^ ^ ^
"OIk
"""^
~*»* the good 01 the „hole „orld
,
„here
S "biKtiVe ^ °bjeCti- «* There may fce a fMth
Stage, which „U1 be outside scQpe of
uhsrs ReasQn
and Spirituality are f±nauy found ^^ same objectivs eRds 24
It is worth „oting that
, for Rant( all teleologies hithecto^
trie, to found themselves in the second stage. That is, they nave tried
to discover in social discipiine the fulfillment of the search for
happiness and have not seen that the seoond stags is aotoa lly oniy one
stage in a progression of judgments. Kant's criticisms of this view
^1^^^^^ «»t - -ndred pages of Kant.
HovtT^u^^c^f"
41^ I. M. Green andoyt H. H dson, trans., (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing,
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will be discussed in detain k i" a xl below, but fi r^ to t st I need to discuss the
characteristic of qpi fSelf-asSerttOH in philosophy
B
' ^^^^^^^
- -apter I( x sxplored in , prelimlnacy gropin9 ^
-ation between treedom and organization
, z dw th±3 ^ ioQkin9 ^
—
r
y o £ . religious problematio
_ ^ disenchantment ^ ^
world, and by noticing ho„ varloua pressures in ^ ^M
"
t0 "ticulate organizational responses to it T. Immanuel Kant was
also concerned with the relrgrous problematic
. 25 In £act
, the logic Qf
all Kanfs mature wor.s tyPicall y bsgi „s „lth the premUe ^^
-es not disclose to as any immediate truths-not even about desires and
Pleasures-nor can it bear witness to the essence of Sod. Mature
answers truthtull, only those guestions with which humans interrogate
it
.
and that it must not allow itselr t k a
°f " S °"n '
prL
u
c
r
r;i
s
es
ea
f
n9
r
trin9s
'
tut
-
ust *™^ the wir:itnn
2X^^^ earliSr W°rk - Hans Saner,
^^^f^ri^T' 7 ; 7 . , tranS -' (Chica^ The University
(New Haven- yT n Cassxrer, KiU1t^j[iifJ>_JLr^^: Yale University Press, 1981), 58-65.
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so, however, i n the character of,that the teacher chooses to say IT*? *h° liStSnS to everythingcompels the witness to an e L ° f « W^ted judge wL ?formulated. 26 questions which he has himself
In a
t%
^
ClSar K3nt ' S iS
* P-^3oPhy of self-assertion
world in which the direct voice of CodG cannot be read authoritatively
-m MtKe
, human endeavors must be seen ^ originatin9^^9M1S Md
"
pl" tl
~
" th
" «-
-— This basicP^ise has radical impllcations oniy physics
_ ^^
religion, and politics as well it- ™0 i
'
Jt 9°eS al °n
^ With Kant's doctrine that
-ngs-in-themselves are unknowable by us, and that there can therefore
be no naturally valid claims to Pledge about how to act, how to
worship, or how to arrange human affairs But it i ,Sl x also follows that
desires, including pleasures
_ ^ priviie9ed^^ ^
nature of Cod and of ultimat9^ ^^ _
Und6tStlndi"9 " ~" ~ - experienced That nature has lost
its status as a teacher and now only assumes significance as a witness
should alert us that Kant, faith cannot rese^le that of Rousseau's
Savayard Priest, nor can his ethics rese.able either Aristotle. s or
Bentham 1 s
.
Kant finds it impossible to think of revealed religion, or any
other version of Christianity based on historical evidence, as anything
but a dogmatic pseudo-service of God. 28 The authority of tradition,
26 Immanuel Kant, I^iiious^^r^Re^n
,
Bxiii, 20
-Critigup of PnrP R QJ<J ^ n j A613/B641, 513
28. imimanuel Kant, EeJ^^ii^^^ 159 _ 73
_
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family, estate, or church are at th»i kexr best merely self-imposedimmaturity Anw „~y -y v.rsion of athics baaed m priMipie ^
is antithetical to either f „
PP^ess
freedom or relioinn k«gxo because it completely
^ PS0Ple U^ - b~ - •™ causal mechanism 29But there i3 a further reason „hy ^ ^ ^^ ^
—t, The maxims of happiness oQmpieteiy contingMt ^ ^
situation and what one desirp, „a es or requires from it R„r. But situations are
—e. Thus maxiras 0£ happiness ^ ^^
"ni'CISally ValW rUl
" f« «— ~e, and thls
, in tu„, leads
" «~- — « Sieves we an ln fact
alCMdy hSVe
' " ~ ^^
' —* .. the revelation pf
an intelligible world through realization e otherwise transcendent
concept of freedom. "30
come
TO help understand the nature of Kant s break with earlier
thinkers one might compare rho.as Aguinas. notion of plaoe with Kanf
notion or spaoe. I, Aquinas the politioal proble, often see.s to
down to putting everything in its proper piace. One can also read
Aristotle or Shakespeare in terms of finding, discovering,
rediscovering, or realising a proper order of places, m Kant there
likewise is a beautiful order to be realised, and a perpetual progress
towards it, but now things no longer have places, only positions. These
positions are not absolute states of being (which is why existence
29. I^anuel Kant, Cr i t ique of Pr , cUra1 peasoQ / Le„ is
30
ran
Md.
^acn,^^ an Publishing Co., 1985,, 10 7-08.
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cannot be a real predicate) For in „,
-stance, pleasure is not a state pureand sxxnple, out the result of Etonian clashes of foSS ° rces
-
If anything
nu Und of Place
,
„h_ all piaoes essentiauy ^
- better thought of as spacei a homogeneous Md^ piaceiessness
Rather than an ordering or a hierarohy of piaoes onPJ-ac , e organizes things
"ithin the general eoonomy of space. In fac , it ,i t is a general condition
for any experience whatsoever.
Thus in politics one doesn't see, to restore things to their
Places, but cather aims ,t ratiQnal progress ^ ^ ^
consult the natural order is not to discover natural right, but to
subject oneself to natural causality, that is t„ .n , o surrender one's ends
to forces beyond one's control 31 Thus ift seems a rather lame criticism
of Kant to compare his ethir-^ »„ .ics to, say, Aristotle's, discover that
Aristotle's ethics is embedded in richly vsried found „ays of people's
being together while Kant's is based upon . cold end ehstreot duty, and
from there conclude that Kant misses the rich fabric of life, while
Aristotle captures it, and, finally, opt for an Aristotelian ethics ^
moder„ity.32 Such criticism ignores the „ays in which Aristotle's
ethics and politics are bound up in the self-sufficiency of the polls,
31 Hans Saner,
-Kant's PHiMr,] Though, 56; Hans Blumenberg, Th£
Robert M. Wallace, trans.,
.CaJLSge, MA :
32. Philip H. Jos, Polity 21, (Winter 1988) 321-43.
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Aristotle's physics, and especially r vGreek aesthetics
. 33 Kant is a
compelling figure because he tried to nr+> ,artxculate a conception of freedom
^
3 th°rOUghlY
—
—
«™ for people whose history had been
CrOSS6d
^
ChriStianit
- "*——
,
lives could not be based in
any form of self-sufficiency. The situation v,y m , here, is far from
beneficent
If nature is disenchanted it makes a great deal of sense to
articulate a morality based on respect and t-„, o say that "Respect always
appXies to persona, neve, to things,. In . oisenonanteo nature,^
reoeive no respeot. They are resources avaUable tor use ano mastery .
Thus in a disenchanted nature human lire, as a part of nature, becotes
another instruct for use unless humans can be made so.ehow special, in
this case, objects of respect.
Probably Kant's most complete discussion of these issues comes in
thS
There, in his critique of
Spinoza, Kant argues that nature, by itself, cannot render any viable
conception of an intelligent purpose, that is, no teleology.
33. For the relation of Aristotle's virtues to his science, see AlasdairMaclntyre, Aft^vixt^ (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre DamePress, 1981), 139. Maclntyre refers to Aristotle's "metaphysicalbiology." For the relation of the virtues to aesthetics see SorenKierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety
,
16-17; compare with Aristotle'sNichomachPan Kthi^, B k IV, Ch. 3, especially at 1125a where the great-
souled man embodies the virtues of masculine perfection, beauty, andgoodness.
34. Immanuel Kant, Critique of JnHa^nt, Part II.
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"6re
"~
° £ MS
"~—— justifiably MU _
Thus, to answer the question; why is evervth' •Y y hing
D ust the way it is and
no other way; what i « n,„
,3 the purpose o£ our being ^ earth?
^ Spinoja
C0"CePti0nS
'
""""^
~— apply to the material
We are here to work- nnt- <-kout the vatMU3 ways of God's being, to participate
in that, and to find meaning in it.
The problem with Spinous world of substrate and accident is that
it contains no contingency. The seeming design of the world turns out
to be really nothing but the Supreme Cause's unfoiding of itseif. Such
a Being doesn't so much cause the world as sustain it. « final causes
are analogous to a iandlord causing a house to be built to realize the
idea of rent, where rent is the determining ideal condition for building
the house, then the appropriate analogy for Spinoza's scheme of
Substance and its accidents would be an athlete and her perspiration.
Perspiring i3 just a by-product of exercise. It is foolish to as k why
She bothers to produce it, it is just in the nature of her constitution
to do sc. Kant's first criticism of Spinoza, then, is that the Supreme
Substance might be very powerful, but needn't be very smart, very moral,
109
or, finally, even omnipotent, since for alle we can know there could be
S"ethin5 mOIe
«~— «- s™ CMS8 0£ the world
. 35
Kant's second criticism is that the proof ^ ^ ^ ^
need, a O&^i^n^r of the world m fh.a
"
In t e modern age, when we ask
theologically „hy things fit together a systematic uhoie> ^
assume several things. For instance
, things do ^ ^^ ^ ^
held by mechanical forrp<? = +- „^ces at certain coordinates in space. Things
possess a radical contingency. They mlght have „ound up ^^
configurations, both internally and spatially; that is, they are
organized. The question of teleology would arise for as oat of the
world of causality and contingency, rather than out of places and
hierarchy. m a world of places and hierarchy it is reassuring to
articulate a teleology of substance and accident. God is the solid
ground we walk upon, the guarantee of a rightly ordered cosmos, the
beneficent provider, and that which enables one to participate in a l ife
cf integration with God, nature, and community. But for us, the world
which generates the teleological question is not a whole in which we
need to account for diversity, but rather a multiplicity that just
happens to be organized in a certain way. m a world of contingency and
mechanical causality, to reply to the question concerning ultimate
purposes with the theory of substance and accidents is not reassuring at
35. On the limitations of God's omnipotence by the material He must bepresumed to shape in Kant's early work see Ernst Cassirer, Kant's Life
and Thought, 59-60.
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all, because it makes one the subject of a hr „o: blind necessity, l ike any
other animal
A continent, yet still
.oral, „orld^^ ^ ^ ^
together not by . su.stance, hut by
. design
. Design u hocizon
against which
. contingent „orW cm ^ contingen^ ^^
could have been ooordinated or ^ coordinatsd ^ irfinite^ o£
other „ays. There U nothing even In the incredible coordinating ^ ^
oak tree that suggests any necessity of its oraani^r'9 mzation, yet it brings
together an array of disparate Aerials into a thriving successful
organise How dld all those materials know to go cosine themselves
into an oak tree. Our conceptual cogent to efficient causality
fails us here.
It is possible to draw an analogy to a construction project. The
steel, the glass, the clay in the bricks all need not be together in a
building, and they certainly could not have put themselves together that
way, yet there they are. They are together because someone with a
design in mind called for them to be placed there in just such a
relation to one another. if we ask again why the designer did this, the
next reply might be that she did so in order to gain rent money from the
building's office spaces. Thus an idea, rent, works as a final cause,
that which is at once the cause and the effect of the placement of the
building materials in the building. Something analogous to rent is what
moderns are looking for when they ask the teleological question.
Ill
in a continent werld must be
, first
, ,^ and
_^ ^
erlyrng substance doesn't help at all, because both
OO* and humans would be sublet to the blind nece3sities of ^^
in reality blind mechanism rules all.
We require our designer god to have one more ma j0r attribute
—Ute. Continue, has two edges. On one side it grants to human
individuals autonomy, it allows for the possibility of free activity
.
On the other, it threatens those same individuals with determinism God
is needed to guarantee the first by staving off the second. The way
Kant answers this difficulty is by formulating a moral teleology.
Through teleology we can glimpse having access to a form cf causality
other than efficient causality.
The argument against Spinoza is just one of the many different
ways in which Kant shows that knowledge of nature can never yield a
conception of God. God is not discoverable in nature. This means that
the traditional link between nature and morality is broken, in much the
way it was for Abel's behavior. Modernity is the era of a fact-value
split
.
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The old way bega n with an ontology designed toyy secure certainty
the nat"e
°
f God
-
d
-— - - „as established
, one
J""
PrinClPl
- "— ^ - ... The problem
had become that ln . iadicany Mntingent ^ o
'
— ana the soul „ould have to res_ie scientific ^ ^
— - vocabulary, theoretioal kno„iedge
_ ^ uhich ^^
— - causal la„3
. But o£ course
, fM Kant> theoreticai knouiedge
=an refer o„ly to objects of a possible experience
_ au
attempts to understand God in the samP Mae w y we understand nature have
become completely unconvincing God 1« *mg. is supersensible; beyond any
possible experience.
Kant turned the entire procedure aroun^ Qiven huMn ^
begins, what can we kno„ about Qod and sQui? ^ ^ ^
term of saying that he „ho desires the ^ dssices meaM ^^
it. 37 Thus the conception of God at which Kent arrives is not
theoreticai, but practical. Nor does it involve us in a Mind
necessity, as would any conception derived from nature, because it acts
as an assurance freely accepted rather than a brute fact. 38
Since God and soul are means to the moral ends of freedom, Kant
spends a great deal of the Critique of T,l„lmi .„ ^-m - nt
elaborating a conception of moral ends. „e must, of course, argue that
36
- Cr i tique of .Tn^orn t- ) Part IT/ 147 _ 49
37. Ibid., 142.
38. Ibid.
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his reader, upon reflection win a1, x also endQrse these ^
needs to find a conception of ends that all „<*s moderns could in principle
adopt. His answer is as fniifollows: all human being5i he ^.^ ^ ^
m0ral intSrSSt
" — * — — always been th6 oase that
People thought it made . difference „hether they
_ ^ ^ ^
when acting rightly oarrled no
It could never be t-h^t- 4->,^ •
has acted fairly or £als * ^J^" »" . Aether . manto his life's end as far =1 k equit y ° r "«h violence, albeit
brought him „„ 1 ' ,- ^: «" -e, his virtues ha^
as though they perceive" vo "e^TL"" PU"" h-«- « seemsa difference. 39 " them saV tha t it must make
comes the notion that there is something for which people must strive
At the basis of humen being Kent finds a moral vocation,, to strive for
the supreme good of the world. This vocation to pursue the creation of
a world where the possible might be actual, simply because it is good,
is the main precise in Kant's moral proof for God's existence. The germ
of this vocation has been with us from the start, but has had to grow up
along with the progressive culture of reason. Kant's most rigorous
version of the argument for moral teleology runs as follows. 4 0
PI. If there is some final end, that is, some ideal for which
everything else exists, it must be man as a subject, not a creature, of
39. Ibid., 120.
40. Ibid., 114-19
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-ral laws. Kant gives four reasons for this all ba Hu n , sed in long prior
discussions
.
Mm. the world „ould ba „orthless if dw Mt ^ ^
world would become valuable for all ™men would have to be an end to which
we could all subscribe unconditionally.
the quest for human happiness,,! since happiness provides only relative
ends, which, as we have seen, are too open-ended, changeable, and
volatile to act as a final end. 42 Just because we know that everyone in
fact values happiness doesn't tell us why people should exist in the
first place, or cf any worth we might possess which justifies our
attaining happiness. We would need a statement to the effect that
because of purpose X, people's existence ought to be made agreeable.
But it is that purpose for which we are searching, what is in question
Is exactly why or how we can be justified in assuming that nature is or
could be disposed to "accord with the conditions of [man's) happiness."
Happiness is not self- justifying43 For the same reason contemplation
cannot be the final end of mankind. 44 The "existence of the world could
not acquire a worth from the fact of its being known." Contemplation
41. Ibid., 88-93.
42. Ibid., 108. See also Rousseau's Bailfi, Allan Bloom, trans., (New
York: Basxc Books, Inc., 1979), 81.
43. Ibid., 108-09.
44. Ibid.
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therefore receives its wnrt-h *ort from „hat ls contemplated
^
»>—g is lntimately c_oted ^ ^d
no matter what our situation. m fact n„ ,, peopie search tor a final end
because our situation cannot justify lt3elf
.
Third, the «« end must must reside somehou be^nd natMe
_ ^
everything in „ature is conditloned ^^ ^^ ^
conditioned. since the argument bsgins with the presupposition that
natural order of causality, therefore, forth, there must he a moral law
utilizing a different sort of causality, otherwise there is no basis for
^eedom, since the moral law, as a causality beyond natural mechanism,
is the formal condition for our freedom.
P2. The moral law obligates us to strive towards the highest good
possible through freedom, the
-.Ua,,^ Kant has shown ^
morality as freedom commands we strive, as autonomous rational
individual, for what is good without regard to self-interest or sensual
desire. Vet, at the same time that people are rational, they are also
finite beings, and the only end available for rational fi^ beings is
happiness. Therefore the highest possible physical good is happiness in
45. Ibid., 99-100
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conformity with the moral law; a state h, by the way, in which the split
—
.
«- says Kaat; onoe conceived; ls an idea ^
both the cause and effect of itself t-w
'
that 1S
'
lfc is th
- ^nal end, that
wh.ch justifies the quest for well-be i ng and, with it the h, n , subordination
of nature.
P3
-
But if the MMU^ is to determine our actions We^u w require
the concept of a non-natural causalitv ny, using only theoretical reason,
that is, the laws of efficient-cient causality, it is impossible to conceive
of how happiness and morality could be af hhoY t t e same time both conjoined
by natural means and conformed to the idea of the That
is, if we did find that nature had somehow caused happiness and morality
tc come together, we could not simultaneously believe that nature had
done so with the in mind. This logic equally applies to
human beings pursuing natural desires and longings. if such people
happened to bring about the best possible world, it would be a random
accident, not a working out of their axeJ^.
C Therefore, a moral cause of the world is morally necessary in
order for us to fulfill our obligation, discovered in the moral command,
to strive for the supreme good of the world, without a moral,
intelligent, causal designer, a God, there is no guarantee that our
moral conceptions are at all amenable to the physical world. The moral
law would still command one to work for the good, but any imagining of
in
the intell igible community-thai-
.
.
^ "he" 311 doings might
associate voluntarily and harmoniously -
«orld-„ould be lost Kant . . ^ " ~— - «-
Deceit, violence, and enw *i n i
although he himself i s ho e 8 n!
rife 3r°Und him
'
other righteous «.
. „ Tf ' b—^nt; and the
^
subject by nature
,
™tlLTLdhe;eedrV Jng ° f haPPinSSS 'the evils of want, disease, anfultim^f d6SertS ' t0 a11other animals on the earth! And so Z ? ! jUSt as the
-
ai.less chaos o?
^ta^r^'iM^h^iTLSn.I?" "
Without a designer one cannot hope for t-h=n t he moral community. But
the moral community is the . .regulative principle for modern politics
though it depends ultimately ^ desirei stresses ^ ^ ^ ^
free desire47 which ,„rb to limit and discipline the more usual
sensuous desires. Preedom occures when one sets before oneself, as the
refined such that we haye "a crowd of insatiable inclinations,. We
c«not, as in the artfully limit desires, nor can we easily giye
everyone the power to realize desires a, ;„ ua , s in Marx. The only way open,
Kant believes, is to endorse the modern world and to articulate its
highest aspiration. He thus argues that happiness in its highest form
would be the agreement or harmony of satisfactions and desires with
46. Ibid., 121.
"^^^1/^ 15 meant " SVOke 3 — '«»
lie
"oral legislation. i n our „„=age
,„ admired man can be i„„ardly anda man of well-being oan be, for thi ,- ins reason, unhappy. To seek
" m° ral ^— -—
.
however, proves
—
.
.r happiness that the quest £or ^
a world of contingent and complex desires, creates as' s requirements yetcannot satisfy it b,,h.pulls one out cf introversion, it discipline, desir„even whiie cultivating them, and it recogni.es individuals as a t
.
,
u i u onomousbeings
. 4 8
The motive for arHp,ticulating something like a ^.^^ seems
to arise out of the development of culture itself. Nature, according to
Kant, provides people with two social drives then6S
'
e Pursuit of happiness
and the pursuit of culture. Culture, then, oan be thought of as the
Other of natural law. Culture unsettles what happiness wouid settle
reopens what happiness wouid close, and broadens what happiness would
limit, cuiture does this by continually creating unsatisfied desires
It shatters complacency, it ieaves us in splendid misery. This renders
the pursuit of happiness, despite its pretensions, finally disgusting
and self-defeating. Eventuaiiy disgust and insecurity lea d everyone to
form civil commonwealths and enter social contracts. But the civil
commonwealth further develops culture, decadence, and war. Disgust is
deepened
.
48. Ibid., 100.
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»» *m „hence comes tMs disgust?
disoust f
lnstitutions. EventuallygUS
'
Sar
'
c^tivation, and reflection reveal that there is aMnCePti0n
« — - «-* judgments
. Ihey
a
" —
— -— nations
. hus
—
° f
- .-PoIitM_ity
, ,
^ * "
"»
- o f „hom seek sarnsstly and ^ .
a~"°n *
y harmoniously to brinr, =u
„„.. g about a higherunity, ln which Abel's h.nn'PPlneSSWlllbe^dw,hCainIshard^and intelligence. We should note that i
,
f we drop God from Kant
«
s
scheme, we are still left with a1 Wl a growing and deeoenina h
of hn,h
p g disgust, i n need
.~ . redemption
. 0ne couid neuher persuade oth^
~~ is jastified
, nor hope for a teieoiogicai^
on some
ion
.
Bef°re leaVl"9 the « x „ish to c_
-cent criticisms of Kant made by the secuiar naturai t^ dit
«* is bsyond my po„ers at present ^ deai Bith reii9io^^iaw t raditio», « ls difficult at times ^ textuai suppQrt ^
Kant. „orks fOB some of these „ltiolsmS( and occaaionaUy ^ ^ ^
astonishing ignorance of „hat Rant actuauy ^ ^^^^ ^ ^^to say that Kant has no notion of a ^ that ^ missea
profound roie of „ature in shaping our moral oonceptionS; Qr that he
misunderst a„ds the pr0olem of tbe nssd for moderation ^ ^^
world, or that he fails to spp th*r ,ee at teleology is crucial to a search for
sources of moderation. Further it 4 clfc 13 Grange to claim that Kant misses
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the importance of the search for ha ^ tta °PP03ite. InKant has a very powerful critique of the a
-ural law traditio
" badly
- 49
S 5tSnd
—— Of Kant one would „ever
or *,ai„, the secular fraction, relationship to nature is
ultimately one of knowing and finallv „, w, ,
Butth . .
^ °f Phll-°P^al contemplation. 50t thrs rs hardly a gocd rejoinder tc Kant, since for hi .' l™ knowledge of
nature, no matter how perfect- nr iP fect o imperfect cannot yield the moral
teleology that natural theorists claim it does To aia . glve an example fromtecent discourse, much of what used to pass for natural knowledge o£
-ial nature has recently become seriously unsettled. Por instance, itU -coming increasingly difficult even to justify
. 5trict distinction
between insane and reasonable people. But natural law theorists, to
this distinction 51 Ruf < * „•= B t rf seme people can no longer accept such a
distinction as natural, in orde r to mate it effective ,rr , someone will have
to maintain and enforce 1 +- mUit. Those who challenge such distinctions would
need to be somehow silenced. But this seems to Involve, on the part of
the silencers, a nagging doubt about whether the distinction really U
natural, since they can only appeal to their own self-definition as
Z'J.t^:
s
iz'.
" Liberty and Nature
'-
41,
50. Ibid., 680-81
51. Ibid., 678-79
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moderate to justify themselves A ,S Wlth Kant ' s nomads, anxiety creepsm to the ethos of natural happiness InPPx . m my opxnion the whole project
would be nihilistic. It is difficult at"icult, any rate, to see how the
pursuit of moderation win
08ntUry PO"tiCS thM
Political visions
To summarize KanHo ,-16 nt s discussion of teleolom, •gy, physico-teleology
~* b8 replaced by the teleology of morai sel£ _asseru
_ ia thia
an arbitrary notion on Kant , s ^ ^ £oiioBs f^ ^
interdependence and continqencv rtcmgency. i remains now to show what the
implications are for modern organizational life.
In tne Metaphy^i^ Morfll(! -rr , , „ ,
-^^-^-^^t ^ Kant gives a fairly standard account
of the social contract a *. By a sort of magic people manage to give up
"their freedom in order to receive it hsnir =+back at once as members of a
commonwealth, i.e., of the people regarded as a state." "They have in
fact completely abandoned their wild and lawless freedom in order t<
find again their entire undiminished freedom in a state of lawful
:o
editor
Ul
Lea?t
0W !°litical Parado*' " in William E. Connolly,
272 '
^^^CY and fchfl State,, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984], 250-
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es
.
dependence (i ei . e., i n a st
,y their o„n legislati
'
dePendS"ce is
—x«y i ve will.
"53
111 light of the Cain and Abel storvy we now know more abont-
-ythologioa! connotations which .. the mere idea of such an act" oarriIn the m°d«n world natural right ha, h9
'
bSen
^PPlanted by a complexdependence, and, if we are f „ .to consrder this dependence to be , ,t .
then „e have to consider it o
assert tht
Sl « " cur own creation. We must alsoat we arP fr-<=~
though something imoorf^nt- * .
" " *»« up, and that now our
^rder. if we take the social n -contract to hp s m„Dionysxan break in the
of chaos, we my better understand its seriousness.
revolution., the sublet is constantly reminded that he or she is a
consenting member Rut- +-u ,- . But the socral contract is actually the source, not
only of the state, but of revolution as well » Dasf ,m
-
A p toral world of
independent noraads retires no revolution. As Kant stresses, a family
unhappy with the soclal relatlQns uitMn a c^ ^ ^
«oc,s and herds elsewhere. Truly independent people retire no
^~-^ep^people
,
however
, have nouhere ^ ^ much
53. I_l Kant, Mat^^i^^, Pact ^ ^ ^ ^
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™re s UscePti bie to t yran„y because they depend^^
"hich, in turn
, depends on the cule of tight< uhich; ^ ^
retires a coercive state. Dependent peopie ju st mig„t oteam of
revolution
.
The social act, the act of creating ourselves as dependent and the
murder of our own independence in a collective act, i s indeed a founding
of sorts. It is both the founding of a regime and the founding of the
overthrow of individual regimes. To speak only of its clean elevated
side is, in Nietzsche's terms, to tell a lie.
2. The Eropaadautifl nf violent
Kant often speaks of the quest for morality, whether in
individuals, nations, or states, as in principle a fairly straight
forward task, even if it is extremely difficult in a corrupt world. But
to unify his philosophy Kant also requires freedom anchored in a
teleology of self-assertion, where even our conception of God is a free
assertion imposed upon nature. This God cannot be presupposed as
creating an evil world, and therefore the fault for evil, again self-
assertively, must belong to men. Innocent man, Kant believes, due to
his naivete will always begin looking for sensuous reasons to obey moral
commands, thus inverting the true moral relation. 54 One might, for
54. Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason A1nnP
f 31-39.
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instance, refrain from tellina 1 I mSrely ln «d« ^ avoid anxiety
This "eates a splitbetween behavior and moral worth. When self l ,- ove legislates, the morallaw rs followed only „he„ it £urthers the interests of self-love, onem9ht eVe
"
dSSi
'"— « PoUtieaa institutions in „hi h
.
L w c self-lovedoes coincide with moral behavior Thi, , „
-e middle classes for h
^ ^^ °*
w om the absence of vice counted as virtue. Kant
— that exactiy this was^ evil
,
„hich_ ^^
extreme if yoo take him to mean shopkeepers b, bureaucrats, businessmen,
and professionals. Ho„ could such
P 8 De radical m anything?
The answer is that the evil is aualit,, iq ative, lt inverts the moral
Elation. „ Be add ^ premise ^ ^ Qxi^^^^
People are also radical!, interdependent, we can guickiy imagine bland
People creating evil in massive quantities
, _^
avciding vice. In a world where everyone has his or her price, Kant
notes, no one is righteous, and everyone is under sin.Sf. One of the
more serious problems in modern life is that if „-"a t encourages a dishonesty
with which we humbug pursers into taking our rack of opportunity to do
wrong for virtue, and thereby never confront our own capacity for evii
But we raight aiso view this from another angle. Xn an interdependent
society, the smallest acts of moral cowardice are matters of deep
concern; they affect everything. No reformer can afford to ignore them,
55. Ibid., 34.
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but neither can the police Th* „
system of systematic cowardice.
* ^„ this situation Kant_ to cuim ^
;
n pr
:
ncipie ™- 56 *— •—— »aS ans_d bytlD9 dSSireS
~ «——, - innocence. ButKant believes lnnocence
_ ^^ ^ ^ ^
-eology . Ths loss o£ lnnocen=e u ^ ^^ ^
and in the iaterm f
- - through the la ; er
^ break " — 1 """-"ion hes aMl03ues throughout
-ern life, espKially in revolution
, colonialism> Md professionaiism
Kant
, for example
, often mentions vioient dispiac
_nt ^
tribes by European colonists. 5, He is cleariy uncom£ortabie
natives, but there ere other displecements which he vigorously
champions. He champions the displacement of an oid form of
individualism, utiUtarianism, by a newer form, autonomy „. advocates
replying older religious institutions and beliefs with newer more
enlightened forms. 58 Governments need to become republics. The list
oould be made quite long. But ell of these evoke a violent moment which
56. Ibid., 35.
57. Reiss, 173.
58. Ee_ligio_n, 11.
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~* - ideologically redeemed ^^PrWldin9 3 nS9atiVe
~»« ~V „e overcome violence.
- overcomi„g is typicany a conective
- ~* — oases, are tOQ corrupti espeoiaiiy ^^ ^ ^
thSmSelVeS
^ " thSir ~ *« "Pirations
. 59 usuauy it ls disgust
wit, o« conective capacity tor evil „hich force3 M ^ create
institutions which l-im-it- i>» ev.l and enable process towerds the good
. 50
ironically, „e individuals are most autonomous when „e endorse out m0 ral
interdependence, even while ~= <-participating in actual organizations „hich
do not «s»re up to our best visions of moral interdependence.
Actualiy, because of man. s asociai sociabiiity
, ail actual institutions
would Have to be classified as pathological, but again, patho i ogy is
redeemed by teleology.
Without these asocial qualities (far *
h ;„
national nature, would be an unfilled void. Natures ould thus be thanked for fostering social incompatibilityenvrously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires forpossession or even power. 61
Kant*"
1S
92.
116 ~ 17
' ^ PatriCk R" ey
'
"Auton0
'»l' Teleology in
Purpo"i Herss/"-^" 3 UniVe-al ' Cosmopolitan
61. Ibid.
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The break with tho •Past „ thus thoroughly a^iguous
^
rr
appaiied and for entertainin9 a
- -
•
——
.
But
-—^. «. ne„ self -kno„led9e begins as a „descent into
which prepares one for a l i
*
Q * .i^e of Klsdom;62 tor nations the horrors
~ ~ taxation are preparation foc a f ^^^^
-an self-assertion, in destroyin9 ^^^^^ ^ h^ •
creates a hell on earth, then saves itself.
— violent founding events open up a „
^^^
—
.
up most PlainlY m the oase of the French Evolution. Ka„t al„ays
insisted that the revolution
„as too foil of misery and atrocity,- thatU imPOtent
"
bri "9^™— ~ therefore perpetnate.
evils it sought to overcome; and that it was by dsfinition too
seoret and faotional to ever be the legitimate oreation of the „hole
sees evidence of a deeper moral disposition in the human raoe.
The international publio of onlookers, Kant maintains in "The
Contest of the Faculties,.,
"openly express universal vet disinterested
sympathy for one set of protagonists this revolution has aroused in
62- tts-itet^^^ Part 1If Elements of
2, No. 14, in Ellington, 104.
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the hearts and desires of »na spectators... a
„hich borders ^
enthusiasm, althouqh the vov, u"y Utte"nCe
° £ =V-Pathy was fraught
with danger. "63 But- fhj 0this sympathy comes at a dear price, asW Kanfs reflections on the execution of Louis XV!
.
m^Tf ZLa£nlTchTs Vol\tetZl%t 3 3 Trr0luti °n ---^" theexecution of a monarch .h,Vk "ors It as the formal
with ideas o f hUma : lgL irt
s
hi:
r
f
us
?-
dread in any soui^
one thinks of the fate o
'
C i
Selln9 wil1 recur whenever
to explain this feelingf Tt is not 7^ ^ BUt h°W «• -[with] the sufferer's situation^ h t ^ ^ sWthy
reaction to the complete r^erS 1 faU^ ^ °Urseen as a crime which must aiwjvs" it C°nCePts of right. it is
never be effaced, and it mignt be itT"^ ^ Whi ° h wil1theologians maintain can 1 £ 1 * t0 that sin which the
the next. 64 ^ be f°rgiven either in this world or
The sympathy which formally revea], „ m„ ^Y ls a moral community of
disinterested spectators is ciosely tied to dread.- to mortai sin and the
death of Sbel. The most dreadfm notion is that the roles of Right, in
order to establish themselves, might become involved in a spectacle of
reversal. Kant, of course, only thinks of this reversal in the sense of
a reaction or setback, but his teleology actually suggests something
more serious. Right and the reversal cf right are both contained within
the same progressive culture. Right, in order to flourish, requires its
own reversal to spur itself on. Morality is an asylum from evil, but
evil is a loss of innocence which makes culture, the realm of the moral
spectators, possible.
63. Reiss, 182.
64. Metaphynir of M^xal^, Part I, no. 49, in Reiss, 145.
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The moral SDect- at- n v = *.Pect ors turn out to be those whose minds have
experienced a mental ra^t <revolution, and who then^ ^
try to remake the sensuous world over to tit their acguired
conceptions. 65 The mental revolution i s -a ,1n ,D 13 si gle unchangeable
decision" to render oneself » a o ka sub:ect susceptible Qf ^ ^
what Kierkegaard would later call * ia leap, and the motivation is the
same, to find a stable form of selfhood of. O course for Kant, there is
only one true form of selfhood, and it is i
i
n v „ .
,
a lmked to the sensuous world-
the sensuous world proves the oondltlons by „hioh _^^ ^
experience the mental revolutioni ^^^ ^ ^
beco.es the ,MM for implementing it slo„ly and smoQthly
, This ^
version of Kant's perpetual progress.
in the other version, horror, dread and anxiety; the thought that
one's best endeavors are in vain; even the deadening complacency of
Middle olass life; these are what the spectator actually reflects upon,
and against which he or she actually frames the vision of the .orally
intelligible community.
Thus Kant offers the vision of a final unity; a whole in which
natural teleology will be superseded by moral teleology, and the evil
principle will be eliminated finally by human moral self-assertion. But
Kant is also interesting as a thinker who sometimes confronts his vision
65. Relicn nn
f 42-43,
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«—U, - same, or „hen he notices ^ oooi( controiiea
reflective characteristic of „
°
° Passi°n.66 The procedures of passion k
.
_x. . , .
U1 beara striking resemblance to those „f »„o moralrty, and Kant seems clearly~ Or, again, God enters the ^^^^ teieoiogy ^^ ^
-cllltate judgment. but judgment ^
^^
0^ ™y be at the same time meritorious, relate to others around onebut objectively a transgressor. Thus God- s unity must be split up into
a trinity which makes us the subject of three diff.l ering principles ofjustice; where Chri <?h »<* +-kas the mrddle term Is grantee that the principle
of relative merit will get , hearl
r\ant is, of course, a
consummate master at usi„g his teleology to tie all these loose ends
together into a Plau3ible systematic acMunt; ^^ ; ^ ^^
t,ing together, Why
, after the Fcench ^ ^ ^ ^
quickly into the Kantian system?
It is difficult to see how one can establish the modern notion of
right without killina the kino- ug g, the bearer of the medieval notions of
Patriarchy and natural law. In practice, Kant would ask us to kill the
*ing slowly, or, actually, ask him to kill himself slowly, since he is
meanwhile to be a sort of vanguard, implementing policies in the name of
the future republic which will someday no longer need the king's
66. M^m^l^lL_tlQJ^ l Part ri
, in Ellington
, 67>
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services. ind in practice tus poUcy ^ h_ a ^t^ ^ ^ ^
—her it takes two years ^ a minutes
_
^ ^
chosen to overthrow the kina v,x g. one has oreated Right by inverting it;
one has murdered to create l aw and warred to make peace; one has
£orcibly closed oneself ont of an entire ran9e or human experience, the
ethical. At his best, Kant snows us that we ought to experience these
self-assertions, these avenues of hope, with a certainxun amount of fear
and trembling.
3. Organ 7^1- -I r^n o
in Chapter I, i eiriphasized how organizations fcake ^ piace ^
*ings, but now this seems too simpiistic. The modern organization oan
be seen as relying on a whole range of exclusions and conditions,
beginning with radical interdependence and the death of natural law.
But within these, there are other more specific conditions.
We can illustrate these conditions by again making a comparison
with John Locke. In a society constructed along Lockean principles,
people would be free because they were independent. in such a society
one would think of the whole of a nation's wealth as an acar^
But in a radically interdependent society, viewing wealth this way would
imply that almost no one was free. Therefore, property and wealth must
be regarded as a distr ibution.. That is, there is an operative fiction
that property ultimately belongs to the sovereign. But this
132
distribution can't take th* *
" f6Udali
- ~ P^ogeniture, since«-* notes, such things are ^^^^ ^
-
C<S thSre
"°Uld be «» higher court
„£ appeal
—— -- ccher proper, bolder be_
^
From this fiction of the stat-«.« •
.
S 3
°riginal o-ership one can derivethe rights of taxation and conscription. So far this^ t is merely what all
governments claim Thn ™ ^i . The modern requirements n-F -f4 of freedom make these rights
-he their particular form. Gove_
_ ^^ ^
"
SUCh S
~~ themselves,. and the state
principle, upon themselves All nf <+.11
° Xt mUSt therefore be "done through
the corps of deputies of the people. "67
Immediately this is sard, the number and hind cf impositions a nd
the various roies of public deputies begin to proliferate.
The police look after public security „t^i^; for it makes it much eLitr^^f11^^^' ^ 3lS °
such as begging, uproar in the street! 1 ^ SenSepublic prostitution. 68 Gre ts, offensive smells and
Me^^phy^^H^^ part lf ^^^^
Consequences of the Nature of the Civil Union , - in Rei^^
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as is6
~* fOU—— - • ««. church. private
associations must, subiect-f ject to proper authority, be open tn i
anr! fh. P inspections,d t ere must therefore be authorities and inspectors. The wealthy
must be compelled to na„ «-p y taxes which go tQ
. i
e social welfare nfthe very poor, though of course t.taxes must never be used merely toen-h
—
——
-U need to be tax assessors and
-lectors, auditors o£ public^ and^ ^
inSPeCt0
" ^——
-
-come au alternative
-
~. Ul of these functions, Institutions, and deputles are
quired in an interdependent society to Insure that all members win
ha'e S St3ke
"
"9 COnti
— -—ent of lawli, government;
so that everyone can cultivate an interest in morality. Otherwise
People cannot view themselves as free. Thus lnterdependence, freedom,
the loss of the nature! right perspective, and the distributive
Principle of legitimacy ali support one another in a teieology of
Progress which demands, in turn, multiple and varied incursions into and
impositions upon daily iife inrlllH j n„y £ , cludi g even smells, uproar, begging, and
prostitution.
These incursions and impositions must be carried out in the name
of those whose behavior is regulated and, therefore, a corps of peopled
deputies is required to organic and enforce the careful regulation of
society. Bithout a civil 3ervlcSi ^ ^ ^^^ ^
be convincingiy called distributive, since feudal, ecclesiastical or
134
personal modes nf h^i^'hoidrng and di3tributing prQperty au vioUte some
«Pect or other o£ the teleology; either m ^
— right, rellglous rlshti ^ independence
_ ^ ^
-—, nor in the prlnoiple o£ giving ^ ^ ^ ^ ^according to personal merit. 69
There are some mundane complications ^ ^^ ^id6ality mUSt ™ -—^ -istenoe.- and Kant himself
understands this and offers a „iolue to rts solution. The complication is
this: on the one hand the civil servant is a sort of eunuch,
disinterested administering public a£fairs
, ^ on ^^^ ^
Officials ought not be discharged without reason. 70 renure gives one a
training time is less likely to be wasted because easy dismissal is
unlikely. But in a distributive society, exactly this argument
undermines the credibility of civil servants because as intaxa^d
parties, they ought to be disqualified as keepers of the public trust.
That is, to endorse an interdependent life, people need to see
themselves as freely choosing their roles and tasks within it. This
free choice depends upon the detailed administration of a distributive
ethos, which in turn requires a professional independent civil service.
69. Ibid., 148.
70. Ibid., 152.
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or
ion of
comPeting
_rs
, undermines peopieis
order of distribution.
This need not be fatal t-o #-u •to the xnterdependent social order, sinoe
People can separate specific acts nf ho admxnxstration f rom allegiance tothe order as a wholp th^i.. e, can stlll think of themseives ^ ^
'
PrOVidSd thSy ™ ^—
* on incompetent, bad
COOTPt admi
—-»• But since arbitrariness is also ,^
"de™ frSed0m
' —
-
in turn that there be open
avenues for criticism and complalnt
, and^ _ ^
government could correct it»i» <„ -i. ,self an the long term, where such feedback
loops ere tenuous end where people reel Impotent, however, civil
servants ere prime candidates tor scapegoating. This does not
necessary mean that they will be victimlzed
,
they ^^ instead
an entire culture of anonymity or in crisis may monotonously see, to
shift blame away from themselves or, most likely, i„ daily tasks refuse
to take risks or initiative and thus become an obstacle rather than a
help to their clients mu; 0events. Thxs, xn txme, would of course undermine the
legitimacy of the distributive ethos.
Kant never addresses the problem in this form, but he does
explicitly deal with a similar issue in "What is Enlightenment" and in
"The Contest of the Faculties." m those essays the problem is that
members of complex organizations must further the goals of their
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organizations while at- „~ ,
'
eVe
"
"he
" ^ ta« —ate reservationsThe government cannot afford fnto remain indifferent tQ
educated in fields like medicine law „
'
reli^on. High standards in
^ fl6ldS "~ - *— society, Plus the_
cannot toierate anything which actually undermines its credibility A3-ilar problem comes up „ith church clergy Jf^ . I a pastQr callg himseif
say, Lutheran, he must present t-h« r *-uhe Lutheran view of religi on , even whenhe disagrees on finer points.
Kant probably kne„ this problem „ell
, since even ^ Ms geoiw
COU"e
" ^ ~ ~ * «- government. rhe proMem
comes because no aof„ a i „actu l organization embodies all of a t-Mnir-u r hinking man's
convictions and aspirations. what happens ^ ^ ^
replies that there must be an unrestrained public bourse in „hich ^
vorce of reason might break through ^ ^ ^
organirational discipline. 7 l The princlple even gfits an
soiution, in that the faculty of philosophy is supposed £o bfi ^ ^
Practice absolute freedom of scholarly discourse. This last shoulder
be any threat, Kant adds, because philosophers do not write for popular
consumption, and thus the effects of philosophic criticism will
necessarUy by felt only in the long term. That is, change will be
painless
.
50 '
edltor
'
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
, 1982), 39-
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The role of free srhni 3r ic ola ly speech thus presupposes a thriving
individual, one whose critic * , .itical faculties break through the
organizational web wh^ ~. at guarantees these faculties i, „Iae ls a remainder
— nsver rests wlth knowiedge in pressnt^ ^
itSe
"
t0
~~ - ** we may ask
almost two hundred yea„ of hindsight< ^
other aspects of interdependence? Or what h*, appens when the legitimacy
of the philosophic remainder closes off ^Q , • •the legitimacy of other more
mundane remainders, like delinquents, the insane „, Ln , or native people?
Kant's recognition of rational otherness in *™Ln some areas necessarily
closes off otherness in Other areas. Lastlv t-h.u y, he organizational
individual may be tak^n »qy te as too manrpulated and corrupt to anohor freedom
anymore. Thus free social disoourse seems lixe a neoessary but
insufficient condition to anchor freedom in an interdependent world.
The bland behavior in all modern organizations will be the focus
of the next Chapter. Here I need to emphasize once again the alterity
Of modern life. The construction of unities, of which Kant is a master
oraftsman, continually opens up small abrasions through which we glimpse
a pathology within. mdeed much of Kantian political philosophy is
aimed at healing these wounds. Yet the wounds tend to be self-inflicted
and self-perpetuating. Ke are caught in the paradoxical imperatives of
our freedom. But I have also tried to show why these imperatives cannot
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be viewed as simply optional. The rea.n ,son to read Kant is that heilluminates our sit-i ia +--i„tl0n
" -^ inte rdependence
.
CHAPTER in
FREEDOM AND PATHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIOM
Th8re
"e in Kant * 3 thought „hich
, BhUa „idely
Known, are still worth reviewing here; first th„t ,, a Kant held the sensual
to be deeply snspeot, and, second
, that his oritioal philosophy see.sU3 9r°Undin9
^ ^ deSP * subjectivity. IB the two
Prions ohapters i explored some of the problems and Operatives which
9aTC
"
theSS
"ions: the continuous a„d reciprocal weh of
economic and social interdePendence, the disencha„tment of nature and
natural law, the Hsp nf n
,
Liie rise o the Copernican sciences andULe:5
'
cl the general need
of conscientious people faced with these facticities to thin, of
themselves as at once modern, good, and free, z also conceded that the
modern large bureaucratic organization is a plausible, though
problematic, solution for this range of concerns. » this chapter
,
will take this one step further and follow up another of Kant's hints;
that the ground of modern optimism might lie in the subjective
experiences of discontent and unworthiness, that is, in a dynamic
unhappiness which calls forth in individuals a deeper reflection. Thus
I will explore organizational pathologies with an eye both to their
cyclical and self-perpetuating nature and to the possibilities of
139
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bleakin9
"— beyond the*. But first ," t I must return to
sensuousness and the subject.
£ejisjiojisjie_£s_
During the 1780s, the decade in which Kan,r t wrote his best known
attacks on sensuousness. Europeens „ere becoming intecested ^ a
3t0rY
"
ere 3ta9Sd
' ——i the one we todey
k
"°" beSt
'
S° ren
— - -—t U U that Mo2art*~ thi. sublet, but also h0„ £ortunate that the subject £ound
- says Klerkegaard
, cannot reauy ^ ^^^^ ^
MtdS beC3USe
' " *» —— —on, the sensuous i. an
mediate expression. lt must be felt in the present, as a movement.
If Don Juan is quintesspnHai i„sentla ily sensuous, he resliy canno t be oaptured
in thoughts, the way ooethe.s Paust oan be, but retires somethi„g Uke
-sio. „usio is indeed
. language, aCcordi„g to Kierkegaa rd, but it
does not rely on thoughts. It is infin^i • ^ .mxtely indefinite, and thus
encompasses more than literature. Xt needs fewer distinctions, fewer
divisions, fewer enclosures, and fewer exclusions. It conveys the mood
of the sensual better than literature because it appeals to hearing, a
more immediate activity than reading.
1. Soren Kierkegaard, "The Immediate
Swenson and Lillian Swenson, trans.,
Princeton University Press, 1971)
.
Stages of the Erotic," in David
Either/Or Vol. I, (Princeton:
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If there is anything to this it f^n°ll0WS that th* Problems ofsensuousness cannot all
'
SOPhY Mi9ht
~ — «- and religion
"7~ believes th-e
-
s
——— «-PO;nt8 in
—axty, the estheUe, the ethical
has a 1=
'910US
'
Each standpointn large number of VaH=n«
""h
"
hlCh
"
Md™d «* human
°°' "hi =h ^ Ceverop deeper re £1eotions Each t- s andpoint
can make a pretty good internal case for its own
,
l S
°W P™cy, but none canbe finally convincing to the other two Thus p h. eac standpoint views the
other two with deep suspicion.
Thi. is brought out strongly in Kierkegaard's discussion of
" m the view of ethics, in terms of human
Ab"ham h
-— "~— ethical tie, he has been
WilUn9
^
SlaUghtSr
~ ~ «* —thing too preposterous to be
a-itted as evidence in court.2 For ethics
, Abraham ± ,^
dS9enerate
- ^ f- Abraham is the knight of faith, he knows
and even acknowledges the authority of ethics- WP m -y r n , we ust presume he loves
Isaac, he treasures his wife's reoarri *g rd, and dreams of founding a blessed
race. He knows what he is ethi'^n,, ^ •cally doing, yet he transgresses ethics.
Edna
S
°H
ren
Ho
K
nr
k
t
e
L
a
n
a
s
rd
' Howard V. Hong and
Lv™; -university of California Press lQfim t = ,,t •
account of Abraham 37-41; For Kie^eiaard^
^
'
8 6thiCal
C Taylor Altar, i-v in* A, erk g ard's account of Abraham see Mark
^
Y , iu ri ty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 340-
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much as
Esthetics would alS o judge Abraham harg
Kierkegaard, can understand sacrific .
*'
l lClng oneself fco
3Esthetics might imagine a lover who -
for a c ' h
Pr0teCt MS bSlOVed
'
13
rime e didn't commit. Perhaps sh.e xs a mother married to hisbest friend. Ethics^cs, of course, condemns such loving siience as
_
^
C°ndemn3 AbrahaM
- ~" —
,
the accidentaUy
COntrlVed 10V6
- ^—— are always only
illusion for ethir? „„,,,cs.
"Ethics demands an infinitemfmrt movement, it demands
OSUrS -" 4 SSth
— «— -— this silence
But esthetics cannot comprehend flbrah
_ flbraham ^^^^^^ ohis own spiritual ordeal *k i_. Abraham u either ^ ^^ ^ ^
" abs °lutely nothing. Religious horroru
'
saV s Kierkegaard, lies
precisely here. Neither we nor Abraham vknows which he is. Abraham is
comprehensible only for the rPH^Y eligious sphere, though even here this
understanding is never generalizable since each rel 'igious individual
must come alone to Abraham.
There is nothing analogous to Abraham's experience in any other
sphere. Unlike the lover who could have spo.en but wouldn't, or li ke
the ethicist who spea.s incessantly, Abraham^ speak
. No _ „ould
be able to understand hi». „e d0es not sacririce Issac to ssve the
—ity, as Aga^on did when he offered up iph ige„ia. Xphigenla and
Agan.emnon can have a mutual understanding. No such understandi ng is
3
- Fea r and Trpmhl \ ng
,
n 2
.
4. Ibid., 113.
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Possible between Abraham and Isaac b.
with al! h" K •
" th°Ughn l is being to carr-v i *.o« y u out
, stlll beUeves absu
won't happen. 1. *«, t^ S
" the sense of statistical
"::rr - ~~— - --—
-
hrm, rash or lucky
, but h herorc, courageous, or faithful. He „ouldno longer be Abraham.
Abraham remains silent—hi,* >,«
the distress and anxiety The i ^ 8peak - Therei* lies
J-t
translates me into the
' universal No"^ * 8peaWLn* is th*tlove for Isaac in the most belu"fji h / ^ CM dSSCribe hi *But this is not what is on h" mLd- T ^ ^ My la^age.he is going to sacrifice him because it " S °methi^ deeper, thatunderstand the latter, and thus ever " *" ' N° °ne canthe former. 5 3 y°ne can only misunderstand
-p^i-:«;t t^s:t^n: he cannot say that——
an ordeal such that, plea '„ e ^
"^erstandable.
: that it is
Anyone placed in such a Position' i "
the temptatlon.
the universal 6
°"trc s an emigrant from the sphere of
outs him off forever from the
_ity . rhis is the
..movement cf
infinite resignation."
„. cannot make anyone understand^ ^ ^
totally singular, it transgresses the webs of language. But the next
move is even more incomprehensible; it is the movement of faith.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 115.
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Isaac, that is
, by v . rtue of ^
S
;b
^oxd wrll give me , ne„
His family wila say; lf you it will happen anyway,
why not abstain? Hp m^h f
~ght answer; because it has to be an ordeal. Butthen his concern for the fanrti™ imily simply appears hypocritical? s . nce ^ .
willing to sacrifice it to the ordeal Or if h*e is sincere about his
-e, his ordeal becomes only a vaudevUle.
„e cannot say anything
good and evil
Hegel had understood ethical Ufe as a mature discovering o£ one's
individuality, not against hut within
_ity lif6 . 8 One dissolves
the opposition between particularity and universality by incorporating
bcth. ror Kierkegaard, Hegel always resclves the tensicn between
particular and universal by givi„g pri0rity to the universal, Kegel-
s
claims not withstanding. Thus Kierkegaard agrees, for instance, that
esthetics always misunderstands the claims of the universal when it
understands community claims as merely limits on its expression.
Esthetics ends in being unable to give itself any expression at all, it
dissolves in pure possibility, of course, unlike in Hegel's system,
actual aesthetes don't find this to be a dead end. They continue to
live in the oscillations of contradictions for a very long time. And
7. Ibid.
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"
ais°
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- ~«. what he denies^ ethios can contaln indlvidualUy success£uii^ ^^ ^
Abraham is that the single indiv . duai yuer man the universal His
experience is completely singular and VP t
'
YS Xt Seems
^appropriate tojudge him by the same standards we usuallv ry eserve for self-appointed
exceptions, criminals, and free riders.
Kierkegaard thus engenders in m.in his reader an uncanny experience,
the experience of placing Abraham
etnical. One finds oneself
somehow beyond the universal and discovers that th*ere is something more
"ethi "5 hUmanlY
~mpletely incomprehensible; that there
"
3
°
laSS
°
f C°mPletely Sln9Ul" to which ethios does not
apply. This is a transgression. Ethios claims to be
"The ethicist sees the aesthetic, ethical snH i •c n , a d religious dimensions of
experience as .three greet allied Abraham , s transgression
demcnstrates that ethics is merely c„e discursive sphere among others.
To return to the sensuous, and to Usn^zxnL. In the Middie Ages
the Church tried to unite esthetics with ethics and spirituality in a
happy „holl sm
. But i„ the late M . ddle Ages this seem . ng un . ty
out to be merely a truce among entagonistic forces. 10 In the stories of
Don Juan and cf Faust, the truce is irreparably violated. It is
important to Kierkegaard that this falling apart results from the inner
William in SSS^ET^ iS ' ° f™ P-phraaing Judge
10. Either/Or Vol. I, 87-89.
146
workings « Christianity itsel£
. ^^^^^^^ ^ oppMed ^
-istiandom, al„ays point3 toward a transgressi
_ It there£oce can
ChrlSti3nlty itSe
" ***^ sensuousness as an other t0 be
negated.
se„suoosnes
r
s
n
J s
P
^«t
aS
Do°"r; T " T" stained system
it is true that Cnrfstranitv bro ^"""^
and in that sense
world.... it is Christr ;
Y
„^h9h sTrUSne3S ^ "»excluded it from the world to add\ ll Sensuous"«= out, has
a determinant of soirif .I' another qualification, . as
Christianity. h . T*?3 fir" PO.it* by
and spirit L the Positive ' Chli "ianity is spirit
brought into the world XI
"hich Christianity has
Of course the Greeks were also sensuous and erotio, but for the,
the sensuous was part of the beautiful personality, it was not an enemy
to be subjugated.
. tlt , was liberated unto life and joy in the
beautiful personality." Thus the Greeks never posited the sensuous
-as
principle, as power, as self contained system." Nor was it the other
side of spirituality. As such one cannot conjure up a Greek
representative individual for the sensuous. For the Greeks the god of
love was not himself in love, the goddess of midwifery was not herself a
mother.
..That which constitutes the power of the god is not in the god,
but in all the other individuals, who refer it to him; he is himself as
it were powerless and impotent, because he communicates his power to the
11. Ibid., 59-60.
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—d, 12
- incarnated Christ
, on the Qthsr^ ^
— - - mention, th6 special individuai
entire fullness of lif~ Mn-4->,j u .
-xtiua himssl£
, and this fullness ex . sts
other individuals only in «,„ r,i « so fat as tney behold it ln the incarnated
individual." Thus rhri.fChrrstrenrty can develop better than ^ Greeks ,
concept of the representative indivi dua l •!„ the «,in representative
relation the entire e„ergy ls concentrated in a single individual, and
the particular individuals participate therein."
Thus on two fronts Don Juan is the product of Christianity First
he eddies a principle of purs sensuous rebellion agai„st the ethico-
spirituel, end, second, he is a single representative individual. But
Christianity has also provided another
.ey element here. Christianity,
in so far as it is the spiritual, has already sundered itself £rom
ethics. This is seen historically in what , have heen calUng the
disenchantment of nature in which, seen from an Enlightenment
perspective, the spiritual is chesed out of the world. Spirit, of
oourse, would tell the story differently; the spiritusl reported the
world
world it L ^ f eXClusively ^ spirit, renounces the, l not only feels that this is not its home, but that it isnot even xts sphere of aotion; it withdraws into the higherregions, and so leaves the worldly behind as the arena of power
piace as th
haS
.
alWayS bSen at Strife, and to whioh it now givesPl . A e spmt thus frees itself from the earth, the~ S
.;
PP
r
rS in 311 its P«r' ^ offers no objection to thechange, it, too, sees the advantages in being separated, and
12. Ibid., 62
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rejoices that the Church is not *hi , ,cuts the bond which united them. 13 ^ to^ther, but
The sensuous was now awakened in *nl all lts richnesSf joy? ^
enthusiasm,
"thus rl-i h i_ ,ord the „hole K0rld become a_oth sounding _boardfor the worldly spirit of theP O sensuous, while the spiritual had
aba
~ ^ "°rld -" —V ^ -aracteri.tion £its Mo2att , s0Pe». Don Giovanni is al„ays exuberant< spontaneous
_
^ voxacioU'S
BOIe than 3 matCh
«"
-— Moreover, an
custom and mores are endlessly use£ui ^ ^
-nners,
.nighthood, and wealth are all so many opportunities. A11
other oharaoters in the opera get their principle of motio„ f_ ^ ^
"lends interest to ali the others," they live off his oapital.
pa'Liofof^n^ne^thelrifL:
ithi\ them - Hls P" Si °" the
everywhere; it sounds L and
~
tZn^lT"^
Commandant, Elvira's anger, and In e s hlte ottTil's"
1
Zerlina's confusion h P « ' 0 avi ° s conceit,
existenoe of all Mother 1
h\
™
H
*-"»i-tor. The
existence. 14 '
cornPared »^h his, only a derived
Of course he must always go in disg„ise. He dresses up as his own
servant or he uses darxness to disguise himself as the expected ottavio
in Anna's bedchamber. Even in broad daylight, when he appears in his
own name, he is in the disguise of a gentleman; the seducer cannot
appear as the seducer. This, of course, is what Kierkegaard discovers
13. Ibid., 88.
14. ibid., 118
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in all spirituality and in *n
the t
311 worthuhils ^i^lity: th9 inner and
ou er are different n *-«ent. But unlrke Abraham who „as
Don Juan makes everythina in^9 Sn SCh
°
° £ him
-"'
— he is himself theendless echo. This nf
"
the element
"
hich makes hi
™ «<*
•~tely musical figure
.figure worthy of Mozart's genius.
With Don Juan desire i s unleashed Qn ^^ ^ &
mdustriousness, though it has its limits Don tx ira . Juan treats women almost
- . universal medium. He desires absolutely ^ ^
To meet a young „oma„ is t0 desir9 her ^ ^ ^^ ^
intense,, is enormously seductive. Bat he desires woman. Once someone
is seduced she is, by virtue o£ her experien^ _ ^
individual, she heco.es both less than and more than the ideal. He
therefore has to keep moving. Li ke an endless echo, desire must
constantly possess its object in a busyness that leaves one breathless.
Don Juan accepts these conditions joyously. Reflection is not his
strong suit. Even his accounts, the list of his conquests-and in
Spain! one thousand and three-is kept only by his voyeuristric
servant, Leparello. Don Juan is too busy to take time to count. For
him life and possession are an exuberant on-going activity. It is
exactly this which makes him compelling. A reflective schemer would
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bother us more. We miaht- m° Ce «— F=«=t for aeducing
Margaret. But with Don JUan „e heaitate _He 13 havxng so much fun.
m u« the heavier and^ profound music of spirituai
^neatness returns to„alm ^^ ^^ ^
~» and
, Ki6rke9aatd „Quld add< ^ ^ ^^^^^ ^Juan may in fact be the last- ^ ,st truly musical figU re to possess the modern
age, and Mozart the* „last composer to capture the notion of a fun
modernity. After th*+- <-uat, the sensuous has become a serious business.
"ore interesting perhaps, than bon auan ia his victim, bona
Blvira. Elvira gave up everytMng ^ jn ^
-vira „as a young nun
, a real coup for ,^ ^^
to her pride. rhere she could hold herself above the inoessant chatter
of eligible young „omen. But after bon ouan she could return to the
convent only « she were willing to humiliate herself. The other nuns
would think that it had been such a rash and unwise adventure; the
Mother Superior's strict but knowing forgiveness would be unbearable.
So Elvira would not return to the convent, nor could she rejoin her
family and the twitter of the social sphere, because she threw all that
away when she went to the convent. In throwing away the convent she has
15. Ibid., 112; 127
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thrown everything away to lov. ne Don Juan
. What could
women know about that? 9
There is thus no external ethical
herself o •
5 WhSre might discl°-u xt r qive hpr^oi f£
^
eXt"i0r
—ion.
"eanwhiie inuard
_ at her
.
«-» is Ridable enough t<j dQ hatrsd uouw
7thins to exra -d - -— - - OPPOrtunity . But „henshe was again alone she would have to think „a contradiction; that the
man she loves is a deceiver. The orohio •p blem ls that she must go on. she
can not return to the convent because ,ha ks e has already mocked religious
^fe. Besides, she would need "a priest who can preach the gospel of
the glad gospsl of pleas_„ i6 ihus ^ ^ ^
the religious also is closed to her.
must
turn to in self-defense. But this is the paradox: oan she love him
although he has deceived her? Thus< taking refuge ^ ^ ^
love throws her into an endless reflation, somethi„9 „egei might term a
bad infinite. she might even desig„ate this paradox with a pet phrase
lite,
», „as .ore slender than a reed, he more giorious than the oedars
of Lebanon... This phrase batons the name for her inward labyrinth.
16. Ibid., 197.
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with conflicting resolutions.
"I ** ^get him, .. but , then she u hersei£ being unfaitMui ^
- ~U,
. deceive, He„ perhaps dQn , t Mderstand a
-d he neve, actu.lly promised anything. And here she ^
P^e, she would never have degraded herself £or ._ he
~
omy stretch out His hand and she had sei zed it. But s he can not
-ink of this without anguish,
"i will not think of him, then, But
she does not dare stop thinking of Mm
, u t. her only ^
reMbet hl,
°
"lthOUt
-
to not remember him at all
. Her
love, anguish, and Don Juan, have all miln n collapsed into synonyms for one
another
.
Elvira, 3ays Kierkegaard, has become like someone on a wreck at
sea who stays on board to save something which he cannot save b6cause he
oannot decide what it is; "her destruction impends, but this does not
worry her .
"
in this way Elvira becomes interesting, even granting that she has
become sicker. She is now the plaything of psychologists, the subject
of their endless reflections. Psychologists, or more correctly perhaps,
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Phenomenologists, are the "kniohts nf" g o empathy" who force open theinterior in order to empathize with it Thp. ey are also called
professional prowlers Th-i «
Ie"eCti0n
- "
S
"
h0 «» -Pathi 2e „ith Elvira can alao . .C s imagine, even
empathize with a vQ fi
„ith h . .
'
ve seduc
"- And b
— - « -30 smpathi2e
labyrinth of reflection. This t a >„„ tkr kes the erotio not only beyond our
physical and social abilities h„* ^ .r , but sends imagination and desire even
beyond human possibilities. In Kierkegaard's^ o£ . Seducer „
esthetics meets its very iimit, and perhaps finaliy even nauseates
"self, depending on one.s reading of the entry dated September „.
Kvery stage of Kierkegaard. s existential diaiectic serves to
develop subjectivity All ^,„. •. i stand rn some relation to spirituality, to
ethics, and to esthetics. M l rely on deeper reflections which are
happiness, but even here the married person or the Judge in Volume XX of
must overcome adversities, must make personal sacrifices in
order to find worldly expression for the principles of love or Justice.
Thus Kant's discovery that unhappiness is dynamic is developed further
in Kierkegaard's dialectic. Elvira's bind is just one of many possible
binds brought out by the unleashing of the sensuous. Esthetic binds, in
turn, are only one of three varieties available. Only the ethical
claims that inner and outer can match, but esthetics would say that the
price is boredom, while faithful people would say that the single
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individual is higher than the ethical •unxversal. I will return to this
—
.
For now , w±11 only
_ ion that ^ spirituaiists t^
^•--U^o^.
^d for aesthetes his esthetics ^too humdrum. what is clear is th^ w13 3t sub ieotivity is not only an
a^uous, but an extremely unstabie ^ 111 ract
» it owes its
exrstence as much to pain and sufferina as it h9 33 X does to enlightenment and
reason
KlerkeSaard 311 tteSe
^velop an inward/outward
di3tin0ti°n
'
b
" d°
- put the sides together again
«* 3Plit between inner a„d outer ls ultimately ^ ^ ^
sustained only in the religiQus^ Eivirais douMe ^
fl
"
"lthin dem°niC
' " ^t-. other. Mhe reas th6 spi ritual
rebates «, world the demonic over_en.races lfc ^ ^
is earnest, the demonic is frivolous.
Kierkegaard believes the modern age is characterized by
spiritlessness.17 Spirit has abandoned the world, and it has done so in
such a way that the sensuous and the ethical become temptations. Those
who succumb to sensuous temptation are liable to demoniac obsession,
those who succumb to the ethical are guilty of arbitrarily declaring as
universe! what is actually only some particular and partial merger of
the inner with the out^r a *-+-,• .i je . A partial and contingent situation is
declared whole and uniwr^i t+- , „a ive sal. it is just this sort of pretension which
17. Mark C. Taylor (1980), 23-69.
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-ic any
or
scandalizes aesthetes fl nH ha d drrves demoniacs cra Zy
. 18 The ethicist
a-tiful story
, but stQry dismisses ^
counter-stories. Especially ethics^ f
spiritXessness, since it claims to be spiritual
, of alienation
an°mie
'
SinCS
"
Clai
- - - « —.rated system of real -life
expressions, and of unfreedom, since it bel 4.
, ieves its desires to be
roughly congruent with its powers But- i-v, ,. t these claims, the demoniac
believes, all oontain hidden denials. if ethics is ,n supposed to rest on
full disclosure, the demoniac demands that these denials be^
disclosed. However, since the co^on iiie presupposes that these
denial regain conceaied, the de.oniac is to ethics merely a
transvessel This transgression, however, is only the do„y . s
twin. The ethicai does not overcome estran_, it ieeds it, and
then, since everything must he made whole, it reasserts its whoieness hy
helping demoniacs reenter its co zy circie. The ethicai, to the extent
that its wholistic ciaims hide fmentation, raay itseit he a de.onia
writ large.
To illustrate some of these assertions I win look at two attempts
to articulate an ethics in the twentieth century United States; the
18. Rene Girard, "The Demons of Garesa" in The^^g^t,, Yvonnetreccero, trans., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 165-183
156
first comes from the popular Hahii^^^ ig™^-^-^ie-tl£axt, 19 the second from the
»or* of the humanistic management school, especial ofpecially Elton Mayo. 20
ttif Of t„„ Hmr* opens with the nations of classical ethics-
how ought „e to Uve, ho„ can we preserve and create a morally cohetent
U£6J Alm°St ^lately the authors discover that there is a gap
between how people live and the avaUaMe resources for expressing it.
oft": :rve
fo
L
u5
„a
o
y
n
s"t
h
^y--:
t
-
; zizitv™ that th-
All prevailing American discourses are individualistic; the good
life, according to the reigning discourse, must be either a quantitative
Of ca^r
N
' T
llah
' ^i^^di^ (Berkeley: Universityot California Press, 1985) y
^JSS(~ST"™ 'r1^" F ' J ' R°« h"*erger, ftaM3£m£n^nd1 g worker Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1964) F tRoethlisberger "The Foreman: Master and VictL c^ouo! iilk'- H^xd
23, (Spring, 1945); Chris Argyris, "On the OrganStTonOf the Future," (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing, 1973) SageProfessional Paper in Administrative Policy Studies, v. I, no 03-006-
M^ilLTco
1**^^ 5oLacmillan Co., 1933); Elton Mayo, Jhe Social Problems of „n t.^^ v
St! w" '
(Cambrid5e
' ^ Harvard Press, 1947), hereafter 1947a;Elton Mayo, Political Problems of an Tndu.sfH.i r^m^^^ n (CambridgeMA: Harvard Press, 1947), hereafter 1947b.
21. Bellah, et al, viii.
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maximization of interest „ 3 ^""^ deVSlOPi
-
° f
potential. The human potential !„„„x language actually possesses a few
"mutual exploration of infinlt.l,, u"elY
" Ch
'
C °">Ple* and exciting selves "22
«'* -nail, explain why two people remain in a marriage, or why theyperform volunteer work in t-w
-
heir communities, or why they join^
movements. What happens when the ral.He ationship does not obviously meet
the developmental needs of all parties' The „ .. potentialist often actually
remains with his spouse, even under severe pressure. But the
Potentialist will resist any la„guage of obligatio„, or a„y notion that
the relationship might have signifi Cance heyond the finite needs of the
individual parties.
^
ordinary men and women tryi„g to articulate ethical relationships while
resrsting the language of ethics.
While they wanted to maintain endurina r*i«*-<
resisted the notion that such relaM ^
latl °nshlP s
'
they
partners in'a relation!! "m g ^ e £ "ZT*?at some of these when he discussed how Ling " o^nfe"someone. bound vnn t-^ k~ y uvea y ur life with
of the ,„ ?" He seemed
r
to
n
re"L
y
h f ^h"^
tba
interests, and indeedThe elve of tL oa t ^ *fullv seoarahle u 1 I " he P r ners, are no longer
PullLg nThac.^ "
Utll""ia
" inoividoalist language xept
22. Bellah, 108.
23. Bellah, 109.
158
-cause there u no „ider of ^^^^^
SUPPOrt
'
"S
— -— „hy long tecm
relationships require the risk of ix loss, hurt, or sacrifice.
What proved most elusive
poignantly di£fioult in t£ IZeTZT^ and ">»t remains most
understanding the world that could^T
CUltUre
' "e °«
between self and other. 24 "-"come the sharp distinction
3Uth0rS belie
-
th3t
-
-Id in principle be ailed bytne langnage of civic republicanism, and they^^^ ^
Tocqueville and allude to ArisfnM.. ^1Stotle 's discussion of friendship. Two
things constitute the Archimedean point for the r ,t criticisms of American
»~. ««, there is an older but still accessible ethical language
and, second, there are implicit hot aotnal ethical practices to which
omy that language can give adequate egression. Sgainst this rich and
ethical disclosure all our current forms of individualism seem sterile
and poverty striken. But only half the case is proved. The authors
can* a good case that
. utilitarian individualism, in „hich »ths
self is
-the only or main form of reality- threatens to be
unsustainable. But then we read:
to a larger whole, a community and a tradition-are cabbie of
XZTlltlT™ «* —ring bothX"
24. Bellah, 110.
25. Bellah, 143.
159
In other words, only ethical Hal llfe Can solv* the problem. This is
suspect, of course, because it-
" Sn »*"» ° f ~«1 critics ofthis position--in the fi^t uChaPt
" 1 J
- Turner-,, in the
ChaPt
"
1 diSCUSSSd
—
'
« * -pter I am discussing
Ki«k
—— * We. an array 0£ other seriousiy suggested
^ticns. Why 3hould Ke loofc ^ Tocquevine^
Pa-.- that modern individualism is self-defeating, but „either couw
accept ethical life as the solution
. There ^ . ^^
republicanism „hich simply could never be redeeme^ because
atomistic individualism i s self-ri^f^t-de eating, xt does not follow that civic
republicanism can be sustained.
TO show that another account i. possible x ,m use
concepts o f spiritlessness and demonia to give a n alternative ceading
.
I "ill focus on an esthetic section ofh^^^^ because z
thin, this will show how it is that ethicists can see, sc boring to
aesthetes, and thereby in turn show how ethics incites the demoniac
responses which it deplores, ana, finally, that the religious sphere can
offer a profound rejoinder to the ethical critique of American mores.
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- ethics; only they dQn , t fcecause thsrapeutic
Clan
« 8— «-— In the sectio„
"MYthiC™" «- authors rind that the classic
AmSriCan h
—"—
- Captain Ahab
, Shane
,
really belonging to the larger society.
The cowboy can shoot straight and fast, Travis McGee is too tough
to be corrupted, they all possess technical s.ills pl us a peculiar sense
Of Justice. Typically the proble, is that society is too corrupt or
cowardly to help itselt. This leads to an ethically unacceptable
movement, where ooodnpqs k~g es and heroism are found only in special
characters who haunt the marains Th^n g . is movement cannot finally ever
come to rest.
chrgooAVto be ^ITVlttZ T "Xine between ethical ^.^^5^2^^*^'
26. Bellah, 144-47.
27. Bellah, 145.
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destructive potentials, ~f
revealed. 28
ntlal t
^
of a completely asocial individual ism is
The problem with cowboys and deteetives is that the kn y embody the
0£ aUtMOmOUS
—
But moral indi.idnality mnst stand
=0 alone that it ris*s nnnnin, to madness, cynieism, or despair.
One accepts the necessit-u ^-f • .
values of the group A d tLr^ffi'T ^ t0 "™ ^important key to the American ™^ t0 al °neness is an
of the profound arnbrgS " r th ^tho^f ^ " iSindividualism that its morai h~
myth°logy of American
from despair. For an Ahab
±5 alW3yS just a »tep away
detective, there is no^rTJoT" 1^ f°E 3 C °Wb°y ° r *The hero's lonely quest for I t 6tY ' ^ m° ral ademption.
nihili sm
. 29 *
m0ral silence ends in absolute
These total breaks clearly violate an ethicisfs aesthetics
Everyone ought to seek happiness in a full and open social disclosure.
It is impossible to imagine life without a town.
Will Kane the hero of High Noon, abandoned by the cowardlvtownspeople, saves them from an unrestrained killer bu ll
= w
h
it
S
h
S
h
h
L
ri
L
f
;de
bad
o
g
n
e
e
i
L
t
L
e
f?
USt ^^ ^
for there is no longer ^liL'Sh'S^.^ ^ ^
This last is a good example of what disgusts an aesthete when he
listens to an ethicist. First of all, the situation does have an
ethical side. Mr and Mrs. Kane have found each other and themselves in
their ordeal; they are more married at the end of the film than at the
28. Bellah, 144-45.
29. Bellah, 146.
30. Bellah, 146.
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beginning, and marriage is S aiH ^ Ky« s d to be an ethical tip T f^"^ e
-
If we must be
pragmatic, I am sure they will settle down in another western community
°nS d
°
"ot « -~— their neighbors
, and mi
"
°
f leadS
" in P— - the „e„ school
^' Unl6SS S™ »»» dO it aU 0ver again
.
Suppose the townspeopie pursue him a„d £orce him t0 do lt ^ ^
COIPl6tely*~ "ith a9ain a„d again step into the
street, „atening him once again slap ^^^
gun down the evil killer- „ 3 ^u'er, watchxng him once again reach for his wife, to
once again teach us that justice prevails to ], let us once again identify
with someone we can resneri- n„+. upect. But why would the townspeople do this? I
only the townspeople who know they are cowards; the audience in the
theater is judged as well. The badge in the dust breaks the spell. He
acted, I watched. I sat watching him on the screen just like the
townspeople. Kane not only refuses to rejoin the townspeople, he
refuses to rejoin the audience. Had you or I been in town that day we
would have let him go into the street alone, just as the townspeople
did. Of course during the whole movie we have been denying this; we
identified ourselves with him against the cowardly townspeople. The
badge in the dust means the audience will demand with their money to see
these scenes over and over again. Certainly American audiences became
obsessed with the western movie.
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If we looked for the last western in, l a qualitative sense, a good
candidate would be Clint Kastwood's
That _ ie
starts with the nameless marshal being orutallv bull whipped fcQ death
while the whole town crin.es; but watches. They have paid the bad guys
interests. The incorrupti.le marshal had learned that their mine was on
Federal land. He was going to ruin everything . Here the theme of the
lonely law man stepping into the street to face the villains while the
townspeople cringe and watch is literally beat to death. Throughout
most of the movie the marshal lies in an unmarked grave. Tradition has
it, of course, that a man in an unmarked grave knows no rest.
Ghostlike, Clint Eastwood arrives and remains nameless. All the
standard elements show up, but all the standard moves change. The
stranger doesn^t play fair or nice, and he takes revenge on the
townspeople, even while destroying the three killers. At no point does
the drifter make the world safe for ethical people; and though it would
like to, the audience can not really identify with him either. He rapes
a woman, he makes fools of people, he deputizes a dwarf. He unravels
the whole fabric of the western. At every point he forces townspeople
to admit their cowardice, he despises them, he dissolves their corrupt
social nexus. Finally he throws the bad guys and the townspeople into a
saloon together, without distinction. The bad guys cannot use their old
tricks, they can't hold good people hostage because the stranger doesn't
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care whether they live or not, and, besides
, there are no^
here. The bad guys can terrorize th* to6 w^people all they want, only it
won't save them. Because rhot-d t e stranger refuse „~4-y ruses to get caught up i n the
trap «* protecting the tounspeoplei „ho ^ re£uses ^ ptet^ ^
innocent, and beranwi ^ cause this movie insists t-h^« x that the townspeople are
indistinguishable from their hoodiums
_ ghostiy^^ ^
at least as it „as before, also dies; its buUdings ^
««* cities mostly killed either fcy each other ^ ^ thsir om^
*U~* its marginal dwarf given
. place of honor< mar3inai^
inhabitants given blankets and clothes.
in the morning after the town's ordea l, when the drifter leaves,
the dwarf is still sheriff, and he is insoribing the dead marshal's name
on
.
tcmbstone. The obsessive cycle revealed and broken, the marshal
can finally rest in peace. The myth had declared that the marshal
stepped into the street to protect the townspeople; now the secret is
out that the marshal was not the town's protector, but rather its
victim. It has at last become esthetically impossible to make a
standard American western movie, its hold on American popular culture is
ended, one obsessive cycle broken.
This brief comparison of High Noon with Hiflh.Plains nHfr.r- shou ld
cast doubt upon the ethicist scenario as described in Habits of t-h Q
Heart. Hish^rm needn't be seen as a straightfoward celebration of
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autonomous individualism at ^^ ^^
_^ ^
ethical account can not really explain why ue find such myths so
miLn9
' " =°"i„ue to be ineffectual ln lt3
The modern city, as even Kant noticed, is a complicated
reciprocity which encourages a system of cowardice and smallness 3!
Kant goes so far as to caii this because though ^^
behavior is mild, the inward disposition is completely corrupt. The
High Plains drifter would agree, and has worked out .any or the dynamic
movements of this system of cowardice. M w6 understand the American
hero, not as an autonomous individual, but as a spiritual scapegoat,
then we are in a position to question the nature of the society which
requires such heroes and obsessively requires them to go through their
endless ordeals, of course we risk having to admit that the instincts
of the^ might be valld
. what popular myths espec . ally br . ng into
question is the notion of a sustaining community which the mad, or the
sick, or the heroes need to only rejoin in order to be made whole.
Perhaps the community has a hand in making them sick. Their condition
as outsiders may fall well within the parameters of the demoniac
community, only they speak what the community cannot acknowledge about
31. immanuel Kant, Religion within th B ,.; m ; h s of Raa ^„ M „„„ T MGreen and Hoyt H. Hudson, trans. (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing,I960), c.f. 29, "We call him good who is bad in a way common to all "
especially 30-40. The most intelligent argument I have seen in favor ofthis form of economic reciprocity and its self-interested moderation isJames Madison's "Federalist 10."
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U
""' "° rSe
'
ml9ht
- *™ 0* coliective
. as the c_nities , „estern movies tried ^ ^^^^
themselves by scapegoating their law men.
The humanistic management movement, U*e the civic republican
tradition, seefcs an ethical solution to the problems of modern
spiritlessness. xt usually refers to spiritlessness as anomie. But
unli.e civic republicanism, numanistic managers are alert to obsessive
responses and to their sources in modern organi.ational Hfe. Like the
-thors of ZzZi^^^ they reject Hobbesean individuaiism(
whether as a prescription for or as a description of modern life. They
agree that as a self
-understanding, such individualism is Inadeguate for
describing people's actual lives and when this understanding is applied
anyway, it becomes a dreadfullv splf-f„ifmiy Self fulflllin9 prophesy, creating
conditions of anomie which it then
-realistically- authorizes strong
measures to contain. 32 Elton Mayo refers to individualist
rationalities, and especially economic individualist rationalities, as
"the rabble hypothesis," by which he means that economic rationality
relies on the premise that humanity is a sea of introverted individuals,
each interested only in maximizing his or her own welfare.
32. Mayo (1947a), 45.
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In their behavior and in t-w
they accept the rabble hypoSsisInT > ° :
C °n°mists ^.te that
financial incentive as thpnni ,
tS dlSmal Hilary of
substitute a logical^ h 2 If ZtlT^ ^actual facts. 33 ° Sma11 Poetical value for the
Against this, like civic republican^ Mayo^ ^ ^ ^
"observe the facts of l ife as they are lived _„ 34J Actual people always
belong to hierarchies
-o-f „n of groups, family, school #-«J-Y/ , town, union, church,
a .e^er „f somethi„3 , everyone ^ ^
~.*io mana9ers „ould dlsagres ^ today
_ couid ^
older civio traditions; £or them TocquevUie uouw ^ ^ heip ^
The scie„tific
, te0hnolojioal
, and
ChM9
" f3Ce " —
-
-ey have„. t simply changed
things once and for a "M tv^ ull. The changes keep occurring and they come so
quickly that no new community of traditions M « „y i- c a can grow up or take root.
This emphasis on change probably is a result of Mayo's and
Roethlisberger's ages. Having lived through the era of the change,
having personally experienced its disruptions, they probably have a
deeper sense of how far from traditional communities we have come.
Bellah, et al.
r often say they understand this issue, but then seem to
believe modern highly mobile career people can still be civic
republicans. Instead of Tocqueville and Aristotle, humanistic managers
get their theoretical bearings from Continental social theorists: the
33. Mayo (1947a), 83
34. Mayo (1947a), 45
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psychologist Pierre Janet and hthe sonologist Emil Durkeim
. In ^
1940s Mayo also studied ax St. Augustrne, the thinker who wrestled with
questions of how moral life miaht- «.ght survrve the transition from classical
to Christian culture. 35
Humanistic managers aiso share „ith the authors Qf
a commitment to intervie„ing Md ieacning fcom
in UU. They too discover that the language Qf indivlduallsm ^
fro, this that what people are ionging to express is ethics, what
People are expressing is rather a sense of estrangement
. What their
interviews reveal is that modern work in modern organi.ations contains a
host of potentially pathological situations and fosters in its
participants a myriad of pathological and obsessive responses, and it
does this at every level of a corporate hierarchy.
The humanistic management school was born in the early !930 s in
the famous Western Electric management study. 36 The study too. about
five years, interviewed over 22,000 employees, and included countless
hours of observing workers in controlled and uncontrolled situations.
It is truly remarkable the way the researchers constantly let their
findings and observations change their own thinking. They were willing
to learn as they went along. Their sensitivity to their subjects and
35 Mayo (1947b), Mayo's debt to Janet and Durkeim are well known; forhis discussion of Augustine's City of r,r.H 0 .f. 143-46.
36. Roethlisberger (1964).
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their ability to know when their „own methods and paradigms had become
-debate on limiting
, and^ ^^ ^
ignorance are all enormously refreshing.
• r own
controlled experiment found that worker productivity and satisfaction
could be raised in a variety « Physioal ways.- i„trodnoi„g mid-morning
-en these ohanges were later rescinded, productivity did not drop aM
a year into the study, the researchers concluded they had to abandon
their previous causal notions of „hv efficHen,-»ny ciency or satisfaction rose and
fell. They turned to Pierre Janet.
in the second phase the researchers started their interview
program. Here employees aired their many grievances, xhe idea had at
first been to set up ways to correct these grievances, but very few
turned cut to be correctable or even verifiable. Sometimes employees
complained about specific things: a vent fan had been broken for a long
time, or a machine was unsafe, and everyone agreed that employee lockers
were overcrowded. But most complaints were against people or referred
vaguely to things like "rates are too low," "earnings are not
commensurate with length of service," "ability doesn't count in my
department .
"
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though these complaints „ere usuaiiy ^ ^
another rational lanan^n -5-7guage
,3 7 on closer inspeotion ^ fo^d
e^^ees really ^ ^ their ^
^ "0rk6d
'
Md
^ ~ - in ths best „ays to
maximize their economic utilities 38 Fn6S - or ^stance, many employees
stated as a matter of fact thai- ^at xf they worked too hard the company
would simply lower the piece rat-P Io •P e, leaving them working harder to take
home the same wages Yet „3- , the Western Eleetric company had never in Uahistory done this.
Several easy explanations were rejected Wn >. orkers were not simply
Pushing their own self
-interests against those of capitalistui management.
For that to be the case worker*' h«K,s behavior would need to change. Nor
»ere they simply ignorant fool>
. The mg^ ^ ^
f6a
" b—
-
the legitimate language in the
Plant, not because it expressed what they were worried about. This, I
believe, was the great breakthrough of the study, to notice that
employee worries and complaints were neither errors nor partisan
behavior. They were neither illogioal nor were they in oonformity with
any abstract logic. Though oouohed in abstract rational language,
employee complaints contained an experiential
'lived' logic.
37. Roethlisberger (1964), 258-59.
38. Roethlisberger (1964), 532-37.
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life. 39
are ver
^
c°™on phenomena in all soc ial
Piecework, th6 gsnulne issue My Mt ^
^
— to take home, but who win be sociaiiy integrated n ^ ^
"
9r°UP PieCe"° rk
^
indiV
—~^ *— t0 get lost
,
„hUein individual piecework
-i t- -i <,
,a rnevrtable that some items win be rated
lT that ~~ *—~* *-* less prestigious
S °me0ne PrefS"in9
— — work t0 provide general
social acceptance, while someone arguing £or indlvldual^ ^^
work to provide a way of standing out.
Thus complaints tended to have bQth a ^^^^ ^d ^^
content.
..
Such statements Had an inner and an onter reference, and the
inner reference could be reached only by further study of ^^ ^
made the complaint "40 Th^ >-^o^ u. 40 e researchers were ied first to abandon their
causai model and then to adept an interpretive approach, raced with a
aeries of complaints for which there was no objective solution, or any
commensurate scale for weighting relative merits, and having been
convinced from earlier findings that these complaints were directly
related to the organization's he^n-h ^ ks H alt , it became important to develop a
way to think about them The rplaHnr, v^+. , .in e tion between complaints and
organizational health deserves closer attention.
39. Roethlisberger (1964), 262-63
40. Roethlisberger (1964), 265.
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test room who ln her old department iabsied a troubie]Mter
She was pretty difficult- t„ *.u0Ult
" tSSt too. She tal.ed too much,
challenged authority needlessly
, Qften ^ ^
she had to be dismissed from the test _ fiut of
featu.es of the early experiment was a series of blood tests
After heing treated her disposition complete!, changed a„d she even
apologized to the researchers for her earliern criticisms, which she now
said were unfair.
As the interview program proceeded what bothered the researchers
was that many employees at Hawthorne had the same symptoms as the
anaemic woman, but they did not ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
theories of Janet, and to the above mentioned idea that workers used a
logic of sentiments. They also decided that good managers had been
dealing with this sort of material for years, and they began to try to
develop explicit statements of the intuitive knowledge of these
managers. They concluded that good supervision is not a matter of
applying knowledge gained through scientific theories, not, for
instance, from fatigue studies or theories of economic incentives, but
of using common sense in a variety of concrete situations. And any
description of the concrete situation in any department would have to
include a reference to the workers' sentiments.
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Indi"idUal PSy°h0l°- h" ^— *» that management stops ,tthe fKt„ry gate „hile people go ^ ^^^^ ^ ^ t^^
interview stage
, the reSelrchera dlscoveted that ^^^ ^
riddled with socisl relationship and groupings Md one^ ^
^k greatly
.^e^^ one , s status ^
_ity
_ "PQJ- ^ employee
in industry the uhole „Qrklng environment ^ re9arded ^
-i* SOcisl 3ignificance ... 41 Thus needn , t foUow dissatisfied
emPloyee home; there „as plenty golng on right „^ ^
shapes people-, dispositions, self-understandings, and ^
as much as anything else.
This discover, leads to acme interesting insights. A supervisor
«ho says
. Policy is unfair may at fir3t seem to be protesting against
discrimination or favoritism
, bgt over and gver such compia . nt3
found to "express
.
disguised demend for privilege, a demand to be
differentiated from those below, but not from those above. "42 Or again
,
researchers found that physical plant conditions, more than any other
aspect of work differentiated supervisory and office workers from shop
workers. Thus shopworkers, the lowest status on the ladder, complained
more about working conditions than any other group. "it is too hot,"
"It is unsanitary" "The tools are no gocd."43 often as not the man at
the next machine had not noticed the problem. Dirt turned out to be a
41. Roethlisberger (1964), 374.
42. Roethlisberger (1964), 364.
43. Roethlisberger (1964), 376.
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ke the weather; dirt may
barometer conrpnt-cept. Conversationally it works li
- ail*** their departments
, but Uked the company__and
employees felt thla „ay._„ould praise fche oompany because pi^t ^
not dirty.
The systems of social relationships had little in co^on with the
company^ managerial flow charts, „or did the technical nature rf^
talophones make it necessary to make status distinctions. Ye t the
social organization of the company was as important as its flow chart or
technology for making telephones. Any cha„ge in either the wot, process
or in supervision affects the company's social organization. Even tiny
trappings of social status, like new ink blotter,, are interpreted in
terms of these social relations, and will be resisted or endorsed
accordingly. What seemed to be happening was that workers would try
under unfavorable conditions to maintain a social identity and self-
esteem. Supervisors whose social identity was also involved in other
community organizations, say church, family, or Little League, were less
likely to panic when things changed than were supervisors whose whole
social life consisted only in work. But for everyone, the social stakes
of every change were high.
Social organization seemed to serve two main functions; internal
discipline, to integrate people into the group, and protection from
external interference. Most of what is "ordinarily labeled 'restrict!on
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of output' represents attempts at ,„ ,socral control and discipline and as
-en are important integrating processes. "44 An internal social
organization on the shop floor can make life pretty miserable for
someone Bho violates its norms, one doesn't drastical ly out produce
otner workers, nor produce drastically less. One must not be officious
or act superior. An officious inspector was constantly being reported
as
-slow- and blamed by employees for their non-productive time.- they
*ad to wait for inspections because they timed their work so they would
all need inspections at once Th« -i^o. e inspector was subjected to other
he was usuall. made to inspect in the less prestigicus back of the room,
he was excluded from trips to the candy store and from conversations.
When his inspections were slew the men made sure supervisors heard them
complaining about it. Eventually he had to be removed.
But if the chief function of these internal organi 2ations is group
protection, and the main threat is radical change, the chief enemies
become those two backbones of modern organization: the supervisor and
the technologist. Both of these figures impose an abstract logic onto a
human landscape not designed to fit it. Here we come to the heart of
the prcblem. In existential terms, the supervisor and technologist
sacrifice the living individual to, or allow that individual to have
validity and meaning only within the terms of, an overall system. The
technologist sees the worker as a pair of arms who should be grateful
44. Roethlisberger (1964), 523
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"hen thin9s
"
e^ that u, „he„ things are
technically rational.
The supervisor introduces financial incentives^ ^ ^
assumption that the worker is an „,.„economic monad. But if people do not
SO to »olk merely to move efficiently or merely to maximize their
earning but also t0 partlcipate
,^ o£^
and if one.s job bears its load of social significance, these attract
iogics may be resisted. The technologists, logic tampers with the
relation between a worker and his job. This can affect "his
interpersonal relationships, his traditions of craftsmanship, and his
social codes which regulate his relationships to other people. "45
Supervisory logic may fail because company authority differs from normal
social authority. No where except in the factory are human
relationships governed by efficiency, and no where else is authority so
one-sided. Ordinary authority, say parental authority, is non-logical
and gives an individual back ahout as much as it takes away because it
integrates him or her into the complicated activity of living. Because
supervisory logic dees not represent our accepted beliefs about human
relationships, it is experienced as alien. Lastly, both technological
and supervisory logics are imposed by people at one level of hierarchy
upon people at a different level. A worker, whose sentiments are
rarely consulted and who sees him or herself at the fottom of the
45. Roethlisherger (1964), 546.
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s
hierarchy
"cannot hold to the same degree the sentiments of those whoinstitute the changes."
—itic management discovers a ionging ^^^^ ^ ^this longing lt3el4 helps drlve ^ obsessive ^ ^ ^
mhealth? SnVlr
— ^ — ** ~~U~ and associationi~ for ltS9lf pathological f_ Humanistio manawnt^U the Peopla it intervie„s a distinction betueen
meaning; but this does not necessam,,nly mask a healthy ethical drive,
though sometimes it dopq nff.es. Often lt masks a resentful over-thought
desire for privileges or status m. insecure employees form unacknowledged
social groupings, but usually these arm,n v,i g oups have to struggle with the
abstract logic s of tech„ology and management
. ^ Qf^^
-eh of huma
„
s„cial behavior-oooporatioo and association--!, either
" irrati °nal
-
Th"e « rules against talking or against
employees „orking together
. F
. Roethllsberger finds that among shop
foreme„, „he„ informal groups are lgnored Qr marginalized
_ start
feeling pushed around.
frustrated" Tv^T,' ^ * ^ ° f 3 is constantly bei„gS.^.,. n9s 1 are important to him —
46. Roethlisberger (1945), 293.
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Impressive technics achievement is accompanied by:
xrnaveTo„g
s
^:ert
o
o
o
„:e
dry by the batei
°
£
with reM.8d hope an* v^:rt- h
h
:i:t;^£
p
::«
to moti
— «
Workers who d0 not work according to the absttact logic of
management get branded as troublemakers., Workars „ho do „ork
according to those iogics iose their sense of cooperation and trust and
replace them with more pa thoiogicai attitudes.- distrusts The problem
starts when managers, themselves under pressure from their own iogic
treat discontented workers as either troublemakers or as too dumb to
understand their own interests !,.,,,,„
'
"^tute on resistant workers tighter
disciplines and incentive systems
-for their own good.. The demoniac
cycle is coveted when workers, in the absence of viable alternatives
such as health, ethical associations, come to equa t e satisfaction merely
with hi gh incomes. 49 Thi^ mo a n c t-v.^^ . .s e s that one might accept work disciplines,
but only conditionally and externally, „ith extreme re3ervations
. Qne
constantly looks over one's shoulder to see how much money others make
and constantly tries to make up for lost dignity by wringing
concessions from management. Managers, to keep their relative dignity
from eroding, try to wring concessions from labor or introduce more
discipline
.
47. Mayo (1947a), 83.
48. Mayo (1947a), 119.
49. Argyris, 25.
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rue
ne.
Disciplina ry systems tend to encourage conformity This is t
both ot informai group discipline
supervisQry ^^^^
Managers, who have the most t-o 1 socially, are particularly
susceptive to discipiinary systems. They want no hint of^ ^
their departments hecause other managers „U1 be quic* t0 take advantage
o £ their weakness. Managers tend t„ oniy ^
issues Ufce base retes, manhours, budgets, cost curves, and production
scales. 50 The re is a deep seatsd negiect and distrust of any human
or emotionai content. in a „orid where the only legitimate ^
a highiy rationai one, mistakes, o„ersights, and probiems are not merely
difficult encounters with finite human situations, they are
sentM i ct i on
, and ij^U^liti^. To be caught in these is to be
hanished from being taken seriousiy . Thus one never accepts criticism
as valid. One vigorously works to refute it.
trthS'of'ther
13 tend
,
t0 rivalr
-S/ force groups
overaS oof t J "
°therS
' ?roble^ reward anerall p in of view rarely, and place groups in win-losesrtuatrons in which they are competing with each other for thesame scarce resources. 51
Workers adapt through more informal activities; absenteeism,
turnover, and apathy, managers adapt by thinking only of their own
fiefdoms and ignoring the health of their companies. The point is that
the modern corporation is structurally organized to insure that distrust
50. Roethlisberger (1945), 21
51. Argyris, 11.
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becomes the only motive forY action and material gain the onlvy 11 La y source of
respect. But to nailc li these motives extPrn^i »-lu say that everyone in
organUation must spend some part of ^ ^
"
h
" ^ SSlf
'
Pl
--— * t, to the demoniac
blnd
' " ^
emPl°Yee Ch0°3« *>— "ith this ethlcally
,
Say through
"llitMt Uni °n
"°rk
-
<~ - - -tive, which la some relief But
union demands ,U accept managerial abstract iogio and economic
rationality. One oan aot, out .tin oniy against oneself. 0r one can
try to retreat back into oneself, but then not oniy oannot aot, but
finally cannot »ork either. „e caii this condition apathy. Both
responses, union militancy and apathy, are double-bind responses.
Either can easily degenerate into obsessive over-thought resentments.
Like the authors o£ Babits of a. h^, humanistic managers know
the modern world runs, not because modern rationality works, but because
we are squandering our centuries old accumulation of civic capital. 52
But by now workers have developed "a social code at a lower level and in
opposition to the economic logic. "53 People's aspiration towards ethics
cannot be read off at face value. The lower ethical code is a result of
having one's efforts at community systematically defeated in the very
act of association itself. An individual might yearn for ethical life,
and covertly be jealously guarding or seeking privileges.
52. Mayo (1947a), 117.
53. Mayo (1933), 121.
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man
The only hope for ethical un-Ixfe xn modern organizations, humanistic
agers would insist- i« +-~ n«» . » to relax the pressures tending to conformity,
competition, and distrust in tk.the modern workplace. Their strategies for
doing this involve a lot of interpersonal group discussions, more
cooperative forms of assenting products, policies of on-going
consultations with workers „rirl i, and polrcres of sharing responsibilities,
risks, and decisions with employees. One of the more troubling aspects
Of their theory is that these changes must always he instituted from
above and this has lead to charges of elitism. However, though one need
net agree with Kayo and Argyris that change can only come from the top
down, one must still admit that change^ come that way and so their
scheme need not be dismissed simply on these grounds. Below ! win
discuss what I believe tc be the christian nature of both the analysis
and the solutions given above, but first I win look at sheldon Wolin , 3
objections to humanistic management.
Sheldon Wolin54 criticizes Elton Mayo on two major counts. First,
wolin fears that Mayors cooperative forms of organization are simply
euphemism for the manipulation of workers. Second, Wolin worries that
over-concern with the healthy organization of work, even if equitable,
will lead to a disregard for creating a properly political public
sphere
.
54. Sheldon Wolin, "The Age of Organization," in Politics and vi.-ion
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1960), 352-434.
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W°lin ' S
"iticism is— - I win return to lt . Thefirst worry seem"? ™^ justified and most of the forgoing analysis
-as given in order to show that Mayo ia offering
. deep ^
— organise, Bolin hece _ ^ ^
Mayo wishes to undermine. chris Argyris ^_ ^
sort of charge by describing the level „f ,g n o commitment he thinks would be
needed to implement humanistic management.
Argyris nctes that wcrkers have become wary of new management
3Chemes with their talk of worker input and communication and, he says,
rightfully so. Most cf these schemes really have turned out to be
hypocritical attempts to raise productivity. But Argyris dissociates
his from these cynical schemes. If management seriously wants a more
human managerial style, the managers must begin by changing themselves.
If change is genuine, sceptical workers will be convinced only slowly
and by long and continuous experience. There ia a further complication;
workers usually resist genuine change. "Harmony., is not going to mean
"placid.'. A humanistic management style would have to respect
individuals enough to allow them to flare up, spout off, and argue. One
of Argyris
•
best insights is to notice that old style Pattern A
managers, for all their tough talk and discipline, are people who fear
confrontation
.
183
covered up. 55 healthy, and this softness tends to get
It has become commonplace to hear i-w *e r n that American workers have
become apathetic. Unions are usuallv hi, „y blamed. But if workers are
apethetic, asks irgyris
, „hy haven . t Pattern R
apathetie „o rkers ? Hhy have they tended ^ instuute^ ^
on f0rmal proeedures, or, I „ould add
, lobby fot economics that Bill £acel63sly disolpline ubor forcs?
to hold
„orters personam, secountehle a„d to ask them individually t0
-Plein thsmseives ars deeply bound up „ith „hat it means ^^
5°TO
"
ith dl9nity
-
T
° «*« and then lay the, of£ at the
first opportune is neither to treat the, as egusl huma„ belngs nor t„
do one's job o£ keeping the organization healthy.
:ern B
;ss
Clearly someone who wishes to move from Pattern A to Patt<
management will have to confront his or her own deep fear and shyne £
about human confrontation. This amounts to a commitment on the part of
managers to changing one's own possibilities for selfhood. This
separates such managers from those who are simply practicing
utilitarianism by other means. Pattern A managers, it turns out, have
been hiding in the rabble hypothesis; their toughness is the toughness
of herd discipline. Pattern B is an invitation to quit aping the crowd
and to take responsibility for one's managerial actions.
55. Argyris, 34.
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ManiPUlatiM ml9ht sti
"
-
- - «ther than an
option. Supposing
. manager gave into temptation
_
a
0bS",et COUW
°
£
— *~ - >—
~ •— interpretation
But to give the behavior only its external utilitar . ,ian reading i s to
oeny the Cheviot any ethioal content at an, that is, take away a„y
recognition that an action may have intrinsic worth. We are then left
once again able to value only extrinsic worth, money . Once again no
trust or cooperation would be available. One wonders how any politics
could flourish in such an environment. Wolin. opposition to Elton Hayo
seems to me to violate Wolin's own best instincts.
Woiin.s second criticism is more serious ana organizational
theorists ought to accept it as friendly criticism. Organization^
cannot bear the weight that Mayo and Argyris place on it. Work cannot
be expected to relieve everts general sense of anomie. simply to
make everything okay at work is to leave much else wrong, m fact, ,
viable democratic politics in a viable public sphere would relieve a
great deal of the pressure to make our work organizations do it all.
Argyris might disagree, speaking of the sorts of leftist political
proposals sometimes championed in the 1960s he says:
bevoLThlY
0
","? " "lth hUman di9ni ty- growth, and realizationeyond the level of economic subsistence, then altering thepolitical system is a good example of tinkering with the system 56
56. Argyris, 44.
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-~ state tend t0 degenerate lnto uhat he ^
^ m°del; endlessly
- *—
, *~ one tcumped up
—x equi.alent of „ar a£ter another 57 ^ ^ £a=t t^ks ^ ^
most likely Dolitioai ^y PO-Litical expression of the* -hhin v,t e rabble hypothesis. But in the
case of both Argyris and Mayo they simpiy conceivs ^ ^
democratic polltlcal realm
. just ^ organizationai ohangs ^
instituted by . managerial elite< so ^ poUtics ^^^^^
entertained are top-down; state planning
, ^
mobilization.
ern
Wolin has a much rioher notion of pollticS; ^ might
of politics a3 the realm of the unsettled. Polities concerns those
things about which we necessarily disagree and will „eed t0 agree t„
argue about. Political actors in Wolin. a p0li ty „ou ld presumably have
made the same sort of deep cedents that Argyris asks of his Patt
B managers, and their experience of treating people with who, they
disagree as citizens would certainly facilitate the sort of
disagreement-in-trust that Argyris hopes to create at work. Likewise
the commitment to human dignity Argyris advocates for the workplace
would greatly facilitate the more public practice of democratic
politics. I frankly do not see why these two theories have to be
antithetical
.
57. Mayo (1947b), 127
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- ^extant insi9ht t0 oarry a„ay fcom thia discussion ^
°0ti0
" "
°bSeSSiVe
— * - — organl2ationsMd
"
lthin Str
— °f i-rCepe^nt society
. But by
considering two ethical theories t k.i •. I believe I have shown that ethical
Earlier my brief discussion Qf ^^
aesthetics could understand guch^ ^ ^ ^ ^
celebrate the, since they render people aesthetically fasc i nat ing. Now
I win turn to a more theoretical discussion of the mechanisms of
obsessive cycles, and the insights of the religious sphere.
F
-
^^^^^^^^
According to humanistic management the modern organization tends
to be a theater in which characters try to satisfy their various needs
for human association against a backdrop of low trust and high
conformity. This results in characters ignoring the overall health of
their organizations in order to be accepted members of some group or
other, that is, it results in behavior by which one hopes to blend in.
Or it might result in pathological exceptions; those who feel excluded,
slighted, and conspired against. These last are of course only
variations on the first response. The Hawthorne researchers discovered
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these people often regretted rmt- k •g not bexng properly recognized as being
superior. So far t k-,I have dxscussed these character
ri6W
°
f a remarkably insightful
s from the point of
group of American social scientists.
Now I would like to brH^-Fl, ^-.ef y drscuss this material from the point q£ view
Of an avowedly christian perspective, that of Rs„e Girard.
in ti^p^ Girard dlscusses these , ssues ^^ Qf
communal violence. The dif.ers from mythical^ though ^
aeais with aii the same relationships and the.es, in that „hereas mytb
hides a guiity victim of
_al murder or ostracism, the Bible
constantly ma.es sure that its c«Ml victims are innocent ^
acknowledged.
„yth is
_al murder a3 told frQm the po±nt Qf ^ ^
the persecutors; the Passion is the 3« story retoid from the point of
view of the innooent victim. The Passion is therefore the un-myth,
since it reveals the mechanism of the persecutors account, and once the
mechanisms are understood they lose their hold cn us. It is worth
discussing, at least schematically these mechanisms and how they worh.
First of all the scapegoat at the heart of myth has been subjected
to a double transformation. First, he or she has been made guilty of
crimes so horrendous that they threaten to unravel the very fabric of
the community. Myth mentions stars out of crbit, droughts, pestilence,
animals refusing to mother their offspring, and great enmities among
people. The scapegoat is found to be responsible for all this. Oedipus
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has killed his £ather a„d macried his mothe
'
cne Jew has poisoned
the water.
»-» are aiways distin3uishin9 mar.s 0£ ScaPegoats, S omething
£3llS
°"
SOme°ne
"
h
°
h
" a ds£i"^ OediPus is a criPple .
disease, they „ere Mamed £o r the plague
. Such distinguishing^
become the reason for and focus o£ the accusation, the victira ^ hated
without cause. PinaU, the community draus up ln a oircle atound ^
victim and unanimously and anonymousiy hlm or her> perhaps through
stoning, perhaPs with weapons, or perhaps they simpiy £orce the victim
over a cliff, or they ostracize him or her.
:ore was
The second move comes hpr-aneobecause the community, which befc
disintegrating and at one another's throats, is now temporarily
reunified through the unitary act of communal murder. 58 The second
movement is to ascribe the renewal of the community to the victim. The
one who had the power to destroy now also has the power to heal, and all
good comes from him or her. The victim is transformed into a god or
goddess. This double move is accompanied, as the myth is reinterpreted
over generations, by a denial of the original violence, but traces
58. Girard, 42-44
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their swords and weanon*! t-o hpons o drown out his cries. 59 Here the circle
around the innocent one is sa id + n
^ ^ Pr°teCt
'
n0t Or in other mythsthe scapegoat qod is 1H it qhkilled unintentionally or because there is a
trickster who, while not actually doing the deedy m , xa responsible for it,
while he who actually does it- i <, kiy u t s blameless. 60 These a rt* ^mes e the sorts of
moves which Girard rail, 4-k«c l s the persecutor.
a account of violence. They are
always cover-ups. The^ never gives this sort of account. To
really understand how co^unal violence wor.s, in order to read this
subtext in ordinary myths, one should study a story in which all the
elements of the sranAnA^ ™ ucaPegoat mechanism are present- K,,*- usent, but where it is not
carried through. Such a story is the death of uohn the Baptist.
Girard.
s
chapter on John the Baptist is relevant for this study
because, first of all, that is where he gives his m0st rigorous
statement of how the scapegoat mschanism
, or ^d^, „orks and
because that is where he ties the mechanism into a structure of mimetic
desire
.
Mimetic desire has a sort of monkey see/monkey do quality. The
story of John the Baptist begins, like so many such stories-like Cain
and Abel-with sibling rivalry. Two brothers want the same life; "the
27. Girard, 70.
60. Girard, 71.
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herita9S
' —— — ««e,. Both brothers „ereCallSd Her0d
' "~ * ~*~ can only hope to Ms
brother's wife, Herodias, at his brnth, .o er's expense. Two brothers aredivided over an indivisible heritage
. ft ^ ^
bi, to renounce it. But Herod does not heed the warning, and desire
festers
Girard points out that onoe he possesses her, Herodias ioses her
direct influence over „erod
, sinoe his desire was not so much £or her
but for his brother's „i fe
.
Thus Herodias resorts to her daughter and
estabiishes a tria„guiar rotation, and possibly even ma.es her daughter
a Prize tor the rivai brothers. The situation becomes more and more
n^tic; twin desires are multiplied. Bveryone siowiy becomes possessed
by them.
For Herodias, wishing only to be possessed as a mimetic prize,
John's warning threatens her with obliteration,- her intensity is lifce
Dona Elvira's only more deadly . Herod, fearing her vengeanoe on j0hn,
has locked up John both to appease and to thwart Herodias. But then
John becomes the subject of a mimetic desire between Herod and Herodias.
By shielding John, Herod seems to Herodias to be verifying John against
her. Her hatred for John grows immense. "Attracted by John because
rejected by him, the desire becomes the desire of destruction; it glides
immediately towards violence."
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By imitating my brother's desiro r h •« mutually prevent each other flu f 6 "h" "e desires;As resistance grows on both sidll °" C COrr™°n d« i«.the model becomes increasingly oh^ ? " beCOmes strengthened;becomes increasingly t bstructive and the obstacle
only interested inXT*™Z^lTl^T^ ^obstacles created by itself jl° tl " 15 only taksn "ithinflexible, inaccessible a , af' iSt " that °°stacle;
"hich fascinates Herod and" elL ZlTTo " T^""' " is thatalways the coming into being of Coa s desire ' is
Power of annpul^n^rcT1"." 1™ ^ *~hatred more rapidly from
.VZUZTZ^tl
.sT
"
There is always a crowd at lynchings, pogroms and communal
murders. Girard is trying to comprehend how individuals come to be a
orowd, how all individual desires become focused on one victim, whose
death is called for in unison. There is a crowd in Herod's banguet
hall, eminent people whose good opinion he craves, but how is it that
they all close on John with him? Girard claims that because the mimetic
structure of desire is the same in everyone, and because everyone is
obsessed with some uohn the Baptist, and because resistance strengthens
and intensifies desire, substitutions are possible. 62 As the intensity
grows, my ability to transfer my enmity from my John to someone else's
grows also. Mimetic desire seeks a lowest common denominator in each
person and after a certain point you cannot tell one desiring individual
from any other. They all copy each other, and in fact originate in
mimetic rivalry. Everyone desired the same thing from the beginning,
their desires were always already related.
61. Girard, 130.
62. Girard, 134.
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The catalyst was first i-h» K athe banquet and then the ^
Baptist is by no„ th6 3candal; st_iing biQck ^
_
— I* Plays on the longing £or free mo
__ ^^ ^
Mimetic rivalry haa bottl ed up everyone in inarbittable
Brothers oppose brothers, the social fabric of =o«y la unraveled
— -
no longer a distinction between legitimate and
violence. Bat the crisis is deferred by fOCasing on the scapegoat. Ihe
crisis resulted from a clash of intert„ining of dssires, bat desire
instead hclds its Other responsive. It cultivates its obstacles,
becomes fail of hatred, and is scandalized by them
.
It happens that „erod
, completely moved by the freedom of Soloes
dance, and perceiving that his gaests are also moved
, offers her
anything she desires. But she has no desires of her own, she is a
child. Her mother has to tell her what to desire, and even so Solome
Childishly takes it too literally. Herodias' "The head of John the
Baptist," which might only he a metaphor for simple execution becomes »I
want you to give me John the Baptist's h P,H h~d l s nead, here and now, on a dish."
The thing is clearly beyond anyone's control at that point.
Thus mimeticism envelopes everything, everyone suddenly speaks
with one voice, everyone sees his own scandal in John. Each one can
exchange his torments for John's head. "By espousing the violent desire
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of Solome, all the guests feel as if th*3 l Sy 3re ^tisfying their owndesire . "63
leaving John
, lt ls inteMsting ^ mention ^
~ " MS
— aPPa Cently believed Jesus „as a
sacred. The persecutor cannot believe the scandal I<3al is really dead. Hishatred built a victim into . po„erful^ ,^ ^ ^
rM
-
ly ^— S *> - -e victim either guilty or
to believe that uohn
.as the cause or social disruption, nor is it
possible to make him a god He is rafha9 a. xa t er an innocent man who spoke a
simple truth.
The examples at Hawthorn are, of course«, r , not so extreme as the
beheading of John the Baptist. Per Girard violence rests at the bottom
of all human association, m times of serious crisis it can always rise
up to demand its scapegoats. But usually it need not go so far.
Between times things are less extreme, mildly demonic as opposed to
wildly Satanic. Girard presents an example of a recurring but not
catastrophic demonic cycle in the story of the demons of Garesa.
Certainly many modern institutions feed on mimetic relationships in
which the scapegoat apes the community's potential for violence while
the community violently denies and preserves his accusation. But within
63. Girard, 135.
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organizations the problem i s most often akin fcQ q .x to Saint Peter's denial ofJesus
.
By the late 1 9 <„ S Elton Kayo had become ^ ^
SOiSntifiC Md tSChniMl
— - ~- - -troyed any American
traditiM
°
£ C°"mUnity
- - « * find any other suitable „ay tQ
strategies „ithin the plant t0 integrate oneseif vatiQu3^
Jesus had just been arrested his fon., x followers and disciples had scattered.
The social group within which Peter was a Hi. • i u" W3S dl sc iple had dissolved. When
>eter went into the courtyard there_^ ^ ^
themselves around
. £ire
, and Peter tried ^ join^
The fire circle is powerfully integrating. It brings everyone
tcgether in a ring feeing one another. It is intimate. The fire
galvanizes a sort of community. Peter, who „a s now alone and empty,
tried to Join in the circle at the fire. A servant girl, perhaps a
popular young woman, objected to Peter's being there. Wasn't Peter with
Jesus? Peter said no and left the circle, but not the courtyard. She
pursued him, repeating mimetically what she had asked him before. The
first time she failed to arouse the others, but this time she pulled it
off. Her example worked. Also Peter denied knowing Jesus a second time
and this second denial irritated them. Come on, now.' they say. His
accent gives him away, he is a Galilean. In other words they are
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saying: You don't real k i
something and it realh, ! •Y
"""^ - ^ ^ « Pending to be oneof us. Peter responded by oallina Hoy c lmg d wn ourses on Jesus and denying heever knew the man. 9
I should point out the incrPH n'Kiedible power of the group; even Jesus'
closest disciples can not resist joining it In thJ mn l . e end peter ^.^ ^
remain in the group by hating whafc
y nace. He of course fails
snyone wh° has
~
-
a
— »«ut-« by . P01ic;
-former should recede the probl_ ^ outsidec ^ ^
person to espouse the group's oauses and espeoiallv it, •specia y s enmities, but
even *U. getting the letter of the thing right, the outsider^
shares the linguistic
_ity they try to i.itate. In Peter . s case
the mechanism of scandal only
.orks to exclude him further from the co2y
hut it clearly shows the attraction of the crowd
, a„d how
.roups
maintain themSelves by ma*i„g distinctio„s and maintaining them. The
outsi der is he who dissolves the distinctions It is thi, k •1C 1S s mechanism we
see at Hawthorne.
In the U.S. labor force there have always been scores cf
i-igrants; people whose old ethnic communities are dissolving or who,
at work, try to plav down their ethnic identities. But people can be
singled out in various other „aya as well. At Hawthorne there were
multiple systems of sentient involved in all sorts of distinctions,
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gradations, associations, and hierarchies 6iHl
. Old-timers were differentfrom new-comers, office workers different fAf ere rom shop workers, supervisors
of one rank differed from supervisors of „P another, inspectors differedfrom assemblers, and so on rh 0. T ere were also prestige hierarchies
Men's work was superior to women's offS
' °
lCe W°rk SUP-ior to shop work(These two obviously conflict. it is intpx eresting that often individualsin the women's movement will ch.n.allenge the former while working to
strengthen the latter Th^ m~
"
°3t SeX1" bsha--
- usually said t0 be
that of blue collar workers ) a=S,) A^embling some parts was superior to
assembling others Tho.nh6re
"
8re d«"-tions of race, sex, religion
,
—ity
, age, education< and service m wi ^
complex configuration of relationsMps ln „hlch different gcoups
separated out and yet tied together,.*, rhis system o £^
conflicting forces and attitudes., workino a, c=>... g t ross purposes with each
other" placed everyone in mimetic binds.
Somehow or othpr Q ffo„ t •
and his work" had been esIZIZ/
interest at this point wastackino' T " COmmunit V <*
en integrate activity an £ I
9r° UP ailSd t0 establish
one could understand or control!^ ^ °* dlSC° rd "hiCh "°
Mayo, of course, believed better communication and open trustful
confrontation could diffuse this situation. He also believed that if
people worked from a genuine motivation rather than the artificial ones
64. Roethlisberger (1964), 539.
65. Roethlisberger (1964), 549.
66. Mayo (1933), 118-19.
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imposed by inrpnUu^ „ce„ti„e systems that the pathologlcal^ ^ ^
might begin to untie themselves From „ „. our discussions of mimetic
rlVally
"
e kn
°" WS *""«~ ™ -co, even if „e doubt the
ascriptions of humsnistic management ere enough. In the
„£
-
trust, competition, and conformity which Mayo_^^ten us tc expect mimetic rivalry and desire, ostracism, demo„i a
, and
scapegoats
.
G
- Connlnsi
^
n
This discussion cf organizational and personal pathologies puts us
" '
POSiti °n t0 aPPreCi"e
— « •— ^st of supposedly
marginai texts, ranging from the outbreak of cholera in Jonathan
Turners illinois tc Kant, preoccupation with Cain and Abel and the
propaedeutic cf violence, to civic republicanism. s opposition to will
Kane and Travis McGee. Modern communities have a deep problem with
miotic violence which we can neither successful!, cover up in communal
myths and traditions nor resign ourselves tc. according to Sirard this
is because the Biblical account has dene its wort cn us. This means
that no version of community life which denies or covers up its
victimization mechanisms will ever satisfy us. And yet, because we are
sc interdependent and subject tc such a continuous reciprocity, our age
is perhaps more susceptible to mimetic rivalry than any heretofore
known, at least in scale if not in quality. The message with which the
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sxngle individual i s higher t ,yn han the universal. Th i s i«,
,
in s, of course,
.
and absurd
, and thus _ never arise
— - yst it ^
ouxcjre
T
° return to Hi^j^ and Hiat^il^ia^j,^^ ue r^-^iii£r, w can see in Will
-e the mar.s o£ an ostracized^ „ ^^ _ ^ ^
responsibility, and his incorruptibility But hu r . e is not guilty of
anything.
_
the three actors-himself
, the ,ill er
, and the
-
is clearly distanced from the evil that threatens the town, though
'W1 t0"nSPe°Ple b6liS
-
th" it not for him, evil „ou ld not
be threatening. Thus the community is unravelino theg, accusation goes,
because of Will Kanp tk qe. The townspeople offer him many ohanoes to leave
tney turn on him, the Uller-, victim is also their victim. They have
become a mimetic crowd, each person monotonously becoming anonymous to
eject him from the community He is t-he „c . h community's victim whether he
wins or loses.
The unstable element in violation stories is the villain. „
the villain associated with the crowd or with the victim? m the
persecutor's version of the story the villain is tied to the victim,, to
horrendous evil, m the American western movie, there is never an
attempt to associate the villain with the scapegoat, and Hi^Jssn does
not explicitly link him tc the crowd either, though 1 have just shown
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^ Cr°"d **« to the villain. It ls alsQ .AC o implicitly
- - throBS his badge ln the d
_ repudtating J
Part of it any longer.
^3 wor.s for the character ^ ^ i
anSf° rmS
"~ *>— '»« * ~1 and audiences „ere
C°ntinUally™d °f^ «—~ity and continuaUy
>-e thi3 demoniac cycle
,
but , _ amend
revenge on the community; the victim fights back and .y o K wins. in the
Proeees he reveals muoh more about ^ ^
between the townspeople and their dSmons, the complicity of the
alienee, the role as obstacle, and the poverty and mimetic
quality of the acquisitive virtues R,,t- K„ • .r . Bu because it is still vengeance,
and even though vengeance at least ta.es responsibility fox its own
actions, the cycle merely repeated itself 0UCsids ^ ^ ^
is in the even more monotonous violence of the police movie. Of course,
there are other interesting aspects tc the drifter. He is, like the
Commandant at the end of Ba^anal, a ghost. The hope, at least
socially, lies te the claim that only ^ spiritual can ^
resources needed to overcome miotic rivalry, or to even call it by its
name
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Obviously one need not see th P«ese movies as celebrating the
tradition of American uHiu, •utiHtananxsm, but as offering a profound
indictment of it t k-,have also tried to show the deeply Christian nature
of this indictment. There h < n !rs „ tencan political culture a Christian
-ily a„onymity of bureaucrats a„d sleepers radical evil, by „hich
-atnan Baldwin runner nan oppose a civic ethios based on an alliance
between Cree, ethios and the doctrine of Om„ip0tenoe, and by „hich
-orge Wiiliam curtis oan oppQse ^ tacti(^ ^
notion of mimetic violence iies at t he Heart of flmerican distrust of
ethical iife. In Amerioan popuisr ouiture, to» tales and sea cha„tey s,
coilective violence and cowardice are seldora successful!, covered over,
and this constitutes popular culture. s great strength and even our
latest hope for moral progress. We can now better appreciate Kanfs
prescience when he linifpH t-h^ ^ked the experiences of discontent and unworthiness
to the aspiration for human freedom.
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CHAPTER iv
THE AGE OE SELF-ASSERTION (THE DEATH OE OMNIPOTENCE)
in an earlier chapter Kant ga„e us , ^ ^ ^
-* loo* like to combine £reedom organi2ation
^ beiieved ^
tO SUStain the notion 0£ freedom
, needed ooncspts of^
action and personal worth. These in turn reguired a belief in the
possibility of a .oral progress „hioh enlightened ^
culturally i.pose upon the natural world. Tor Kant
.oral process also
retired a
.oral creator whose rational plan could grantee a pcssiMe
progressive approximation of our .oral ideas to their realization. But
Kant rejected the notion of a Greek cos.os. He instead replaced divine
voluntatis, with hu.an voluntaris.. Because he could no ionger consider
the COS.OS a beneficent provider, whether of
.aterial goods, theoretical
knowledge, or of .oral direction, hu.an voluntaris. had to take the for.
of self-assertion. Self-assertion, Kant thought, had to be the affair
of intelligible tenuities and, in an interdependent world, could not
be an individual endeavor. Self-assertion, even of morality, finally
involves one in organized rational activity. These organizations,
because they are themselves assertions upon material, rather than
expressions of cosmic purposes, immediately seem to undermine the very
freedom which makes the. necessary. For instance, to what extent is it
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Permissible to subordinate nature to self .
.
-asserted rational principles;
to what extent must peoD]^ uk.P ple who are insufficiently convinced of assertive
rationality be made to comply with ora.n' ,•P y l ga izational imperatives? These
sorts of questions, alono with «-hag
.he discussion of mimetic desire in the
Previous chapter, seem to undermine our faith that moH°dern practice might
somehow work out these details. We mioht ofw g , course, think of Max
Weber's characterization of the modern calling:
^^^Tl^^T^^^ -is nulity
or civilization never beforeachieved.
1
All this presents me with a complication. None of the thinkers
mentioned so tat expressly uses the term
.self-assertion.. The terra
belongs rather to Hans Blumenberg.s analysis, and, as used so far,a— to an interpretive projection upon these thinners. It was only
after reading Blumenberg that I was able to see a problematic of self-
assertion in Kant, Turner, Curtis, and Mayo. This problematic allowed
me to take these thinners more seriously than I otherwise would have,
since they were replying to a fundamental problem of the age. But now
the notion of self-assertion may have, as a framework of interpretation,
become existentially unsustainable. That is, in faithfully following
its lead, I have undermined my own faith in it. In order to continue tc
respect the notion of self-assertion, and the thinkers whose work it
interprets, I must now reconsider Blumenberg's discussion.
1. Max weber. The Protectant Ethir and the sniHt „ f o^ h ^ TalcottParsons, trans. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 182.
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The idea, however, is „„ f ,.„ .. ,not to simply say to him, yes, but it all
Heidegge,s ..nestlon Concerning Teohnology ,. ot F„ t . s
But X am sure Blume„berg has read his Kaf.a. Hathet l
«i3h to engage him at the philosophical level, and especially „ith texts
which share „ith him the conviction that fennel Kant is crucially
i-pcrtant to the modern self
-conception. Thus , win COnsider
Heide"er ' S E^-^-^«^ and Hh^^i^, and
r-aulfs ^M^^him& . Hith these texts , hope ^ deapen ^
understanding and appreciation of Blumenberg. s problematic of self-
assertion
in Chapter I, Z said that organizations in America grew up in a
context of Protestant religious proofs, especially the disenchantment
of nature and the shift from an emphasis on God's omnipotence to an
emphasis on God's moral teleology. m Chapter II, i discussed this
teleology in greater detail, but the withering of omnipotence and the
lose of the cosmos were both treated as Kant's "characterizations" of
the modern situation. That is, I did not question them much. In this
chapter I will use Blumenberg' s discussion as a means for understanding
why these things were no longer available, but yet were still operative
as negative motivations. Their passing could not be met with
indifference, but called forth something called self-assertion. What
does Blumenberg mean by all this?
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» i3 Characteristic o£ Blumenberg . s „ay of arguing
self-assertion. Self-aq^r*-,^ssertion was and remains historically necessary,
thus, since we must will there be aplf aself-assertion, we must also will all
the presuppositions of self-assertion. if certain Dh , . . ,J-J- p ilosophical
speculations undermine self-assertion, these speculations ought to fce
abandoned. This
, , suppose
, t. an eitpample of s^ssertio„ at uork
.
One of the things „e are told not to ask i,s Heidegger's question of
Being; another might be the focus of this dissertation, the
organizational implioations of self-assertion.
in the preceding chapter I found that one reason organizational
relies for its motivational basis on structures of mimetic desire.
These structures are in turn facilitated by a pervasive concern for
materialist gain and the anxieties produced by a world of relative
scarcity. How did we come to rely so exclusively on materialism and why
do we characterize the world in terms of scarcity, Are these things
just bad attitudes or are they inscribed somehow the decision to be
modern?
If they are, then is self-assertion a sort of
' decisionism?
'
Blumenberg wants self-assertion to be a form of voluntarism, but doesn't
it set in advance what problems we might consider and what solutic.ons we
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might try and what we have to simolv 1<~v p y live with? Sppp
fc .
een thls waY Kantianvoluntansm would share some of t-h*
'
aSPeCtS that
-
ke us unoomfortable
with Hobbes- decisionist social contract Bl k. umenberg notes that in
Hobbesean theorv "t-h^ uy he contract of subjection can never be one that i sYet to be sealed, but is only one that 1,1,Y is inferred to have gone
before. "2 Blumenbercr a„prf„9 e ts against cacl Sctai"'
= juri8tio positiviam
that
:
•••juristic positivism must ally itself wit-h ^ u-that puts the contingency of posiM 11 I hlstorical factor
reach of observation T i i
institutions beyond the
relation to legitimacv r! tl Y deGlslonism derives its
voluntarism i/asTt wefe the LTtlt ^ ^ V°lunt--m-because
-solute power, while^n^^^^TT^ °f
'decisions- have always already been made that
^
form of historical authorities! Y 3PPSar in the
Thus organizational resignation and routine replace progress and
freedom as organizational motivati ons
The ultimate decisionist is, of course, the sovereign state.
"Decisionism cannot function without a
.sovereign, be it only a
metaphorical one." Actually the sovereign in whom final decision
inheres almost has to be a metaphor since he must simultaneously both
decide and legitimate his own authority to decide. The question is
whether self-assertion is not already a deeper form of decisionism, an
t*™ "um^b"9. The Legitimacy of The Modern ngo, Robert Wallace,rans., (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1983) 98.
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ultimate soveripnn ,,k- u
-e9n, „hlch might play ltsei£ ^ ^ ^
transcendentalism or pragmatism.
— between Hans Blumenberg, Ma rtin Heidegger, and Michei Foucault
"1 three things Have an appreciation of Kant. wk and it3
centra! to an understanding of, using Blumenberg. term, modern sett-
assertion. M1 three take seriously
^^^^^ ^ ^
understood it, though none or them
.eiie.es that Kant, solntions have
been programatically successful. iet their approaches to the stody of
~ty MIy greatly
,
and their disagreements throw li ght on the sorts
of problems I was just discussing.
A
- Hans Blumanbarg
in previous chapters I have discussed the importance of the
disenchantment of nature, the iose of a
.prose of the world,, and even
the death of God in Series. For Hans Blumenberg such events in our
intellectual history are different ways of designating the relation
between the religious doctrine of theological absolutism and the modern
response to it, human self-assertion. Blumenberg. s thesis is that the
medieval doctrine of omnipotence aroused a deep anxiety which it then
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could not contain. Out ofO th„ anxiety „as bor„ human sel£ .assertion
Pr°]eCtl0n
°
f
* P*™« 'tanc, upon the „orld
.
economic preservation"? ^CanT" bi°logical andavailable to it. It means an » onanism by means naturally
which man posits his existence S^ 6^^1 ?r°9ram ' "cording toindicates to himself how he is ""^"cal situation and
surrounding him and what use L ^ °^ " ith the *«"tythat are open to him 3 "lU make of the Possibilities
™is project must be differentiated from self-preservation, a
naturalistic-and positivist- biological conception. Self-assertion is
rooted in an existential situation, with its own historical a
P-ori.
« thus Con tains possibilities that
"self-preservation" would
net have; it, for instance, leaves room for freedom and for self-
limitation in history because its understandings and agendas are
potentially open to thought. Blumenberg illustrates the difference by
discussing modern technical activitv rr „„y. If one understands technology in
terms of self-preservation, one necessarily must view nature as a
beneficiary which is deficient in the means of distribution. Human
technical accomplishment then has the function of assisting and
supplanting nature to execute essentially natural ends. One will then
risx viewing the "growth of the potency of technique" in the modern
period as simply a continuation or acceleration of something which is
present throughout all human history. But, argues Blumenberg, modern
3. Blumenberg, 138.
208
self-assertion grew out of a will „nr t»r , not to intensify an old orientation,
but actually
-extort from.
.. reality a new
in the late Hiddle Ages two doctrines had changed the faoe of
«alrty. These were the dootrines of omnipotence and predestination
Buropean Christianas struggle with t hese doctrines is brilliantly
_
meticulously catalog and rehashed inXh^i^^^^^
gist of the story is that beginning „lth st
. Ame , s
of Gnosticism, Christian theories were co™itted to maintaining Cod's
pcwer over evil. Gn0sticism had maintained^ ^ ^ ^^ ^
the result of the evil oemiurge who has weave, us into a state of
forgetfulness. This imperfect state is his cosmos, in which we are lost
in what ! would term a mimetic existence, the God of salvation brings
us back to ourselves by reminding us who we truly are.
The problem comes with the Incarnated Jesus. !f He were really a
man, He would be a creature of the Demiurge, with no power to get out of
the cosmos. If He were actually God, He could be said to be using
manhood as a disguise in order to slip by the Demiurge. But if He
needed a disguise He must be subordinated to evil and have no power over
it. Furthermore, as time passed it became apparent that Christ's second
coming might take a long time. Cn a Gnostic interpretation this might
be further evidence of Cod's powerlessness to remove his arch enemy, the
Demiurge
.
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Blumenberg also mentions ^ ^
" "~
—— one ln „hich Roman
civilization knew itself to ho ^ i • .
° ^ dSCl—^ Civil i2ed pagans viewed
Christian doctrine of the La<^ n= ^ .st Day as being hostile to the world. They
viewed the persecutions Christian. „s underwent as a mild foretaste of
what, in their view, Christians wished to visit •a even upon innocent women
and children. The Gnostic doctrine had no reply to such hx i c arges since
salvation lav exant-iw a „ *-uctly ln the negation q£ ^ ^ ^^^going to have to exisf in , ,«Mt . the world for a long time, It would need a
doctrine In „hich that uorld „a3 ^ wholly
For Augustine, God created the world and he created It good. EvU
in the world is the result or human sin, and humans were accredited with
^ee win, „hich made their transgressions ^ ^
^atonic elements fro. Gnosticism remain; sin leaves man in a fallen
state, in what ! would again call mimetic rivalry. Por Blumenberg
•
s
purposes this means that theoretical knowledge is severely limited
because, since fallen insight is measured against God's omniscience,
what dees not effect our immediate needs for salvation is beyond our
ability. However, our curiosity can extend beyond our needs. Some
science is even encouraged. But the scientific thinker who pursues
theoretical knowledge beyond the point of what is needed for ethics and
salvation is, according to Augustine, a busybody; he is officious.
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icame
Over the coo.se of the Middle flges these ^
_
intensified th^ ~„
- The comment to God . s pouer eventuaiiy ud
- * Point of saying that any statement GQd , 3 intentioM £m ^
or about how much of His knowledge and n, over wh.ch areas, He might haveUft accessible to human explocation; an guestions _ s^p^UMM"CMble be"USe
——^ a restriction 0£ God , s
°""iPOtCnK
-
BUt tWs
•
—~< to h^le human endeavor
and eno„unga
. surrender to^ ^^^
-is is because it seemed to open everything to , radical
For instance, we could no longer assume, as had the Cree.s, that the
cosmos
.as the actuation of all that was possihle, since for Ood to
exhaust an Possibilitie s ln creatlng the^ he^
have had to duplicate Himself; in „nich case He^ ^^ ^ ^
«.* powerful Being . Nor could Cod be assume, to wor* o„iy according to
the schema of the Platonic Ideas, and it hecame inexplicahle why only
these ldeas and no others were used. Nor could He even he held to
having made a cosmos that fit human conceptual frameworks at all. At
its most radical, the doctrine of omnipotence forces one to assume that
God at each instant freshly creates from nothing each and every thing in
the world. It is inexplicable „hy or even if He maintains the physical
continuity between one instant and the next; or whether he will continue
to do so.
If we tie this to the notion of predestination, we can see that
this situation was fraught with anxiety for human-kind. As Max Weber
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— out
, the dQctrine ^ predestinatiQn ^^^^
never knows whether one i s saved
^
or not, in a situation where being
saved is not a matter of indifference Thi, v,
Cal . .
lS 13 Wh^ for Weber, asoetiolvmists and Pietist-* «tlSts Pursued earthly success Th
•
Y . ls worked best, as Inave stressed earlier, where Arist-nr- t
Ch . ,
.
^stotelian physics was in pl ace alongsideristian doctrine.
points out that when the doctrine of onmipotence ^
intensified t0 this level
, God^ ^^ ^ ^^^^ ^ ^
Cnosticism, the dependable God i3 the ^ of saivation
_ ^ _^He has withheld from men's knowledae "frh*g the range over which he chooses to
be dependable.
"
In a similar predicament in an earlier Pr* rn e a, Gnostics had been able
to articulate an escape in salvation But ™i . now escape was blocked by
predestination. m that same earlier era En.n,"
'
Picurus could articulate a
doctrine of ataxia as interworldly composure and
indifference. But now ataraxia was blocked because nature was no longer
a cosmos containing a minimum of beneficence to support indifference.
Nature had become creation; ataraxia bad rested on tbe physics of a
cosmos, our nature is no longer reassuring, and our physics has to be
about reai human power over nature to compensate for our radical
insecurity
.
212
Nor could a few good men repeat the st«- • „
in nMl individual's fulfilmentphilosophy Phii^o uP»y- Philosophy now had to assure ^SSU the adequacy of mankind's
possession of the worinld, S1 „ce the problem of nature could not longerbe forced to the ed9e of consoiousnesa
. One oould no 1c longer rise abovethe world, nature had bar-™,„ ,ecome a pressing theme which made insistent
demands on philosophy.
These demands were acknowledged, Bluraenberg notes, through
P-tical solutions iike^ an intersubjective
, inter_generatiQnai
way of focusing the
..inoperable theoretical energy, in „h0se servi
both individuals and generations were enrolled,.* But also, beoau
once neither the cos.os nor the Platonic Zdeas could serve as limit
upon creation an infi„ity of possible uorlds and^
became possible, late medieval thinners began looking for oonoeptual
constructions which could be used in any possible worid as
. instructs
•
of understanding: mathematlcs and materialism . La te medieval thinkers
speculated that, though Cod mi ght know .ore about geometric figures than
we do, of what we do know beran^ i , =.K , B cause it is a priori and necessary, God
could not know any better M^tory s . atte , as a speciesless substrate, is the
stuff from which man can make whateyer he wants. Materiality, of
course, becomes the ideal premise of an attitude to the world defined by
technicity.5 Because God is hidden, "man constructs for himself a
counter world of elementary rationality and manipulability . "6
ce
se
:s
4. Blumenberg, 155.
5. Blumenberg, 164.
6. Blumenberg, 173.
213
Earlier, says Blumenberrr <-k«enberg, the nominalist Gregor of Remiri had
begun to answer the problem of sense oerr«*p ception in a world whit
correspond to human conceptions as foil
ch may not
ows: the act of perception never
-stifles more than . limUed judgm^ ^ th±s^ ^ ^
"elude the more ambitious judgment, "This oolor exists .
"
Such confining of certainty to the facts of ™ •y cn t consciousness, says
Blumenberg, already contalns ^ ^ ^
Already it asserts, though with a new intent, Augustus tree win, and
it asserts free will precisely in so far a «, hy s human beings are responsible
for what is bad in the world Tf =. i we are accountable for evil, then we
can be held accountable only to the extent that we can be responsible
for our own perceptions. if we are to remain responsible for bad in the
world, this minimum must be assumed.
When Descartes in his First Meditation radicalized Ocham's thesis
of God's absolute potential into the possibility of a malioious
deceiver,
he sharpened the doubt surrounding certainty to such an extentthat the pragmatic formulas for the self-assertion of reason tsuchas Gregor- s] could no longer be sufficient 7
7. Blumenberg, 195.
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Thus, says Blumenberg, Descart-^.9, es- contribution is not to
articulate a brand new Dl 3n *nPXa for modernit-v h,,«-ernity, but rather to make the
absolute immanence."
" ^ " fc
—dy noted that if God could
tamper with the knowledge seeker when thatn seeker was being honest, thenHe could tamper with mnr-^in oral responsibility too m hh.fy . t at case God would
«- «- author of, say
,
hatefulness, „hlch is> of cQursei ^^^^ ^
—
.— , and there£ore canMt fce supposed
^ Des^ ^ ^
uu. discovered that the unlty o£ the subject exciudes ins_ity
" theoretical knowledge. God might fake appearances
_ ^ ^^
questions He cannot hold the mora , ^.^ ^ ^ ^
carries back to epistemology . Thers is a^ >t^
becomes so impossible that moral responsibility U lost as „eU ^
that point, like one small atom against theological absolutist, early
moderns asserted a resistance, a self-defense a limit t„5
'
1:L o omnipotence. 8
Thus modern knowledge relies orucially upo„ m0ral freedom since
there is one incontestable thing-morali ty and responsibility-knowledge
is grounded. All that is necessary is to show that theoretical
knowledge is the expression of a consolidated self, the sa.e self that
is morally responsible. Thus Descartes articulates "the primeval right
8. Blumenberg, 196.
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of self-assertion " +-h=>+-
' anth«P°logi cal minimum" „hich is „ the essence
of the modern age's understanding o£ itself.
-
Again according to uean de Hirecourt. knowledge can he a product
either of Aristotelian receptiveness or of the activity of a knowing
sublet. « the former, God produces all pledge, if the latter, the
taei mUSt
' " * »«• ^tervene, and so become implicated
in what is known. Just as the primary cause, God, could not substitute
anything for itself without duplicating itself, neither can the
secondary cause allow any valid substitutions for itself either. That
is, only a unified subject can be held responsible. Blumenberg stresses
that because God had become absolute, man's concern for himself also had
to become absolute. Because of this, modern man had to reject the
Aristotelian conception of receptiveness, "For this receptive openness
delivers man up to an absolute power of whose goodwill he cannot be
sure . "9
Scholasticism had early-on accepted the Greek notion of cosmos.
The problem, which plagued Scholasticism right up to modern times, was
that, unlike Plato's demiurge, the God of creation cannot be contained
ithin His cosmos. He could not be assumed to have merely made the
orld according to pre-established universal rules, and therefore, "the
act of the divine will no longer related simply to the existence of the
w
w
9. Blumenberg, 197.
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»orid, but also eo the MiTCrsal truths that hold ln lt ,. io
«ay such a situation eould guarantee ^^ ^ ^ ^
POS8ibility „as coincident „Uh reauty Md rsason ^
by divine win. 0£ course, nominalism had rejected both .eject assumptions in
favor of God's infinite potential.
POS—^ «* onlv of
the security of a coLos that ^
bUt
*lso ° f man
Platonic deLurge-^t be tL'^s^arinr^'^t/^ ^
what is possible as material appearance
nSUrpaSSable inst
— of
The question then arises of whether the hidden truth of the
creation is not a matter of indifference. Could one retreat into
ataraxia? But the Middle Ages had theological reasons for rejecting
such a negative happiness. If happiness were merely the absence of pain
or the absence of insecurity arising from uncertainty, then the bliss of
the Beatific vision would become a sort of superfluous addition to a
condition already sufficient unto itself. The essence of man's need for
happiness must continue to be fulfillible only in the possession of
God's truth. But that truth, because of predestination, is unavailable
to this-worldly knowledge. It is in this situation that early moderns
began to assert the hypothetical mode.
If one says, "Well! Let's just assume we have sufficient
certainty to continue," the implication is of self-assertion. it means
10. Blumenberg, 198.
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we assert „e have the „here„ithal fay^^ ^
impossible,, is to assert that metaphysics
make
possible. If knouledge of nature ia a condition uhich ^_
assertion possible, then the epistemological conditions under which
knowledge of nature is possible must be assumed to h.be given. The appeal
to 'the normal course of r ac„rc i < ^ tun tu e 18 thus no longer teleological
, "but
rather hypothetical, in the sens? «f = ~e o a general supposition without which
no other hypothesis has any sense at all~a postulate of
which does not assert the regularity and dependability of nature but
rather assumes them as the only possibility left to man. "11 with
Descartes this was extended to the assertion of "the freedom to abstain
from all categorical judgment in favor of hypothetical indecision . "12
The ultimate assertion is that "man does not require certainty in the
sense of insight into the plan of creation and the reality lying open
before God in order to assert himself in existence."
This means that human knowledge is no longer even a cloudy version
of divine knowledge, it is radically different. In relation to
happiness this means that human endeavors to prolong or materially
enhance this-worldly existence can be strictly distinguished from the
other-worldly conditions of their ultimate fulfillment. But in the
11. Blumenberg, 191.
12. Blumenberg, 199.
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context of the witherincr of ^a
„ .
9
~' the l°« of its teleological
beneficent protection, henceforth:
a^t°efrcf^"^^ T *™ "ith a «™ «-t i.inconsiderateness of n!? / t0 anticiP*te thecw-enesa t atural processes +-„inadequacy of their products bv til * Up f° r the
which from one point of "ew £ thj ^ P'°dUCtion - Hypothesia,
renunciation of the claim t
e formal expression of the
adequacy, becomes i£^^*^?0?* -nse ofassertion, the potential fl I V1SW a means of self-
or dr„:t -hich~
This means that theory is no longer a way of contention, an end
» "self, hut is, and must he, mediated throu3h human production.
Blumenberg summarizes this entire discussion of the geneology of self-
assertion as follows:
The absolutism of the hidden God freed the fhBnrof . ,
dfvWofrof'view'and'thus It^^Tl^ZT^L the
The pri e of t isTe^STtS^^ S^lg^the restrng point of a blissful onlooker but ratherTo theworkplace cf human exertion. Theory that can no longer be
value
lng
ts
U
stat
P°theSiS a™ loSt its *™t
or t^orv for a "
itSelf
'' ^ the ^ctlonalization
t L „ " y . Ch°Sen endS ' Us ent^ into th -= rol. of
its status ^ "
m
!
anS
'.
iS a Pr0cess ^sequent to the loss ofas an end in itself. 14
Hypothesis is an escape from the old criterion of adequacy to the
object, and method emerges as "artfulness and self-defense" against
human inadequacy to know the divine truth.
13. Blumenberg, 199.
14. Blumenberg, 200.
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Stated thi, way
, the modern turning ^ ratiQnal _instrumentai
and organi 2ation does constitute a of , decisionism , h_1— constant Stains that ^ , ^ ^ ^« us to the technical as such, and though it does close off
quired to endorse „ithout questlon whatevet teohnoio9y ^
technical itself
, he says
, need not play ^^ ^ ^
technicel P^ocesse, B1„e„berg is the £irst t0 admit that technolQgy
can create a sterile wm-inorld. Thus we are not, in relation to technicity,
in a situation analogous to Hoboes' citizens in the Leviathan, m
Hobbes, whenever we protest we are told first that we already agreed to
the oontraot and seoond that any deviation will make the „hole contract
come unglued. Blumenberg seys modern teohnicity leaves room for
criticism and change.
It remains here only to say something about the relation between
Kant and Blumenberg. m many ways Blumenberg seems to me to be an
exemplary Kantian, and my own analysis of Kant owes a great deal to The.
Legitimacy of t he Mod&CD &g&. One of the chief advantages of reading
Kant more like Blumenberg would is that it corrects a tendency to
understand Kant as a rationalist. Blumenberg would say rather that Kant
is better understood as an anthropologist. Kant explores the
anthropological minimum perhaps better than anyone, and also understands
better than most the extreme drawbacks of anthropology. To underscore
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all this one could cite* an« ^ .Olt. y of hundreds of examples from the CxitUu^f
Pure EsaapJi, but i win o-nnt-oquo e only one. it co.es, appropriately, from
Kant's discussion of hypothetical reason:
The hypothetical employment of reason 4. n
aim is, so far as may be possible to
" S
.
rGgUlatlVe^ its sole
our detailed Knowledge, a^t
S
nfr:;y\^\
r
!;pr0ximlL
i
th: f °funiversality. ap o mate e rule to
The hypothetical employment of reason ha* ^ e
jr
,
i-y AJt: regarded, not as criven in itcmif u..*.
only. 15
yive itself, but as a problem
Blumenberg-s analysis of self-assertion uses a certain structural
triad: Theology-Cosmology-Anthropology. Whether this triad need still
confine us, I cannot say, but Blumenberg stresses that it is basic to
the way in which thinkers on the threshold of modernity understood
themselves. Blumenberg-s thesis is that the intensification of any one
of the three elements of the triad finally requires the intensification
of the other two. The thesis is most consistently worked out in Part IV
in the discussions of Nicholas of Cusa and Giodorno Bruno. Theological
absolutism eventually shattered the finitude of the cosmos because an
absolute God cannot be contained in finite manifestations or in finite
ssibilities. The finite cosmos thus gave way to the infinity of
ssible worlds. This meant that an infinite God and an infinite
universe confronted a finite humankind with an awesome indifference, and
PO
PO
15. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp-Smith, tram
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) B675.
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with the real pos3ibnity that human conceptions ^
ineongruent with metaphysioal
^ ^^
humankind had to a^p^ssert lt3 own standing and self-adequacy.
„nen it
did, anthropology joined the rank of the absolutes.
NO one has explored the features of this self-assertion of
anthropology better than Manuel Kant. I„ Kant, the principle of
sufficient reason, which Leibnir had asserted to exist in creation,
became a principle of the sufficient rationality of the human subject,
inhering especially in practical activity. with all this in mi„d ! „m
now turn to two of Martin Heidegger's discussions of Kant's MMt.
Pure R^<^n
B
-
Martin HenHpggp r
If for Blumenberg the problem was to show first that self-
assertion is a sort of historical a priori, but, second, that its
imperatives of mastery needn't be domineering, Martin Heidegger, though
not using the term here, looks at the same self-assertion with a more
jaundiced eye. While Blumenberg opposed positivism in order to gain a
foothold for reflection, Heidegger carries the discussion of the modern
a priori back beyond self-assertion to ask about self-assertion's own
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presuppositions. From t-M . ™jhi. point o£ view Blumenberg resembles more the
positivists whom he overtly opposes.
Heidegger begins by taking self-assertion at its word, but
eventually disoovers that you can not be self-assertive without
presupposing some relation or other to being. It is this understanding
of being against which an ontoloov of 5augy self-assertion even makes sense
An ontology, however, provides a stance t„ deeper reflection than self-
assertion can allow. To make this clear Heidegger refers to eiato-s
characterization of the dreamlike quality of positive science.
Plato had said that the positive sciences were dreamlike in the
sense that they could not ask after their own a priori, they proceed
without understanding their own philosophical grounding. This is
because there is a difference between doing, say, mathematical problems,
and asking after the foundations of mathematics. To do a problem at all
one must already assume the set of foundations appropriate to
mathematics to be true.
Blumenberg not only admits but celebrates this dreamlike quality
of self-assertion. Self-assertive freedom, he maintains, crucially
relies on affirming its dreamlike stance. But to know you are in a
dream state is already to put pressure on it. Heidegger finds that the
ontological basis of self-assertion treats the natural as the ontic.
But we can only articulate that because there is some prior horizon
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on
s
which allows us to understand it Th. „. e understanding of self-asserti
is therefore n„t lt39lf
. sei f-asse«ion. That is
,
,
one mode o £ comportment touard Khat u# faut Mt
_ ^ ^
the whoie story even in its 0„n^ Heidegger expiores ^ ^
these issues in Terence to Kant , s thesis:^ ^ ^ ^ ^
predicate. 16
From the discussion of Blumenberg we know that self-assertion
involves a projection of human rationality upon a material which may orW not fit its projection. The only test is to project a production
and see whether or not one can successfully produce it. So long as the
product works as predicted, one need not revise one's theory. We know
also that this involves a break with older metaphysical and ontological
stances in the world. In the medieval and ancient period, it was
believed that the logos was the structure of both thought and cosmos.
Thus, one could get by with only one kind of logic, formal logic. Of
course, the ontological argument comes from this earlier period. But
the postulate of self-assertion implies a radical break between the
rationality we project and the rationality of God's creation. Kant
formulated this break in his notion of an a priori synthetic judgment.
What it means is that our conceptions are disconnected from a cosmos.
To say a triangle has three angles is still true, but one need not
16. Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phpnn^nn]^, Albert
Hofstadter, trans. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), pZ/ /6/ see also Cri t i que of Pure Rpa ^np B620-30; Heidegger also
explicates "The Postulates of Empirical Thought" B266-74.
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from a
a priori
—
.
that ons has said anything about the^
ab°Ut
^ - —nio. as distinguished fc
synthetic, judgment. Modern self
-assertion requires Kant's
syntheti°
-—
-
.
«« * 3e lf-:::; ion
,
-stern pbiiosophy quired only analytic . udgments since k_ cs_
Prim"ilY reCSPtiVe
-
B" — *™ become Prej«lre a di£ferent
sort of judgment became necessary h~
i
a. Heidegger points out that Kant
retains the medieval notion of realitv in ^ „.r y m his discussion of analytic
judgments; reality still reside in +-k± sides the conceptual structure, but
Perhaps here as in other places Kant, seeming bsctatd usage u^
to the self-conception of self-assertion than is the one we normally
use, where reality resides with the object.
When Heidegger begins to unpack all this he disoovers that, as
Blumenberg would admit, modern self-assertion makes use of all sorts of
boundary concepts which it dare not clarify. Aecording to Blumenberg
this should not surprise us; this myopia is the condition by which self-
assertion assures itself an arena of free projection. But Heidegger
transgresses the boundary conditions; he asserts, following Kant, that
using these concepts without a clarifying analysis is an invitation to
error
,
Some of the concepts in question are: reality, perception,
actuality, and existence. The most crucial mistake that comes from not
analyzing these concepts is subjectivism. One wrongly places the
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subject prior t0 percelving> and to discovery
_
thr^
of the other conceDts p^v- ^P > For instance to say a house exi<^<, *UUb sts, according to
-nt, i. to nail it do„n to an ^^^^ position ^^ ^^
fcring it int0 relation „ith the ptegiven knowing sub . ec^
says Heidegger, that the subject goes towards the object
'intentionally • that , <? „ w .S
'
thS SUb^Ct « lo°Kin9 already beforehand for
something Uta that sort of object existing in that object's
.ode of
existing. But then how did the subject *now to do this, The Kantian
might answer, because of the struct-,.™ „m cture of consciousness, the categories
of understanding. But these stand in Kant, again, as unanalyzabie
boundary concepts. These concepts, Kant asserts, get their unity f rom
the horizon of the
.transcendental unity of apperception,, another
unanalyzabie conception.
Under subjectivism one tends to take over the medieval
understanding of being and existence as 'extant.- Rocks and trees are
extant, so are tools, but what about other entities like causality,
perceptions, or realities? These are all positings which themselves
have no positions. Heidegger finally discovers that Kant's conception
of the real is such that reality cannot be a real predicate. Perception
is not itself perceived, reality is not itself real, existence does not
itself exist, causality is not itself a causal connection. Thus Kant is
right when he asserts that existence cannot be a real predicate. But if
one pursues this thought further one discovers that this is because when
the subject comports itself intentionally, it is not prior to its
-captions, as Kant had a„. Rather
_
„ the sub . ect bcings itaeif
perceivingly" t0 the ofcject because tMngs existence ^^
are given prior to the knower Kan* mat> t make s use of "a wealth of
structural moments" without- r-^n, „ .W hout eally notrcrng that he does so. And all
these moments are a priories.
^ sublet doesn't use these a priories in the sense of someone
using a tod. Rather t0 comport onesel£ intentiQnaUy ia
extant, these a priories must have provided a prior orientation.
Heidegger at this point drops the term subjectivity in favor of Dasein,
to show that we xnowers are always already involved in something l ike
the extant, we already belong to objects, because we are already the a
priories of intentionality
.
The intentional relation doesn't arise f
the addition of an object to a subject, rather the Dasein is structured
intentionally. Be can even hallucinate only because we "intend in
general," and only in this way could intending assume the modifications
of "imaginariness
.
"
rom
The subject, if we recall Descartes' First Meditation, is a
defense against deception. If I just stay in my subjective sphere, says
Descartes, I can't be deceived. But Heidegger finds that the subject
can't understand its own intentionality. This is because intentionality
is what "lights up" the subject. The subject of modern thought is,
then, like its sciences, a dreamlike positivity.
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scovery
While thU analysis has not even managed ^ recapitulate
Heidegger, extremely involved ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
that the self-asaertion of subjectivity relies on ^ ^ ^
not itself subjective, no, is it really
. sel£ _assertion The ^
that the subject relies on a whole prior structure undermines somewhat
out allegiance to the assertion of subjectivity, but it als0 means ^
those prior structures become a Mtter „hich conoerns ^ ^ ^
with these statures? In this way we £ind the structures o £ self-
assertion leading, in spite of themselves, beyond themselves. They
lead, Heidegger believe 1-0 = ^ieves, to a deeper thought of being; presumably to
free a positivist subjectivity from its dreamlike stupor.
Ten years after this analysis in the B^i^^, „eidegger
confronted Kant's first CxiU^ again. Inm^^^ Heidegg6c
returns to all these themes. On the brink of World War n his tone i
more anxious; apparently breaking-through to being was harder than he
had expected; now it might take another hundred years or so, provided
decide to really ask the right questions, and even for this, mighty
efforts are needed.
3
we
Self-assertion can function now perfectly well without a clear
ontology. When the pragmatist cautions us that our language today is
unsuited to ontological questions, Heidegger responds by acknowledging
the point. In a passage recalling the earlier reference to Plato's
dreamy positive sciences, Heidegger says:
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not made do not take place in e J feClsions "hich are made orbut somewhere else-that is in h T ° r °n the ™toroycle,i.e. where a historical being ^1!^ ^ ° f Mst0rical ^edomdecides, what level of freedom 7f t i 33 Wel1 as h°* it
what it will posit as freedom 17
ifc ^ choose and
Decision, he quickly adds is theV aa , structure of questioning. To
remain content with a low level of, .f questioning is to remain content with
a low level of freedom, and, X would add, to cultivate an innocence
The primary question is the ontological question; and the primary way we
should ask the ontological question is historically.
"we question
historically when we ask what is ^ -in h =* n still happening even if it seems
past. "18 The question "What is a thing?" turns «„* k k,y
- out to be the primary
question of our own historical period. Kant, Blumenberg, Heidegger, and
Michel Poucault aU address that question. The reason to return to the
threshold of our modernity thus becomes a little clearer. Our
historical questioning "is not directed against the beginning, but only
against ourselves insofar as „e drag along this beginning no longer as
such, but as something 'natural, i.e., in an indifferent
falsification. "19 This means this past does not lie in the dim past
where we cannot rparh i t- "Kii+- i v,~e c it, but is here in every proposition and in every
everyday proposition, in every approach to things."
17. Martin Heidegger, What Ts a Thing?, W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera
Deutsch, trans. (Lanham, MD
: University Press of America, 1985) 42
18. Heidegger (1985), 43. '
19. Heidegger (1985), 48-9.
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Decision u, then
, to „ k the forgotten ^^^^ a^ ^
concerns e„eryone, lt is the task of ^ entite Mstoricai^ ^
it quires
-that „e percelve more exactiy uith ciearsr^ ^^
holds us captive and makes us urfree in t-ho.fr he experience and determination
of things."
»ith this i„ mlnd
, Heidegget loofcs lnto Rant , s ^
the thing. when he dop<! i-h-i<= -a-u es tms he discovers that K^t- „ n" b cn Kan t is looking for the
structures of reason which ground a thin, in its things.
„eidegger,
I Should mention, is u„comfortable with Kant's struotures of reason; he
would l ike to oppose thinKing to reason, reason being just another self-
incurred tutelage.
Kant worked through a sort of method which he termed critique.
Critique is a deciding of reason's claims beforehand; a sort of civil
court procedure, where several civil litigants, all with plausible
claims, present their cases to a magistrate.
Pure Reason in this its self
-formation, pure reason in this claimpure reason as the authoritative court of appeal for thedetermination of the thingness of all things as such-it is thispure reason which Kant places into
' critique . • 20
However, in deciding the dispute this way, the litigants pay a
rather high price. The litigants accept the finding of the court
because they recognize reason as the legitimate arbitrator; this, by
20. Heidegger (1985), 119
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analogy, resembles a mimetic rivalrv in „ v,
.
h .
V y l Whlch ^e two parties are sodetermined not to let the other's ini-.terests prevail that they will
accept domination by a third party if itP l l st0ps the other. Reason
Slate into th
*— - * does chis by
making a critical survevrvey, a survey which seta the boundaries for the
enterprise of pure reason,! strategically this means that reason takes
an interest in those disputes which enhance its position.- it encourage,
disputes without which reason would he superfiuous. To the extent
" 15 trUS
'
rSaSOn
-
^—
-
-gime which enccurages some
questions while discouraging others. What happens, then, when these
discouraged cushions get opened, Heidegger hopes to say that the
Principles of reason-x-principle, law of Contradicticn, and Principie
Cf Sufficient Heason^-win give way into a rethinking of what Reiner
Schurmann calls an-arche, non-principle.
Like Blumenberg, Heidegger finds that Christian metaphysics
divides intc three
.ones whose subject matters are: God, the world, and
man,
3
In Kant these three questions are explicitly all subcrdinated to
the last one, which in the CxiUau^^^^ is the 1_ptlaolpl
..
This, I have maintained, is the essential mcve cf self-assertion. The
character of a rational mathesis demands that things must exhibit
themselves as axioms of the highest principles,
..according to the schema
21. Heidegger (1985), 121.
22. Heidegger (1985), 108.
23. Heidegger (1985), 110.
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of positing and thinking as such » anH ^, d the progressive illumination of
-
world in terms o f rational mathesis is called
Critic wishes to "determine in advance out of principles the
being of what is " Tn n,=the regime of modern self-assertion, thi, is an
essentially
tas, The^^^^^
teaUy
"
almS
" "* 9"ng of this 'mathematical "
what Heidegger refers to as the
.mathematical, would certainly include
Blumenberg . s .method' and
. hypothesis . The mathematical is a self-
Heidegger focuses in thi, accession, not on Kanfs refutation of the
ontological argument, but on the chapter called "System of all
Principles of Pure Understanding... (Heidegger has already shown that
for Kant, and the Wolfean school generally,
"understanding., can be
collapsed into "reason.")
Philosophically, self-assertion, at least in its subjectivist
mode, has always been most at home in epistemological issues, and Kant,
at least in the U.S., has usually been read as the epistemologist par
exellence.25 Heidegger challenges this reading in many places, the most
interesting occurs in the sub-section, "Pure Understanding as the Source
and Faculty of Rules; Unity, Categories."
24. Heidegger (1985), 111; 118; 184.
25. c.f. Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mpnt- p l »„H „.j- y(Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Press, 1973)
.
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The needs of modern se if.aQ^ fc .l assertion had dictated that the ground of
all possible judgments lay wholly in t-h« k-Y n ii x he subjective sphere. But, as
again both Blumenberg and Weber in H4~m Afferent ways point out, this sets
up a certain metaphysical anxiety which seeks to reassKS ^assure itself through
productive activitv in ux« , a the physical »orW
,
or nature
. Kant ^ ^^
Philosopher t0 squarely £aoe probiem knouiedgs^
against an object „hlch in absence ^ ^^ ^
to.10, other. Heidegger claims that Kant . s „ord object is usuauy
not ..0bje,t .. but ..Gegenstand,, 6 „hich liteMliy transiates as istandi^
against.. Gegen also means
. tear*,.. . in the^ of , . , opposite
to, 'in the presence of. • what we are able to k„o„ ..mu3t encounter us
from somewhere, come to meet » a „H .ir us, and also must "be determined as
standing," and is therefore constant. This requires that there be
seething that does the job of Aristotle's receptivity, but which yet
leaves self-assertion intact. Following the western tradition of
metaphysics, the solution must remain a mathesis, but, and this is
Kant's incredible insight, mathesis as self-assertion requires a
gegenstand. otherwise self-assertion, unlike medieval mathesis, asserts
into a void.
This means that Kant had to change one of the oldest definitions
in western philosophy, that of the judgment. From Aristotle through
Christian Wolff and Leibniz, a judgment was defined as a relation
2 6 Heidegger (1985), 137. Peter Fenves has pointed out to me thatHeidegger is grossly over-stating things here.
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between two concepts and *P^s, the foremost principle of all w^ r i logic was the
aw 0£ no„-contradiction
. Kant deftned ^^ ^™ in „hioh gi„en modes Qf knouledge brought ^
-ity or appe.cepeion.-a, It u no lQnger
. f
concept, but of placing ,.given cognitionsn ^ ^^^^^ ^ ^
objective unity provided, Kant argues bv a, y transcendental
"I-think "
The "I-think" provides a mathesis in t-w *n l x hat xt projects concepts against
an intuition which comes to meet it. If x say . blackboard , ^
intuitively given is grasped and ^ ^ ^ ^^
Pointing out that one repercussion of this is that the hegemony of the
Principle of non-contradiction has come to an end. A judgment might
contain no conceptual contradictions and yet still be false; for
instance,
. Giraffes are purple ., ^ ^^^ ^ ^
not really be excluded because Cod certainly might, if He wished, make a
Purple giraffe. In the age of self _assertion ^^ ^ ^
speculations are empty and unsatisfying.
Self-assertion, of course, must resist becoming a slave to the
'given.- Determinism haunts self-assertion precisely because it depends
so heavily upon the gegenstand. Thus in Kant the mathesis reasserts
itself in the structure of the categories. Judgments can't be Hume's
"every time X, Y also," but the more definite, "if x, then Y.-28 In the
event of a rock being warmed by the sun, a poet might encounter a sun, a
27. Heidegger (1985), 157; £££ B141
lL HrlttT„: ''.nV'""' and °avid Hume ' Enquire riming Humanunoaratanauig
,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Para. 20-32, p 25-38.
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— . Object i. the„ abstracted instances ^ ^ ^
of warm rocks and sunny days Hum«» a iV . e s is a general concept, the highest
generality beina that- n„ *-wr g at ln the past the ^ ^
past," so Hume gets into the h a h< »-bit of expecting future suniit rooks to
exhibit warmth. For Kant, this a tyranny of the gegen,- the warmth is
not any more directly known than is the rock or the sky or the sun.
Kanfs object is the necessity of the cause/affect relation; .„
sunlight, then warm rocks 1 'if => *-hor,i •I
> then- 1S what we know, but we must
quickly remember, only through rocks and sun.
"The mere intuition of 'against, is not yet an object," not a
gegenstand, "but what is conceptually thought in general, as something
constant," say, a triangle, "is not yet an object either. "29 One has an
object, strictly speaking, when "the intuitiyely giyen has been brought
to a stand in the generality and unity of a concept," in our case, cause
and effect. This unity is what Kant means by a synthetic a priori
judgment. The crucial discussion in Kant is therefore the one which
explains how it is that something like a synthetic a priori judgment is
possible
.
Kant says that synthetic a priori judgments are possible because
they take place in the faculty of understanding, and understanding is a
faculty of rules for synthesizing the intuitively given into knowledge.
29. Heidegger (1985), 140
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"
rUlSS
'
"e
" '— -** P-edes experience. To
~ «~ ~ — Uke cause and e££ect in
when
advance, otherwise
„e would not kno„ instances ca^•"oLdn of use or effect
we encountered them. Understanding is the ,Mi rule-governed activity that
apprehends causally, or we would not experience it at all.
But mathesis as self-assertion actually puts more pressure than
this cn the understanding. n*. only is [pU re understanding, the
faculty or rules in resPect or that which happens, hut is itself the
source or Princi Ples according to which everything that can be
.resented
to us as an object must conform to rules..
.30 The understanding is not
only the faculty, but also the source of rules and their principle.
When Kant says that understanding is the fa^uiv of rules,
Heidegger replies, "Here the metaphysical definition of the essence of
understanding asserts itself." Kant is not just doing epistemology
here, he is doing metaphysics. One is no longer busy understanding, but
asking how something like understanding is possible. Thus Kant here
leaves the dream world of positive science. Understanding is posited as
that which makes something like an object possible at all because it is
ssentially the faculty of rules, when Kant further says that pure
derstanding is the of the principles for rules, Heidegger
plies, "This means that pure understanding is the ground of the
e
un
re
30. CPE, B198.
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necessity of rules at all »3l mu • .Thxs 1S not just metaphysics, but
ontology
,
specifically, an ontology baSed in the • I -think ., Pure
UndSrStanding 13 baSed
-
*— ^physical ^essity, and here
Heidegger and Blumenberg completely agree The met H. aphysical necessityu~ intm requiring there tQ be 3ometWng a ^
as an overpowering pressure
, ^ neither ^ a ^
fabrication
to stand, thns forming ana maintaining ^ lt
constancy. The metap„ysicar„ecessitv
°f P°Ssible
is grounded in this need that fh! PUC<S "^"standing
standing. 32 the Pressure must be free-
Thia prior metaphysical necessity mates something li ke a pure
understanding necessary to provide a source for this
..free-standing...
Kant finds that source in the principles of understanding which, in
generally, means for a correspondence between our experiences and
objects. This is only possible, of course, because that to which
experience corresponds, the objective, "already comes before us in
advance and stands before us." what comes forward in the Gegen, then,
is not the rock or the sun, not even the warmth, but the objective as
such; for us, the causal.
31. Heidegger (1985), 188.
32. Heidegger (1985), 189.
vity of
s.33
Clearly it la no stretch ^ ^ ^ ^ ^0nt0l09y
^
-
insisting on not £ocusing sQlely m uhat
-owing, 34 Helde9ger uncovers a oertain ^^^^^ ^^ ^
ep1Stemology would find scandalous «l-h*f *-kluai , that the conditions for the
possibility of experiencing are at fhog.-. t e same time the conditions of the
standing-against of the obiert<* ^:ects of experience.
"35 Human freedom finally
comes down to a
-between;- between man and thing- but tW kn , his between is an
Uke a rope stretching from thing to man, but as an anticipatio„^
beyond the thing end similarly back behind
Earner „e saw how Blumenberg tried to soften the most domineering
aspects of modern teohnioity by returning to the threshoid. His purpose
was to discover there whet „as essentia end whet superfluous in modern
self-essertion, and he opposed self-assertion to self-aggrandizement or
self-empowerment, both of which Blumenberg admits to have had
destructive histories in the modern age. since it seems to me that
Blumenberg was attempting to reply to Heidegger's objections to modern
"enframing", as stated in such essays as "The Question Concerning
33. Heidegger (1985), 190.
34. Heidegger (1985), 243.
35. Heidegger (1985), 242.
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Technology" and *The Age of the World Picture ,„ „hat ^ interesti
—
= is h0„ clQsely Heide9ger , s discussion ^
' bet"een
'
~U
'~ rg .3 ,ersion o£ self-assertion. Ihe*~- o, 5e1£wio„ as articulated ^ Rant
_ Heidewer
*. not necessarily imply the^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
standing reserve. In fict( human freedom rests ^^^^^ ^
what is to come freely forth.
Yet there is a gulf separating Heidegger and Blumenberg
Blumenberg, wnen be comes to metaphysical guestions, would say that
though it is hard not to as, such guestions, modern self-assertion is
not really eguipped to deal with the.. It has lt3 oun sets of pressing
issues and „ should stick to what
.e do best, respond technioally to
our perceptions of need. Besides, the age has already come
pragmatically to its limits. Tne state, which nas always used eternal
threats as a way to defuse inarbitrable internal fractures, has come to
the limits of such tactics. External threats, in the horrors of nuclear
war, pose a much greater risk than any internal dispute ever could.
Thus the tyranny of state bureaucracy could begin to unravel; we all
know that if it doesn't we might annihilate ourselves. Therefore we
don't need the question cf being, we only need the pragmatic structures
of dialogue which arise from our relations with the technical. 36
36
ai
ar
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With Blumenberg one comes away feeling that rh „Y un , t ough the modern agehas some serious flaws, it ,tins ill possesses the resources to set itself
on a fetter course. Assurance about our age. potential for progress
quires a massive and complicate, historical study, but if Be patiently
-sue this study, in the end we will be r6asSured. Where Kant could
champion an entire teleology of self-assertion, Blumenberg Klll offer
only a wispy possible progress of self-assertion. Self-assertion, in
its pared-down form, of course, claims it doesn.f need teleology, nor
does it need to totally subvert nature. Such things derived from
-occupations of older medieval guestions which are not properly our
own. But self-assertion can now, because those old issues are being
forgotten in the pragma of our lived dialogic structures, show a more
authentic face, a gentler side, and with this better attitude, self-
assertion is at least potentially equal to the world of problems it has
so far produced.
But after examining Heidegger's account of the structures of self-
assertion, it seems harder to nod assent to Blumenberg- s optimism.
Clearly if we are to endorse modernity, we must have faith in the common
future we are building, and it is exactly this sort of faith which
Blumenberg tries to generate by giving modern technicity a clean
geneology. But what if the questions he downplays still bother us?
Doubts begin to intrude. Maybe we mustn't ask about teleology because
to do so makes modern life look like a treadmill. Maybe we mustn't ask
about ontological horizons of subjectivity or its objects because to do
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30— US notice that tectaoiogicai
_ u ^
0OnfiniD9
~" ^ - " ——
„
hen „e replaoe
truth as correspondence with dialogic strn.t-x l uctures, we evade having to
confront the ways in which self-assertion fosters discr ourses of powerinstitutional^ problem con3tituencieSi ^ ^^^^^^^ ^
'
di3CiPliMrJ
°°ntr0lS
' ^ - « -^ .ustify our instituti
as correspond to natural £orces „ ^^ ^ ^
of power
ons
re
Heidegger uneovers in Kant almost the same structures of tnougnts
and options in the modem a9e as does Blumenberg. This
, a5 z
mentioned before, is not surprising sinoe Blumenberg often replies
directly to Heidegger. In Kant „eidegger finds that a self
-assertion
whioh oan be plausibly described as free requires a gentier attitude
towards the thing, otherwise self-assertion fails on its own terms.
But rather than finding this attitude disabled by metaphysical and
ontological structures, „eidegger finds instead that it relies on them.
Kant's interpretation of the thing, then, is enabled by and in turn
enables a deeper insight into metaphysics and ontology. From
Heidegger's gloss, I would draw the opposite of Blumenberg's conclusion;
the loss of the 'medieval' questions is a source of anxiety. The loss
of teleology, the loss of the correspondence theory of truth, the death
of God, and the obscuring of the ontological question all mean that
modernity also loses its free relation to the thing. Yet modernity
still requires, more than has any other age, a relation to things. The
241
-ex,- ^ Se1£-assmlo
„, in the absance q£ a reiation ^
thi"9
' ^ ^ "tiSfy
- »—
,
or mimetic
. telation
things
.
C MichPl F^'n-ilt
111 ^^^in^37 Michel Foucault also asks about the
modern relation to objects, especially its objects of study
. But where
Blumenberg discusses the threshold of natural science and technicity,
and where Heidegger concentrates on the threshold of philosophy,
Foucault offers a comparative study of the human sciences. Where
Heidegger discovered that modern self-assertion presupposed an ontology
which it squanders thoughtlessly, and with which, if we took stock of
it, we might proceed with dove-like steps towards a freer and less
domineering relation to things, Foucault finds that the human sciences
are riddled with the imperative to duplicate and reduplicate localized
versions of the ontology of self-assertion.
Foucault also finds a central text in Kant's Critique of ElATS
RSiiUXm, and he would find much to commend in the Heideggarian
interpretation given above. Heidegger had found that Kant's faculty of
37. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Arrh.Poin^ of thf> H„m n
Science;?
,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973) .
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understanding was bnt-h
experience, as experience cf objects, possible Kant, ui>biDi . arrived at the
transcends! by «m conducti„9 ^
_^ ^
Objects. Both Heifer and Blumenberg take this t o be an act of
Anthropology; what is discovered ta t be subject which experiences ana
donnas itself. Kant tbns articulates what Foucault calls man as
that which both knows and provides of ^
experiences and
,
through tbat very experience, provides tbe ground or
experience in general. Man, according to Foucault, is tbis alliance of
tbe empirics! and tbe transcendental, and
, defined tbis My
, obviously
would be a recent phenomenon peculiar to modern western culture.
Foucault actually plays down Kant's role in creating man. Kant,
says Foucault, was merely worried about grounding natural science. The
more ambitious project of knowing man, which Kant admitted in "Was ist
Man" he couldn't complete, is left to the human sciences. These
sciences operate in much the same way as Kant 'a understanding; the
empirical is known through an a priori which acts as the transcendental
ground for the empirical. The a priori both renders possible knowledge
Of the empirical, and at the same time is what one knows. For Heidegger
this structure of knowing could lead to either a dreamlike science or,
if properly acknowledged, to a freer relation to objects. For Foucault
this sort of claim merely repeats the tedious to and fro between
positivism, where pre-critical naivete seems to rule supreme, and
eschatology, in which what we know and what renders it possible are
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to at U3t be transparently united; „here in_itsei£ ^
last become for-itself
. For Foucault< phenomenology , s ad_ce _
Comte. the positivist
, and Marx
_ eschatoiogisti ^ ^ unite
projects in „hat aluays „as their presuppo3ition(
transcendental had to sneak i„ , kp in the empirical. To accomplish this
nergin, of projects, phenomenology merely chsnged the point of
application in transcendental a„a lys is,. where Kant had be£ore^
after the possibility of a science of neture, now phenomenology~and
pragmatism-a sk about the possibility for man to conceive of himself.
These clsims should become cleerer below when , discuss Poucaulfs
section on Ricardo.
To ward off a deep insecurity, modern man relies on things.
According to Heidegger, this leads Kant to the point of seeking to know
the I-Principle through things. Thus the question of the thing was
crucial. Kant found things to be essentially a rule of synthesis, say,
of causality. Causality thus reveals to us rocks and warmth, while
rocks and warmth display a fundamental causality. A causality runs
through things and through ourselves such that we who know and master
its mechanisms are also those most subject to its overwhelming order.
This, of course, need not cause a natural scientist to lose sleep. But
things are different when one seeks in this same way to know something
about man, when man becomes the thing which grounds knowledge of man.
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- ****** to know ourselves through things ieads moderns
*- "P03itiVitieS.. They are: Life
, Lafcor
, LMguage
_
—
. ~ughly, to biology
, economics
_ ^^^^^^ ThsM ^
are not themselves, according to Foucault hy c t , uman sciences, but their
Pr0je0ti °nS
°
£ li£S
' -— «e -t render the human
sciences-say, psychology, ethnology
,
possihle. At any rate man turns Mt ^ ^ a ^ a
being, and a speaking being. These noaitiv^6 P sltl^tres are the subject of what
Foucault calls the analytic of finitude.
From Kant, Blumenberg, and Heidegger we learned that the basic
claim of self-assertion is that "the limits of knowledge provide
positive foundation for the DossihiHf,, up b lity of knowing, "38 or, self-
assertion was born in the incredible idea of a * n <=8 G
'
s Dreyfus and Rabinow put
it, "a being whose verv finUnwQ = i.y itude allows him to take the place of God. "39
Finitude. as the essential idea of self-assertion, is no longer opposed
terra for term to the omnipotent God's infinity, as it was in the time of
Galileo and Descartes, the time Foucault refers to as the Classical age.
No longer is there an operative divine knowledge which we can
participate in, though only dimly. Now finitude is self
-referential
.
38. Foucault, 317.
39. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel v«„r» ulf. R^ynnH
btructuraUsm and H ^ rmenentj r,s (Chicago, IL: University of Chicaao
Press, 1982), 30.
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From one end of exoer-io
it is the identity and the llfT*
°th" finit "de answers itself
-—, of the body
, the yearning o£^ a^ ^s ^
3orta. My £inite deslre expressea a
almost
-«=al, £initude, a £initude „hich ls Sel £ -grounding
.
as fundamental finitude th^ u, at which provides the source of all concrete
limitation, finitude is radically other- it i ,ki O , is the a priori which is, in
Haidegget.s terms, what is £urthest £ rom us becaU se it is what is
-rest. In modernity we study the spatiality of the_ body
, ^
desires and appetites in virtue of uhich
_ assume^
and the language in which, in time, disCourses ate given. m these
studies ate oased upon the eddied £inite experience o £ man
, a be i„g
who exists in contrast with both mute animals and an omniscient God as a
sort of neither- nmi,; „cxLxier. This is to say that parh ^-f t-KY n e c of these positive forms in
which man can learn t-hat- „ •t he is finite is given him only against a
background of his own finitude." it is this a «H »n priori, which is always
needed yet never given, which animates the human sciences.
whrch man s being win be able t0 provide a foundation\„ the"
inriSt
3
";:"7 a" thOSS f°™ "MCh indi
— ^ >» ^ n°t
on
40. Foucault, 315.
41. Foucault, 315.
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— *u~. then, £rom the natuce o£ seif _assertion
3 ^lety and lt3_ to seif _ground itseif ^ ^ ^ ^th. ground o£ knouing
, . serles of ^^^^ projects ^^ ^
-i-l
-*> the transcendental.
, uill „ot revieu ^ here
_
first of these attempts took o£ repetition; t^^
"°"U
"
reP6atSd
-
b°th
- Thus, the death
which gnaws at living things is the »«am„ * „s e fundamental death on the basis
° £
"
WCh
^
6mPiriCal iS *~ to the desire that gives rise
to economic interdependence is the same fundamental desire which
..ma.es
everything desirable for me-" and fk. »•, the time in which language moves
discourses is the same fundamental time which draws out my own
discourse. Foucault finds this repetition permeates everything in the
early human sciences; the transcendental repeats the empirical, the
ccgito repeats the unthought, and the return to the origin repeats the
retreat of the origin. "From one end of experience to the other,
finitude answers itself."
The problem is that the positivities, the concrete forms of
finitude, all open upon structures which submerge us. We are part of
life which began long ago and will survive our death; we labor and toil
within an economy of human making which no one remembers making or hopes
to see completed; and we speak a language within which we were only
inducted. Thus we are rooted in contents and forms much older than
ourselves; life, labor, and language are always already begun, and they
8
——, they subject us t0 .
hiSt0rlCity
"
hMe f°U
— ~" continual eluda ua
Foucault brings out some of the main f.*,6atUres by looking at Rioardo's
notion of ^rsr^u,, ,CltY
'
5lnTO
" I- worthwhile to compare
Poucaulf, account of scarcity with Bluroenberg
, s
, ^^ , i-nib wij.1 allow me to
do two things at once.
During what Poucault oill3 the Classicai ^
Galileo and
.escapes, there was scarcity because people represent t0
wealth because the land produces »„re objects than are inTOdiately
consumed. These objects can he eguated with one another in acts of
exchange, and therefore can represent other objects in the act of
exchange and circulation of wealth.
Foucault claims that Ricardo recasts this relation in which there
was scarcity amid a basic abundance into a mold of fundamental
insufficiency. Land, Ricardo says, can not support everyone. So,
Foucault says, "humanity is henceforth labouring under the threat of
death: any population that cannot find new resources is doomed to
extinction.
"42 Inversely, as people multiply, labor, because it is done
on more marginal land, becomes less immediately productive. To feed
everyone, labor must become more intensive. In this way, scarcity
becomes a fundamental scarcity and economics no longer finds its
42. Foucault, 256.
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principle in the intern! awpl y of varrous representations; where , represent
to myself an obierr t uj ct I don t have, or where my commodities can represent
other commodities ha„N°W thS PrinciPle of economics has become not just
quantities of toil, but "rh a +- ^ • -.
.
t t perxlous region where life is confronted
with death. .
"
Economics, in this way, refers to an anthropology. It includes in
its reference the biological properties of the human species, it is
related to human poverty and hunger, and it sets human labor over
against death. This is the economic side of what Foucault calls the
"anthropological hollow" within which modern thought sleeps. its main
economic tenet is that economic man is not representing his own needs to
himself, but rather "spends, wears out, and wastes his life in evading
the imminence of death." Economics is thus a study of finitude, and
Ricardo studies finitude through its concrete forms, for instance,
population. But population and its fluctuations call forth a history,
and history turns out to have its own concrete forms of finitude.
Ricardo 's economic history runs something like this: Rent of land
used to be a sign of the land's fruitfulness
. For Ricardo high rent is
a sign that marginal land is being over-cultivated. New population
provides new workers for industry, but also forces new land into
cultivation. This is because if a day's toil is worth the amount of
food and shelter it takes to get the worker through a twenty-four hour
period, if real wages remain constant, it will take new cultivation to
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feed new work^r=? BUt m"91nal l3nd
estivation and work
than the prime lands did ar^ <-u, and the coats of production in the marginal
area will be higher
. ^ ^ _ ^
indispensable, unless industrial workers ate permitted to starve, the
production coats in the marginal areas determine the ptice of wheat
This means that producers in the mote fertile ateas can make higher
Profits, and thus iandiotds can iease these iands for higher rents.
This is the basia of Ricardo's theory of the falling rate of
indnstrial profit. Because coat of subsistence rises, entrepreneur's
must, to make real wages remain the same, raise the nominal value of
wages. Thus as ground rent rises, and marginal land is cultivated,
industrial profits must decline. However it does not dwindle to
nothing, since there is a point at which entrepreneurs refuse to hire
any new workers. « this point the labor force stagnates, population
remains constant, no new tracts of land are cultivated, ground rent
reaches a ceiling, and no longer pressures industrial profit.
The tide of History will at last become slack. Man's finitude
will have been defined-once and for all, that is, for anindefinite time. 43
In this way Ricardo's History presupposes, at least as an a
priori, the end of History, a time when labor will limit itself to
needs, and when.
43. Foucault, 259.
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"...any additional agricultural i =k
population would perish! lift and 1* TV* «*the other, surface to surface both eXaCtl*
reciprocal antagonism 44
° ™°b^i«d and reinforced by
m Ricardo, History is given concrete forms.- labor, production,
far as "man as a natural being i s finite -y unite. Thus we have the beginning
of a reply to Blumenberg. According t- n tt ,g. to Foucault, in Ricardo we can see
how modern anxiety breeds itself.
The more man makes himself at home in rho v,further he advances in hi. ™ .
l t e heart of the world, the
also does he feel the preLSreTn™ ? T^' *** nore
comes to his own death 45
f-rtude, and the closer he
Ricardo-
s
History, then, can be taken as a dramatization of an
anthropological situation, a situation which is carried forward by
History and its changes, but which does not itself change. History is
merely the way, says Foucault, that the anthropological situation brings
itself closer to its own impossibility. By this Foucault means that
nineteenth century economists—Ricardo and Marx-longed for
"anthropological truth to spring forth in its strong immobility."
Ricardo looks towards a gradual slowing down, as though by half-lives,
and a final stasis in which, with no more cultivation at the margins, no
44. Foucault, 260.
45. Foucault, 259.
more pay raises, no more ront-ent increases, „o new population, no excess
Paction, there will be no more too, tot finitude to elude itself.
^™ti*T^ bv^?r o£ everythin9 hide
elements that tena to" Mur »„J h"*
SXhausted a11 the possible
time his anthtopoLgica^aSness^r ^ ° £
Rioatdo, of coutse, is not alone among sooial scientists in
resenting people for their „u» strategies in eluding anthtopological
truths
.
Marx, on the other hand, sought the end of History through
revolution. History is negative; now. Labor is alienated; now. But
labor produces infinitely more than it is paid, so that new labor is
continually hired, so that the number of people held by History at
subsistence level ceaselessly grows. Eventually this causes over-
production and underemployment. Others might see these disasters as
part of the natural order of things, but workers, and they alone, can
see through to the real meaning of History. They will understand that
this finitude is a human creation which alienates them from a truer
finitude. Workers can restore this truer form, but to do so they must
first reverse or suppress History. Then a truer time will begin, one
that has a transparent form.
46. Foucault, 260.
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— -3t0rl0lty and_ essence uouid ben^ ^
»Pon the othe, Attempts like Ricardo , s Md Matx , s ^ ^ ^lot of excitement anymore; neither do *wr their positivist brethren. But
FO"CaUlt lnSiStS
*>~ finitude upon itself ls
StU1
"
lth USing t»t^.. Pte„„Knolo9y and perhaps
DeCOn3tr"CtiM
"* ^
~* °* the analytic of £inltude
.
Fro, P«ault , archaeology
„e note featurss o£
Heideggec .s and BWnoer^ examlnations of Kant and ^ ^
our modernity.
Both Foucault and Blumenberg agree about the metaphysical basis
for the early modern, or Foucault- s Classical, age, the time of Galileo
and Descartes. Self-assertion in that age was based on a metaphysics of
infinity; human action and knowledge was held over against divine
knowledge. This meant, observes Foucault, finitude is an external
condition imposed upon human beings. It merely means people see vastly
less than does God. Finitude is thus not a fundamental finitude, but
just a result of our status as fallen beings. In this setting
representations could be linked discursively to what is. Descartes- "I
think, therefore I am" "was accomplished within the light of evidence
within a discourse [which] articulates one upon the other what one
represents to oneself and what is. "47
47. Foucault, 311
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—re and huma„ nature used ^_ ^ ^ ^ ^
-agination and memory used to re»ort nature's random chronology
Thought a„d ceing oould come together in disoourse
. But
,
Blumenberg, we kno„ that such an epistce presupposes an o^ipotent hut
absent god
.
Goc, s fcnowleoge would be whole where ours is partiai, clear
where ours is fuzzy.
After reading Xh^^^jnu^ we can see that almost
immediately self-assertion abandoned this metaphysics and began
searching for its own self-grounding. We have observed Kant's efforts
in this regard. The new metaphysical stance in Kant's
Ee^n is that understanding itself, as the faculty of rules, is itself
the condition of the possibility of understanding anything at all. And
understanding is, in turn, the condition of possibility of experience at
all. Along with this self
-grounding Kant can completely overturn the
ontological argument for God's existence and displace the centrality of
the principle of contradiction. He is able to accomplish both these
things, Foucault shows us, because God's knowledge, power, and
especially infinity no longer stand surety for human finitude.
With this we can understand American pragmatism's hostility to
Kant. Richard Rorty's attacks on Kant's rhetoric as too technical, too
obscure, and too abstract all imply that a simpler more direct language
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U a"ailable
- 48 H"e 1
— i.— aomsthln9 llfce
Classical disoourse
,
„hece tMngs ^d representatiQns
_
together in a way which makes self
-assert- i osert n relatively unproblematic 49Ho"ev
"' Plamt3^— -aphysics
, tryin9 instead t0
encourage a dialogic structure Qf devslopment> There u ^ ^ ^
anchor this dialogue
, ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
would point out that suoh a c_ltment ^ iangua9e ^ ^ ^
a self-reflecting positivity;
_ u^ ^
duplicating Kant while seem-inrrnxx em g to oppose him. 50
At first it might seem that Blumenberg escapes this sort of
criticism since he is closer to Kant, end implicitly edmits it, even
though he too chempions
. dialogic struoture Qf ^ ^^
Blumenberg else agrees with Foucault over how and why early moderns
understood nature in terms of a fundamental scarcity. 51 Under pressure
from absolute Will, he says, the Classical age broke up into two guasi-
political groups; those defending God's absolute interests a nd those wh
responded by asserting, equally absolutely, the interests of man. Soon
he discovers that these interests are insecure and that self-assertion
is fundamentally an assertion against nature's fundamental inadequacy to
provide for human happiness. Under conditions of insecurity man self-
O
48. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of N.tnro (Princeton, N.JPrinceton University Press, 1979), 147-64.
49. Foucault, 338-9.
50. For a criticism of Rorty see William E Connolly, "The Mirror ofAmerica," in his Politics and Ambigu i ty (Madison, WI : University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987.), 116-26.
51. Compare Foucault, 368 with Blumenberg, 197-200.
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-«~. himself to an unadjustable
when ^n
so
-« . fundamental capacUy aajustment> Biumanbetg^ ^ ^
taUng over Ricatdo . s postulata o£ a fundamentai ^
WleTCS
"
1Sa
- ^~—
•
Blumenberg u not trying
to be positivist at ail o *.l . But
: ust as for Foucault phenomenology i s
transcendentalism becomina i n u. u .g, its emphasis on the life world,
positivistic in sdi1-p of UoMtp te itself, so pragmatism is a way in whioh
Positivism can become, in its emphasis on human plasticity, ontological
in spite of itself. Just as causality
_ ^ ^
Kant's sunny rock, and juSt as scarcity was the positive content of
Ricardo's History, pragmatic adjustment is the positive content of
pragmatism's version of man-and I almost wrote 'Dasein'.
Blumenberg thus sees quite clearly why positivist sciences had to
fail, and he is worried that Heidegger's search for being will
degenerate into a search for an absolute substance which will be too
decisionistic and will squeeze out any hope for modern freedom. Yet, he
would think Ricardo was on the right track, and that self-assertion
might still, by remaining in a dialogue with its own technical
developments and failures, solve its own problems. Besides, he would
ask Foucault, what else could we really do?
Foucault 's replies in his
continue to be Kantian, that is,
later years seemed to say that
continue to be self-assertive
we must
while
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continually testing the boundaries of self-assertion to see whether they
have given way. 52
Still I believe Blumenbera. in order to save sel£ .assettion
_
requires the metaphysics of the Classical age- that is M<aye, ma , his genealogy
works because it shows why self-assertion had to oppose the metaphysics
of Absolute Will. He makes self-assertion rely on the opposition
between man's knowledge and God's knowledge, and shows how crucial it
was to overcome this metaphysics. But what makes secularization theory
and Heidegger so suspect is that they seem to be, at least according to
Blumenberg, championing the Absolute half of the opposition. Leaving
aside that this is not a particularly exciting interpretation of
Heidegger in a book which contains very exciting interpretations of
everyone else, the fact is that Blumenberg- s text works by kindling
opposition to Classical metaphysics. Embraced or opposed, this
metaphysics is still the basis of self-assertion; it is the only
metaphysics Blumenberg considers. The OrrW ^ thh^, coupled with ^
Basic P roblems, and What is a Thing? allows us to examine more closely
modernity's own metaphysical stance and the eclipse of that of the
Classical age. Classical metaphysics is no longer available even as
something to oppose.
52. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in Paul Rabinow, editor,
The Foucault, Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1884), 32-50.
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It also makes a different i-v, *.rence that we extend the discussion of self-
assertion into the area of th* kt e human sciences. This nf ™mis, o course, has
^cations for our oonoern „ith ocgani2atio
_ ^
«- office does not make us ao suspicious as d0 those „hich hite ^
their top l9ve! positions practitioners of human scienoes ^ ^
-re the personnel department, the ^ ^^ ^
consume, research division whioh bothe„ „ as ^ ^ ^ ^
as Weber supposed, that we object to the pervasive rationality of
bureaucratic processes, though in the previous chapter , gave a number
Cf reasons tor being uncomfortable with that too, but „e also feel
uncomfortable with the substance of their missions. Vet, we may be
unable to thin, of any reason to oppose them. But now we can at least
harbor the suspicion that these agencies work to corner finitude, trying
to force it to confront itself; but also that every attempt to corner it
merely drives it further back. Every attempt to discover, say, why men
are so much more violent than women will either become positivlst;
seeking a gene, a secretion, a physical underdevelopment, or a societal
deviation, or it will become transcendental; seeking the violent a
priori of a society such as ours in rapism, misogamy, or domination.
When these two strategies turn out to be unsatisfying we will turn to
interpretive approaches. These last will have their value, not the
least of which is that they are difficult to routinize into an
organizational approach, but they will succeed by changing the point of
impact of the study from objects to self-analysis. Foucault predicts
that this project will likewise finally be unsatisfying, leaving the
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field open again to posi t ivistic approaches
, if ^ no^^
because they are easily organized.
D
• Concl lisi nn
in every chapter so far, one event keeps coming up over and over,
in too many ways to be systematized, the event which Nietzsche called
the death of God. Here I have specified it a little more closely as the
struggle with omnipotence. At one point in our history, all
spirituality became concentrated in the notion of an absolute Will. But
as absolute, spirituality had to flee from the world. This seems to
have opened, very briefly, an era of freedom in the Classical age, but
it gave way almost immediately to the dream of a return of a stony
stasis, much as the stony ghost arrives at Don Giovanni's house for
dinner. But if this uncanny guest from the future has failed to appear,
failed to set limits on our desires and impositions, perhaps we must
learn to get along without expecting him. All three authors consulted
in this chapter agree more or less with this characterization, and all
three are trying to come to grips with the situation left in the wake of
this one event
.
I began this discussion of our
Blumenberg' s ' s account of the second
might also designate as the death of
epochal threshold with Hans
overcoming of Gnosticism, which we
omnipotence, or, in terms of the
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history of thought, Kantian self-assertion. This second overcoming of
Gnosticism, which has c1mt-i„learly been unsuccessful, and which leaves one
hoping that a third overcoming will not be necessarv is ,hy, S t e experience
of the God of of salvation-s radical separation from the world. Self-
assertion was an attempt to make this loss irrelevant by grounding human
thought and action upon itself. But along with the Absolute's
withdrawal there followed several important consequences; doctrines of
scarcity, a search for a proper relation to things driven by an
existential anxiety, and the inability to articulate an ethics. Modern
organizations are often driven by all three hut t ixx i_nre , o I will consider only
the last one, the lose of ethics.
Without a beneficent cosmos, nothing like an order of the world
was available from which to derive, say, principles of wisdom or
principles of the city. 53 For us, says Foucault, morality consists in
restoring language to what is mute, or destroying social myths, or
reanimating what is inert. Thus it is naive to ask, as does Blumenberg,
for a list of our options so that we may choose among them. Nor can we,
with Richard Rorty, simply establish a morality by decision. The reason
for this, says Foucault, is that Aristotelian receptivity is gone, or,
as he actually puts it, thought is no longer theoretical. Optional
choices and decisions could never be accepted as an ethics today,
because they are much more aggressive than ethical formulations could
allow
.
53. Foucault, Order of Things, 321
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As soon as [thought] function- It- „*<
or repels, breaks dissoclat^ "
°"ends or reconciles, attracts
but liberate and enslaved """" ° r r6Unite3; il c— <= >»lP
This does not mean merely that the sciences of man are
inextricably bound up with ethics and politics; but "more fundamentally,
modern thought is advancing towards that region where man's Other must
become the Same as himself." Modern morality tends to incorporate more
and more into its order of things, yet always discovers the remainder,
that which eludes and mocks it. Moral progress can easily become a 'bad
infinite' or as stressed in an earlier chapter, freedom loses itself in
mimetic desire.
Lon
Suppose we require a government agency to implement a modern
morality. Suppose we wish to, say, liberate minority constituents by
busing their children to school in parts of the city other than where
they live. Other constituents experience this busing as an impositi.
on their right to control the character of their own communities. And
since in this case the policy was set by courts, the time-honored
sanctity' of the court is also called into question. The court is
openly made into an agency for pushing partisan political demands. When
morality is this controversial, modern people seek the aid of powerful
government agencies. Foucault, of course, speaks at the level of
thoughts and texts, but the problems he uncovers have a bearing on
54. Foucault, Order of Things
,
328.
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public administration. The loss nf hh.in o t e cosmos and of omnipotence is one
>rming
powerful drive behind people . s turning to state ^ ^
Probations at all. „orality la unsettled ^^ cieariy^
possible a thrivin, democratic poUtics; ^ u mates ^^^^
miotic and resentful bureauoratic positions. Unfortunately nany of
these latter are done in the name of so.e one or the other of the human
sciences
.
s
o
o
Finally, the notion of mimetic desire seems to give us some stance
from which to unravel modern organization with its discontents, but
after the discussions of this chapter we can see that its force is not
so much that of a spiritual Archimedean point as that of a language of
omeone in foreign captivity. The figures of speech, the very language
f freedom and liberation and alienation which the captive must use, are
all borrowed from the language of the captors. How can one sing a song
f freedom in this strange tongue? And yet, it is the only available
language
.
Blumenberg could show, I think, through the relation of neo-
Platonism to Gnosticism that the concepts of mimesis, as found in
Kierkegaard and Girard, presuppose a Gnostic cosmology. Kierkegaard may
have even owed a debt to Marcion's writings. Mimesis is the concept of
an inauthentic structure of desire imposed upon us by our situation of
being radically cut off from the Good-principle. Our perceptions and
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especially our self-knowledge are kPn. *a , ept from their true content by the
illusionist demiurge.
Foucault-s explication of man and his doubles; of man as reduced
and promised, as the being whose 'in-itself longs to be
- for-itself ,
certainly shows modern thought to be a fragmentation into a series of
"regional ontologies" which in turn seem to proliferate a plethora of
regional gnosticisms, any of which might give rise to an aspiration for
an authentic freedom of which it can never even formulate an adequate
conception. Self-assertion thus becomes a sort of Babylonian captivity
in which we endlessly sing songs of freedom in Babylonian.
Clearly an analysis in terms of mimetic desire repeats the
structures of reduction and promise. Elton Mayo discovered that at
Hawthorne, the positives had reduced workers to being maximizers of
economic utility and thus subordinated them to incentive systems.
Shunning Marxist eschatology, Mayo offered his own, based not on class
conflict but on existentialist cooperation. in so doing he made an
important contribution to social analysis, one which no strictly
economic theory could ever provide, but the "Organization of the
Future", as Chris Argyris calls it, rests in a promise that more
transparent relations might be achieved someday. It would be easy to
show that Management and the Worker is a very skillful development, but
still only the latest trick, of the analytic of finitude.
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It should even be possible to show that where pragmatism Is a
'Positivism trying to acguire sensitivity to esohatologioal criticisms
existentialism and phenomenology are 'eschatoloo^,- - •v*jr scnatoiogies trying to be less
alienated from daily life
. But „hile ^ thQught o£ ^ ^
not escape the analytic of finitude, and while it relies on the very
structures of Gnosticism it opposes, it still maintains the possibility
o£ finitude'
s criticizing itself, of undermining our allegiance to
modern moralities of incorporation even while we participate in them.
Whether this is simply unhappy resignation, or the opening of a new
space for freedom I simply don't know. I will conclude this study by
showing how this concept of mimeticism might be included in a Weberian
analysis of modern organizational life.
CHAPTER V
A WEBERIAN TYPOLOGY OF A MIMETIC WORLD
in the preceding, the authors whose works I studied employed a
number of structural triads: Theology-Cosmology-Anthropology,
Aesthetic,
-Ethical-Religious, Life-Labor-Language. in this chapter I
will also mention a forth triad, George W. S. Trow's Spirit-Manners-
Toughness. It will be the purpose of this short chapter to tie as best
I can some of these triads together. I will do this by looking at
Donald Mcintosh's interpretations of Max Weber.
Weber's typologies form a starting point for Mcintosh. Weber's
aesthetic, ethical, and religious are all possible ideal types which he
finds are required by material interests. 1 For Kierkegaard, Elton Mayo,
and other thinkers I have covered, there is an underlying presupposition
that material interests by themselves cannot motivate action. An ideal
interest is also required. Certainly, says Mcintosh, Weber agreed.
Once basic material needs are satisfied, materialism is an external
motivation. The actions one performs have no meaning of their own, but
are merely a means to material satisfactions.
1. Donald Mcintosh, "Weber as a Critical Theorist," Theory and Society
,
12 (1983) 75.
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The battle, then, is often over „hich id6al prevail
and direct material interests Thi, ^S Sl ls 13 verY important since, Weber
notes, full scale rationalization requires strenuous effort and
strenuous effort requires motivation.
Mcintosh also finds that Weber deals with the Theology-Cosmology-
Anthropology triad. These are components of the religious ideal type.
AH religions, Weber believed, once they grow beyond mere mysticism must
begin posing and answering three questions; "What is the realm of the
supernatural like, what is its relation to this world, and what are the
consequences for human life?«2 They must ask these questions, Weber
thought, because as religions become established, they become more
rational and ethical, and as they become more rational they give rise to
the theodicy question; why do bad things happen to good people, but even
more important for this study, why is there a difference between destiny
and merit?
We have also noted that expansion in any one element in the triad,
say, of theology, results in an expansion of the other two. But the way
that worked in this particular case was that the realm of the
supernatural became so absolute that it might as well be absent. Once
beneficence was taken away, instrumental action became necessary, and
social hierarchies became questionable. But the triad, in Calvinism
2. Donald Mcintosh, "The Objective Basis of Max Weber's Ideal Types,"
History and Theory 16 #3 (1977), 272. C.f., also Mcintosh (1983), 93.
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and, for this discussion, in early New England, had been the source of
anxiety and of ascetic motivation.
3
At this point Mcintosh reconstructs a part of Weber- s model of
rational action. Weber had asserted that action directed at values, or
ultimate ends, finally fails at the level of meaning. 4 This is because
if a saintly person refuses to ever use any questionable means, no
matter what the end, then the saint is obviously willing to give up the
worthiest ends, those which give the saint's life its direction and
meaning. This is simply irresponsible, Weber thinks. But then, notes
Mcintosh, Weber is unwilling to admit that Jesus or St. Francis were
merely intellectually confused about what they wanted. With these men,
says Weber, "this ethic makes sense and expresses a kind of dignity."
So perhaps Weber occasionally thinks that the ethic of utlimate ends
does sometimes work at the level of meaning.
Mcintosh seizes on Weber's term 'expression.' Perhaps the problem
isn't that Jesus' actions are incomprehensible, but that Weber's
instrumental concepts for understanding it are inadequate. Some action
isn't describable in means/ends terms because it is expressive. As
expressive, it still can be judged as more or less rational, but not in
instrumental terms. One might apply this to New England Puritan
asceticism. The Protestant work ethic, Weber often stressed, is closely
3. Mcintosh (1983), 98.
4. Mcintosh (1983), 81-82.
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related to an anxiety over whether or not one is saved
. Weber himself
tried to understand this in instrental terms. Good works in one , s
calling "are a technical means, not of purchasing salvation out of
getting rid of the fear of damnation,' But in an ethically expressive
action, notes Mcintosh, "The worldly activity of such a blessed person
gives a concrete behavioral expression to [the] sanctified state."
ITe ^ttefbuHoef° ethiC ° f WOrldl- —ticism to
thtt h! t u
n achieve worldly success knows in his hearta e has not been saved. He nevertheless continues to endeavorto act well, because that is God's commandment
. if, 0 vsuccess does arrive, this is taken to mean that God has aidedone's efforts and hence that one is a member of the etect Tnemeanrng 1S reflected in the results of the action.
5
In this case there is also an element of interpretation. One
notes a result and then finds an explanation. This, according to
Mcintosh, is in keeping with the nature of magical action, which, as
opposed to scientific predictive rationality, is postdictive.
Mcintosh's second revision of Weber, then, is to add a type of
interpretively rational action. The examples fall into two categories,
ceremonial action and magical action.
Given all this, Mcintosh believes that Calvinism's incredible
ability to motivate action stemmed from its amazing ability to integrate
three modes of action, the practical-instrumental, the ethical-
instrumental (c.f., saving souls), and the ethical expressive; or more
5. Mcintosh (1983), 98-99.
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Precisely, he says these
.odes "a, differentiated, rationalized, and
integrated in the most thoroughgoing fashion." That is, these modes
were not part of a homogeneous social matrix, as in primitive societies,
but analytically separable, with each element consistently developed,
yet made to work as a part of a unit.
Of course, historically we know that the practical-instrumental
mode dominated. Weber notes that as one mode is rationally developed,
it tends to do so at the expense of the other modes in its
configuration; they become less and less rational or underdeveloped. In
the United States these other modes have tended to remain as possible
critics of the rational-instrumental, but they remain unable to sustain
themselves as dominant modes. It might be helpful to follow this story
through some of the organizatinal literature mentioned in this
dissertation.
First of all I noted that the work ethic and the ethical-religious
parted company somewhere around 1775, and certainly after the American
Revolution. Mcintosh recounts this loss of the ethical-expressive in
the following way:
The person who has the reputation for practicing this [the work]
ethic finds ready credit and trusting customers, and so is likely
to succeed. This presupposed a community in which one is known,
personally or by reputation. But as capitalism advances, the
units of economic interaction become larger, and social mobility
within and between such units increases. More and more, one
cannot evaluate in advance the good faith of the person with whom
one is dealing. The result of this situation in which neither
party can rely on the good faith of the other is the proliferation
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At first there was a tight fit between the ethical expressive and
the practical instrumental, but economic expansion and the loss of face-
to-face relations undermined the trust required by expressive
rationality. Consequently ethical behavior became less and less a
guarantor of success.
What I must explain is how it is that as the doctrine of
omnipotence receded, the anxiousness which drove economic expansion in
the Puritan era did not also recede. The answer, it seems to me, is
that we are dealing with a triad. The cosmology and anthropology
associated with omnipotence were still those developed under the sway of
the theodicy problem. Especially in the Newtonian understanding of
nature, and in the anthropology associated with an infinite universe
riddled with scarcity, we can still note that they were first
articulated in response to the God who may as well not be there, since
he provides no clues or direction in His creation. However, though in
the United States worldly success and personal worth remained tightly
connected, once omnipotence receded as the dominant doctrine, they were
never again so close as they had been in Puritan times.
6. Mcintosh (1983), 100.
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lorms
in Mcintosh' 3 terms, in Puritan times institutional n<
Prescribed behavior „hich was believed to be morally good in itself.
But there was »a heavy emphasis on the goal of worldly success in a
situation where the opportunities to achieve such success by good faith
action [were) restricted." This created the possibility of two sorts of
responses. One could continue to accept the culturally defined goal of
worldly success, but precede by unethical or illegal means. Or, one
might reject the goal of worldly success while remaining loyal to the
ethical norms. In the* Tin-it-oHi ne U i ed States thxs meant that one could become
the 'nice guy who finishes last.'
What strategies are available to this nice guy? Mcintosh lists
three ideal typical responses: ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.
Advocates of alternative politics in the United States often in practice
mix these types in various proportions. In this study I am least
interested in rebellion, but will consider variations of the other two.
Such oppositional stances are difficult to sustain because, says
Mcintosh, in religious terms the ethical-expressive relied crucially on
hope, and hope was signified by worldly success. If one gives up
worldly success, hope is also eroded and it is difficult to continue to
act faithfully. In secular terms, in the world around one, lack of
personal success means lack of personal worth. To maintain self-worth
in such a situation would take an exceptional person, "it is difficult
to continue to act worthily if one is convinced that one is worthless."
The ethical-expressive is also in an equivocal position vis-a-vis legal-
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institutional rationality. The ethinyl «Y m cal-expressive must regard the legal
system as either ethlcally meaningless ^ ethicany ^^
1156
"
rStreatiSm
"
r6belli
-'
- " -** 9ive UP on itself in favor
of a ritualistic adherenoa to the letter of the law.
We can see these various strategies being worked out by some of
the people mentioned in this dissertation. ^ong transcendentalists
„e
might think of Henry David Thorean 7 tk.y a in u. Thoreau practices retreatism. m
this we can see that by developing a non-instrumental, and more
expressive, relation to nature hP t-r-io* *=, e ries to formulate a different notion
of success, one more compatible with ethical expressivity. Thoreau-
s
vision of the self arises in this context as not just a haven in a
heartless world, but as a heartful self which inables a heartful world.
I noted in the first chapter that this self has affinities with Kant's
practical philosophy, which I have further specified as self-assertion.
It therefore shares some aspects of the utilitarian culture it opposes,
especially the need to be able to give its notion of worldly success,
and with it personal worth, a worldly form. Transcendentalist
institutions like Brook Farm tried to do this, but with limited success.
Certainly Thoreau himself couldn't have joined the commune, since he
would have been too sceptical that it might become yet another they-
world. At any rate, I found that the next generation of American
intellectuals did not find it satisfying. Politically retreatism was
7. My understanding of Thoreau is indebted to Jane Bennett, "On Being
Native: Thoreau' s Hermeneutics of Self," Polity
, in press.
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unable to respond effectively to somethi„g Uke the slave, problem, and
existentially it was defined too closely as an opposition to Kali street
busyness
Jonathan Baldwin Turner introduced science as an overt strategy
for opposing omnipotence, social hierarchy, traditional college
curricula, and slavery. Scientific farming puts one in touch with a
cosmology of God's causal laws, while traditional farming traps one in
ignorance and destroys the land. Turner hopes, at the level of
theodicy, to integrate cosmic law and human ethics in the intelligible
farmer; an individual in an intellectual community who is materially and
socially successful precisely because he is good, both to others and to
nature. During the times of plague Turner rejected any Aristotelian
receptive ethics, especially as it related to omnipotence, because it
was just too unfair to assume that those stricken deserved their fates.
He does, however, try to retain it to some extent in science. He
rejects any ethical doctrine based on the world as we find it, with its
conservative overtones, and champions instead a scientific doctrine that
the world as we wisely mold it grants success to good people.
All this, however, turns out to require a network of national
organizations: The Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural Extension
Service, the Land Grant College system, not to mention farm lobby
groups. The analysis so far allows us to understand why the first
generation to staff these institutions found them so fulfilling. It was
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that there was finally created a set of institutions which seemed to
reunite the ethical-expressive with the rational-instrumental. But
after a few decades the rational-instrumental had completely taken over
the Department of Agriculture. The Extension Service became the
employer of experts who wrote the pamphlets for farmers who ritually
accepted their conclusions. There was, of course, an encyclopedia
problem. Individual farmers cannot know what "we" know, where "we" is
the community of agricultural scientists. The individual farmer loses
the direct ethico-instrumental link with the cosmos, and experts and
support industries swell within the gap. The farmer may as well be
dealing with omnipotence again.
Turner's attempt, unlike Thoreau's, tried to integrate the
ethical-expressive back into the culture of success. But in a large
extended commercial republic around 1862 this had to mean integrating
the ethical-expressive into the legal-institutional system. But, as
Mcintosh notes, the legal-institutional system, based as it is on
distrust, continually undermines the ethical-expressive. By the late
1980s when farmers lobby for government support on the basis that the
farming way of life is somehow ethically worth saving for its own sake,
other constituencies in the U.S. only hear a crass economic demand
disguised as a principle. Why, they ask, should farming be the only
business in the country which doesn't have to be cost effective?
Farmers themselves have for so long viewed the Department of Agriculture
in an instrumental light that they can offer no rebutal except lobby-
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on and
se this
group pressure. As someone who has belonged to , £arm otganizati
knows the personal capacity for virtue o£ American farmers, I cho
example because it seemed to me that if the ethical-expressive
could be integrated into the legal-institutional system
, it would be in
farming or nowhere.
ever
George William Curtis also worries about the theodioy problem, and
tries to solve it by institutionalizing merit. In this he explicitly
tries to recreate the spirit of the Puritans by attempting to carry
Emerson and Thoreau into the public realm. Curtis introduces civil
service reform as a deliberate check on unethically and illegally
attained success. Again the first generation found working in or with
the Civil Service Commission to be exciting and fulfilling, but in time
the legal-institutional structure would make it unlikely that men like
Curtis would find careers in civil service. Everyone is familiar with
Weber's notions of bureaucratic inflexibility, where action is taken
only because the rules prescibe it.
Thus, scrupulous compliance with formally legal rules constitutes
rj- tlja:l behavior in the strict sense of the term... The difference
between traditional and modern ritualism lies in the source of
authority (traditional versus rational-legal) and the type of
formalism ( "extrinsive" versus "logical")
. In both cases,
compliance with the law is in itself meaningless. It is up to the
actor to endow the action with meaning, i.e., to fit a meaning to
the behavior. As it is developed and rationalized, therefore,
modern formalism becomes more and more an interprtetive
,
and less
and less an instrumental or expressive mode of action.
8
8. Mcintosh (1983), 102.
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This brings me to the „ork of Elton Mayo. „OI„tosh
.entions that
in a for-nal or9a„i Zation like the Western Eiectric piant at Hawthorne,
the formal elerapnt-<! <~*-f „ements of the organizatonal structure undermine its
instrumental element- <? ™ments. This may be srmply because formal rules can
sometimes be inefficient- hut- +->,•6nt
'
b t thls 13 not the interesting case, since
one might simply instate formal rules which are ^^
interesting case results from the informal structures which grow up in
large formal organizatons
.
That is, workers, faced with formal rules
which seem extrinsic to them, respond to them with an interpretive
rationality. Sometimes this rationality enhances the effectiveness of
the organization, but most often it limits it.
The modern large scale bureaucracy presents to the individualsworkmg within it an environment analogous to the natural
environment of members of a primitive society. it is a world ofarbitrary personal, and uncontrollable forces, both meaninglessand inexplicable, to which one must adapt or perish. The solutionis to endow this world with a symbolic meaning which provides aframework of cognitive and motivational orientation for theindividual
.
9
While, in light of Blumenberg's discussions, we may question
whether this situation is primitive or quintessential^ modern, the
point still holds good. The small group interpretations of individuals
within large-scale organizations have a large bearing on not just how
the organization performs, but on whether or not people can think of
themselves as free within them. This also brings up another tension;
that between interpretive rationality and the ethical-expressive. For
9. Mcintosh (1983), 103.
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example I mentioned in an earlier chapter that a manager motivated by
the ethical-expressive may easily be interpreted as trying to use
psychological trickpn; t-^ rr^-i- k' uery to get higher productivity from workers, even
though what the manager reaily wishes is tor higher productivity to be
the expression of honest ethical relations in the plant. From Mayo's
work we would expect people to change their interpretation only if the
new interpretation wouldn't challenge the structure of their current
informal social structure.
Mayo himself tried to bring together the ethical-expressive, the
practical-instrumental, and rational-interpretive in Humanistic
Management. In this, unlike Turner and Curtis, he doesn't have to
invent the legal-institutional system since it is already a given.
Again the trick is to tie economic success to ethics. But what he finds
in the factory is, according to Mcintosh, a modern form of ritualism.
Of course, the "archenemy of ritualism is innovation." Since Mayo's is
a truly innovative approach, it is not surprising that workers
themselves usually put up the strongest resistence to humanistic
management
.
Bureaucratic ritualism thus constitutes a sclerosis of the main
artery of instrumental progress in the modern system:
technological innnovation .... Bureaucratic ritualism is an at least
partly constructive answer to the problem of the meaninglessness
of action which the members of a bureaucracy face. By endowing
action with meaning, bureaucratic ritualism provides the
motivational support necessary to the continued existence and
operation of the organization. 10
10. Mcintosh (1983), 104.
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:s own,
Mayo-
s
attempt targeted bureaucratic ritualism, and correctly
understood that modern instrumental rationality could not, on it,
motivate action. He also noticed that bureaucratic ritualism as it
presently exists is unhealthy both for the organization and for its
members. He sought, therefore to channel interpretive activity in a
more healthy direction. He sought to replace the sick motivations of
the present with the healthy motivations of the future, and he saw quite
clearly that neither the ethical-expressive nor the practical-
instrumental can be maintained for long unless a more adequate
motivational base is found. However, no one would maintain that his
reforms have taken hold in American business. The work of Chris
Argyris, insightful though it is, still shows quite clearly that, as
Weber might say, the institutional-practical is much easier to
rationalize than are either ethical-expressive or interpretive
rationalities
.
Mcintosh notes that Weber's ritual motivation is majical, but
reminds us that magic need not be confined to ritual. Mcintosh takes
things one hierarchical step further. Moving from the modern business
to the modern state, he examines the charismatic and magical basis for
the widespread popular support for modern state authority.il One
problem with Weber's saying that in the modern age everything has become
11. Donald Mcintosh, "The Charisma of Reason: The Magical Basis of
Rational-Legal State Authority," (1986), unpublished manuscript
.
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disenchanted is that Weber also held that t-h« ,n he magrcal was a crucial part
of human motivation. The drying up of enchantment, Weber believed, was
what made the age so spiritless and locked it in its iron cage. Yet
clearly modern capitalism and tne modern state can generate guite a bit
of enthusiasm. These institutions have:
•retained a vigor and adaptibility which can only be accountedfor xf we are to take Weber's theories seriously, by t^
C°U S
contxnued sustaining presence of the magical power of charisma 12
-S
no
The ideal interest which legitimates the modern state i:
nationalism. Mcintosh argues that nationalism is religious; it is "not
the equivalent of religion; it i* a religion in the literal sense of the
word: the belief in and worship of the State as a supernatural power."
To make this clearer Mcintosh repeats his analysis of the expressive and
interpretive componants of magic. The expressive, being concerned with
ethical action is not so interesting in this context where ritual is
longer the center of the discussion.
As a pure type magic seeks not to change the world but to
understand it. It is an interpretive, not a practical, mode of
action, even if we use 'practical' in the broad Kantian sense
which includes ethical and expressive as well as instrumental
action. Prototypically the magician is a seer, not a doer... 13
Magic is a search for meaning, a vital part of human life. Magic
ties into cultural myths, where myth is understood as "an explanatory
12. Mcintosh (1986), 4.
13. Mcintosh (1986) , 8.
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account in narrative fn™ o-f 4-u • .r orm of the orxgxn of the world and humanity, their
current situation, and often their ultimate fate." it is a form of
explanation in which events are explained by referring to the
supernatural powers which must have motivated them.
A viable religion must, in Weber's terms, combine magical with
ethical ideas. Ethics keeps magic from being a mere cult, magic keeps
religion from becoming a secular creed. For a long time the modern
state integrated these two, so that one could think of the state as
furthering the universal interest, or, when with time no one could
believe that anymore, the national interest, or, again with time, the
interests of the elite. But finally in our era the state, especially
its massive power for destruction, can not be said to serve any ethical,
practical, or instrumental ideal. This leaves us wondering why we need
such an awsome presence. How is it that people are actually willing to
die for the modern state?
Mcintosh replies that it is in the means of violence that the
state excersises its magical hold. Modern weapons possess a charisma
and it is the charisma of modern weapons, not their efficiency, which
makes them attractive. The modern state has become, not, as Hobbes
thought, an artificial person, but an actual person; in the same sense
that God is a person. While one might reply to this that persons for
instance die and the state does not, surely in this dissertation I have
shown how and in what sense God also can die. Mayo and Roethlisberger
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found at Hawthorne that wooers often personified the c-pans , much as
modern citizens do their state. The systems of offices and roles tend
to take on a sort of personhood of their own which actually operate in
individual lives the way that a God does. Besides, millions of people
seea, willing to die for their states, and can think of no greater or
more rewarding sacrifice.
Charisma, according to Weber, must be constantly bolstered by
repeated magical acts. The state's use of terror, sayS Mcintosh, is
what fills this requirement. State violence takes the form of war
against foriegn enemies, war against internal enemies, and punishment
for criminal acts; often using torture or other spectacular acts. In
the modern era the cult of the state takes an instrumental turn. This
is again because a religion is a combination of magical and ethical
ideals. The ethic which the modern state espouses is the ethical-
instrumental, or ethic of welfare. As instrumental, this ethic, unlike
expressive ethics, can also be political, and this gives it access to
political violence.
Matters are easier where the ethic is primarily instrumental.
Here it is above all the act of violence which simultaneously
serves the earthly purposes and proves the supernatural powers of
the leader. 14
Viewed this way, the value of the matchlock musket in the 15th
century, did not lay in its supior ability to efficiently kill people
14. Mcintosh (1986) , 29.
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Actually, it wasn't very much more effective thanui ma the crossbow for a
long time. But,
were
sive
e
The French Revolution took major steps in the rationalization of
violence. "The guillotine is a grisly symbol of scientific efficiency
in the administration of death." But nationalism also made the mas
conscripted citizen army possible, and Robespierrie connected the
cultivation of virtue to the excercise of terror. But, "The ultimat
proof of charisma in the Modern era lies in the possession and use of
nuclear weapons."
I find all this makes a certain amount of intuitive sense, and
Mcintosh is not the only one who thinks the modern period is becoming
more and more fixated on rational violence. John Keegan in his The FacP
Of BatMe l6 at one point compares modern battle to modern
mountaineering, and in both places finds how increased technology and
rationalization has led to a more and more severe emphasis on endurance
at the cost of every other virtue; he speaks of "the hard men of the
15. Mcintosh (1986), 31.
16. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985),
304-15.
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•Winter Eiger Direct
,
,
^^ ^ ^^^
filthy, smelly snow holes. "17
Or George W. S
.
Trow, writing in the Ne^rJ^ig finds upon
examining the textual strategies of Harvard University alumni
Publications over the years that at one time the Harvard man was a
mixture of spirit, manners, and toughness. It was this particular
combination which allowed Harvard to be a backwater for American
society, an institution which could shelter something like the Blackrock
Forest from the mainstream utilitarian ethos. After the First World
War, spirit was collapsed into manners, and finally in the 1970s manners
were collapsed into toughness. In this way we get talk of making tough
realistic decisions, but with a rhetorical evocation of spirit and
manners. Everything has been subordinated to toughness; and toughness
says that the Blackrock Forest would be a more lucrative investment if
it were sold. But, of course, this means that Harvard is no longer a
backwater. The distinction between Harvard and all the utilitarian
institutions around it has become rather vague. One would no longer
trust Harvard to care for a forest that one wanted protected.
Thus we find a society which increasingly can motivate itself only
with toughness, hardness, or endurance. These things were always
important components of the American self-image, but now they seem to
17. Keegan, 307.
18. George W. W. Trow, "Annals of Discourse: The Harvard Black Rock
Forest" New Yorker
,
(June 11, 1984), 44.
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-ve beeoa,e dorainant and to have thrown ^ ^^ ^
or virtues which used to temper the,. Kee9an here uould a9ree^
Meintosn ana Weber that there is . reclprocal relation ^
abilit, to rationale a aominant iaeai ana its acceptance. Ciearly it
has been easier to rationale toughness than manners or spirit, sinoe,
as Kee9an points oat, the reiation between toughness ana technoiog, is
so tight.
To the extent all this is true, Mcintosh's thesis of a charismati
violence and of the state as its legitimate wielder ma.es sense. But
what, we must ask, do people find so magioal about violence. Here
Mcintosh refers to Preud's thesis in Ci^iliz^^d^^
that people have sublimated violence in order to live in groups and
nations. Social life demands a taboo on murder, and thus the state
acquires a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.
The charismatic appeal of offic ial violence springs from the factthat civilization requires the renunciation of personal violence,at least most forms of violence against parents, spouse, siblingsand offspring: precisely those towards whom we have the strongest
vrolent impulses. Since one typically identifies with bothpunisher and punished, one can simultaneously have the sadisticpleasure of exercising one's violent impulses and the masochisticpleasure of being punished for having them. These meanings of
course are mostly unconscious
. 19
This is the only place where I would differ with Mcintosh. It
seems to me that Rene Girard's account of the scapegoat mechanism offer:
19. Mcintosh (1986), 30.
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a
-re direot „ay to unders tand the same phenomena
. what McI „tosh
Points to over and over again u the phen_ ^ a cQiiective^
™oioUS drive
' "
tMa^ is • »*y - «orking the meanings and
activation, brought forth by myth into the thoughts and actiQns of
^ra of tne co»nty
, and the magical^ Qf ^^
but the power of the unconscious . "20
For Girard myth and violence are also closely connected; myth is a
coverup of a collective murder. what we find is a collective
which uses scapegoats to take the heat off mimetic and frustrated
desires. Thus the need for violence stems from the social structure of
desire itself; in this case from the dominance of instrumental
rationality, and the technical rationalization of systems of desire. in
this way Girard would keep Mcintosh's relation between violence and the
sacred, between magic and ethics, and between personal frustration and
rationalized violence. The violent enforcement of ethics is a prime
ground to develope something like a scapegoat mechanism.
The source of frustration may be something more mundane than
unconscious drives. The civilization of productivity has by now come up
against numerous physical limits; third world people are not willing to
labor at starvation levels indefinitely, domestic oil reserves are
depleted, the earth's ecology may be unable to withstand unlimited
exploitation, and many people experience the achievement of affluence as
20. Mcintosh (1986), 10
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empty and unrewarding. 21 On top of this I have noted how various
strategies to reintegrate ethics, meaning, and instrumental have all
been at best only partially successful. In Weber's terms,
instrumentalism is by far the easiest of the three to rationalize, and a
rational reintegration of all three would be a tall order indeed. Thus
as instrumental rationality loses its ability to satisfy desire, we at
the same time put more pressure on it than ever to do so. Since
instrumental rationality simply cannot supply what ethics, or spirit, or
manners used to provide, and since material success is still the major
source of self-worth and of hope, I would expect people to be rather
reluctant to question desire itself, and to rather seek the source of
their dissatisfaction in exactly those people who are either the victims
of that desire or who oppose it; the poor, perhaps the rich, third world
peoples, and domestic criminals, that is, anyone who can be accused of
undermining the very foundations of society, or of causing horrendous
ills, and who carries some mark which sets them off as different.
With this slight and friendly revision of Mcintosh I will end my
discussion of the Weberian structure of American organizational reform.
21. William E. Connolly, "Progress, Growth, and Pessimism in America" in
his Politics and Ambiguity (Madison, WI : University of Wisconsin Press,
1987), 42-51.
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1. Conr] ^n
Modern organizaton owes its existence not so muoh to the courage
of Francis Bacon or Galileo, but to the collapse of omnipotence in the
everyday lives of sincere people. It has been the task of this
dissertation to understand how this happened, what it has meant, and
what we might make of it. In pursuit of these things I have explored a
variety of existential situations and organizational reforms,
Philosophical systems and interpretive standpoints, and especially the
characterizations and speculations of Immanuel Kant. This is because it
seems to me that Kant was especially insightful about the nature of
modern freedom and its connection to modern goodness, and about the
necessity and difficulty of trying to sustain them both in an
interdependent world.
In the course of his analysis Kant emphasized a series of themes,
and it is these themes which I have found unify the diverse thinkers in
this dissertation. All agree that the loss of an Aristotelian cosmos,
the separation of theoretical and practical reason, the hope of moral
progress, the rationalization of sensuous desire, and incongruence of
merit and earthly reward are important concerns for an age that seeks to
think of itself as free. All thinkers in this dissertation also agree
that individualist solutions are impractical, but that ethics is also an
unlikely possibility. Kant's attempt to solve these issues has not been
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sucessful, but once we understand what is at stake, we can better
understand why the Kantian answers are so hard to give up.
In line with this, I have also considered some revisions of the
Kantian approach. By developing some features of Kant s thought while
ignoring others one can get such different approaches as those of Hegel
and Kierkegaard, but I also found important Kantian features in
Blumenberg, Heidegger, Foucault, Elton Mayo, and Clint Eastwood.
However, I did not find that any of these approaches could make
Kantianism succeed, rather, their value lay in their ability to
characterize the modern situation and articulate its worst dilemmas.
This finding obviously has not yielded any optimistic political or
organizational program, but such a study of the modern prediciment
cannot help but generate a certain amount of hope.
This is partly because Kantianism has a history. One of the
things I have discovered is that once Kant articulated his philosophy,
it did not sit dogmatically above our thought, but constantly found it
necessary to revise itself until today Kant himself would hardly
recognize it. What this means in practical terms is simply that human
beings, and even theories, are much more wiley than social theorists
used to suppose. As soon as we capture people within our conceptual
webs, we find they have somehow escaped us again; sometimes precisely
because they have believed our theories about themselves. In response
we must revise our theories again and again. This is not to say that
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the discussion of memises above is meant to apply only to text
theories; memesis exists also in existential experience. Yet memisi
a theory can never encompass all the behavior it purports to explain.
At some points it will have to strain itself, and at those points
perhaps we will discover new avenues of inquiry. m other words, what
we don't know may yet help us.
A second avenue of hope lies in the activity of criticism itself.
By learning our limits and their nature, we already make them less
formidable. This is partly because of the subjective experience of the
theorist; it is hard not to occassionally allow oneself to wonder
whether it isn't all just words on paper. But the more serious reason
is that once we have given these things names we already in principle
look to the horizon beyond them. In the process they already begin to
dissolve. This double nature of criticism, that it articulates limits
by becoming less limited, is captured in the following two quotes; the
first by Karsten Harries, and the second by Michel Foucault
.
It has become fashionable to answer the problem of spiritual
dislocation by calling for a return to the life-world or to
ordinary language, suggesting that it is only the philosopher
whose disengaged speculations have let him lose his place in the
world. Such answers are not convincing. Descartes is too much
with us. We have grown too reflective, too free in our thinking
to make this return. Inseparable from this freedom is the desire
to reincarnate the dislocated spirit, the longing for words that
will let us rediscover where we belong and thus defeat that sense
of contingency and arbitrariness which is the other side of
objectivity. And yet, in spite of such longing, we find it
difficult to step out of the Cartesian shadow. And when the
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attempt is made it seems to yield no more than poetry: we areoffered a vacatxon from reality rather than its reveLJon 22
we win
C °nCludVnd t0 Come^ to Kant. I do not know whetherll ever reach mature adulthood. Many things in our
experience convince us that the historical event of theEnlightenment did not make us mature adults, and we have notreached that stage yet. However, it seems to me that a meaningcan be attributed to that critical interrogation of the presetand of ourselves which Kant formulated by reflecting on theEnlightenment. It seems to me that Kant's reflection is even away of philosophizing that has not been without its importance oreffectiveness during the last two centuries. The critical
ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as atheory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge thatis accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos
a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at
'
one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that
are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of goinabeyond them.
This philosophical attitude has to be translated into the
labor of diverse inquiries 1 do not know whether it must be
said today that the critical task still entails faith in
Enlightenment; I continue to think that this task requires work on
our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our impatience
for liberty. 23
22. Karsten Harries, "Metaphor and Transcendence" in Sheldon Sacks,
editor, On Metaphor (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 71-
88.
23. Michel Foucault "What is Enlightenment" in Paul Rabinow, editor, The
Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32-50.
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